Chinese walker

China%26rsquo;s National Audit Office (NAO) recently published a report on the last seven years of efforts to deal with pollution in the Liao, Hai and Huai rivers and the Tai, Chao and Dianchi lakes, known collectively as the %26ldquo;three rivers and three lakes%26rdquo;. According to the report, 91 billion yuan (US$13.3 billion) in government investment and bank loans was spent between 2001 and 2007 on 8,201 separate water-pollution projects, including environmental infrastructure in urban areas in the river and lake basins, ecological construction and general improvements. Yet the water quality remains very poor.

Almost 100 billion yuan were spent and 515 million yuan (US$75 million) were wasted on false reports and embezzlement. The ecological crisis, the public suffering and the constantly changing plans for megacities along these rivers and lakes all make one fear for the future of China%26rsquo;s environment and its cities.

I started researching the pollution of Dianchi Lake, in Yunnan province, as an investigative journalist and later completed a doctoral thesis on the matter, looking at the lake from an ecological and anthropological perspective. I focus on the paradoxes and conceptual risks at the heart of how China handles the ecological crisis %26ndash; in particular, the costs of foresight. The German sociologist Ulrich Beck was the first to propose the concept of the risk society, where decisions increasingly produce unforeseen future hazards. These hazards proliferate and can eventually overwhelm safety systems. A nation may fall into crisis due to a loss of foresight.

The NAO said that management of the rivers and lakes had failed because of inadequacies in these areas: environmental examination and approval; environmental compensation; water pollution statistics; assessment indices; implementation of pollution control plans; enforcement of environmental law; and treatment of urban waste-water. It also pointed to a lack of environmental concern in economic development zones.

But none of these are the crux of the issue. Faced with an unprecedented environmental crisis, the real danger arises from a contradiction between awareness and systems. The systems that exist for managing and investing in the environment perpetuate the pollution.

For instance, the authorities in charge of Dianchi Lake decided to bring water in from the Jinsha River to help control pollution in the lake and water shortages in the city of Kunming. By 2010, Kunming%26rsquo;s population will reach nearly 3.5 million, by 2020 almost five million; the urban area will expand from 201.5 to 470 square kilometres. Meanwhile, Yunnan%26rsquo;s government is working on creating a megacity, one part of which is the idea of a third land bridge between Asia and Europe. This %26ldquo;bridge%26rdquo; would run from China%26rsquo;s eastern port city of Shenzhen, through Kunming to Burma, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Iran and Turkey. It would end up in Rotterdam, in the Netherlands, after passing through 21 different cities %26ndash; a distance of around 15,000 kilometres (3,000 kilometres shorter than the sea route).

Yunnan %26ndash; a water-poor, inland province, with a rich yet fragile ecology %26ndash; has not yet developed an effective or intelligent environmental management system. Nor have policy-makers thought about how to create sustainable cities for the province, preferring to simply propose expansion. Hence long-term plans about land bridges and megacities are unpersuasive.

In dealing with pollution, solving social issues created by urbanisation and searching for sustainable modes of development, there is still a tendency to focus on technological fixes. But these do not clarify our plans for the future of cities or necessarily make them more scientific or advanced %26ndash; in fact, they often continue to create problems.

This lack of foresight means that many areas in need of assistance have become host to manoeuvring by various power groups. There is a tendency to ignore future dangers and confuse their relationships to current pollution problems. In many cases of dealing with pollution, the influence of power is becoming more complex, and the allocation of resources and interests is changing.

A large-scale plan to build a city and scenic area surrounding Dianchi Lake is already underway. Historic villages and semi-urban areas are being flattened. Under that kind of %26ldquo;long-term%26rdquo; guidance, both natural and social sciences need to provide research and analysis. The combination of technology and power in urbanisation will no doubt lead to controversial projects, such as waste incineration, the transportation of water and the construction of clusters of cities.

Dianchi Lake has been given many names through history, from the %26ldquo;Pearl of the Plateau%26rdquo;, to the %26ldquo;Sick Lake%26rdquo; and the %26ldquo;Geneva of the East%26rdquo;. The question is: which one will prove true in the future?

Zhou Lei is a postgraduate anthropology student at Yunnan University and Chevening Scholar at the London School of Economics.

Homepage image from Wikipedia

The Colorado River is one of the most dammed in the world. Over the last two hundred years, fortunes have been made harnessing its flow. But the Colorado%26rsquo;s role in supporting a unique and biodiverse ecosystem for long went unnoticed.

Recently, I was lucky enough to visit the area and see for myself its rivers, mountains, forests, grasslands and snowfields. But what made the greatest impression on me was the contrast between US and Chinese attitudes when it comes to dams and ecology; to development and conservation.

About 50 years ago, people in the United States realised that the country had made a huge blunder; too many dams were causing rivers to dry up, deltas to become deserts, and species to disappear, with many varieties of fish facing extinction. The idea of returning the rivers to nature took hold and, decades of hard work later, we are seeing the results: sluice gates opened according to the needs of fish; some dams demolished; nearby forests, grasslands and wetlands recovering; birds returning to their old haunts; and threatened alligator populations rising.

Unfortunately, the foolish errors made by the United States in the past are still happening in China.

The most important %26ndash; and last %26ndash; endangered fish reserve on the upper reaches of the Yangtze River is soon to be %26ldquo;moved%26rdquo; to allow the building of the Xiaonanhai Dam. Aquatic organisms unique to the river are, one after the other, being sacrificed, and this relocation of the reserve will prove a disaster for biodiversity.

Even more astonishing is a recent announcement by China%26rsquo;s Ministry of Environmental Protection. While construction of two dams on the Jinsha River, a western tributary of the Yangtze River, will cease, work is set to begin on a dam at Liyuan on the same river. This is close to Tiger Leaping Gorge, home to stunning rapids and the stretch of the Jinsha River least affected by humans. The Liyuan reservoir will partially submerge the Haba Snow Mountain nature reserve as well as Jade Dragon Snow Mountain and its celebrated scenery.

China%26rsquo;s rivers, lakes and wetlands are already in a sorry state. Despite the desperate pleas and unstinting efforts of scientists, conservation groups, the public and the media, the interest groups that thirst for profit from the rivers have not been stopped.

Robert Wigington is a freshwater conservation expert at The Nature Conservancy (TNC) and is based in its Colorado office, in the city of Boulder. He says his organisation aims to have one million kilometres of river under protection and flowing freely by 2020.

TNC has 170 river and freshwater experts and runs over 500 river recovery and protection projects worldwide. In the United States, it works with the US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), which is known for building dams, on ecology protection projects around 60 dams of particular importance for biodiversity.

According to Wigington, the Colorado River flows through many different ecosystems during its course from the mountains to the river basin, and is of huge ecological value. It irrigates some 23,000 square kilometres of farmland and provides water for many cities, including Phoenix, Las Vegas, Denver and Salt Lake City. Analysis of its 45 different ecosystems %26ndash; including comparative studies of soil constituents, fish, microorganisms and aquatic plants %26ndash; has shown that, while the upper reaches of the river are well-protected, downstream there are problems.

On the Colorado River, USACE and TNC have removed just one dam, concentrating instead on mimicking natural river flows. This allows fish to breed naturally and ensures the dams can continue to generate electricity and provide water for irrigation.

The next stop on the tour is the Flaming Gorge Dam in Utah. Looking down from the 229-metre high structure, you can see five metres into the clear waters below and watch the huge brown and rainbow trout swimming around. The Green River downstream is said to offer some of the best trout fishing in all of the US. These are not farmed fish and the dam operators are not even allowed to catch them %26ndash; local bylaws state that fishing must take place at least one kilometre downstream of the dam.

John Morgan, an official at the US Bureau of Land Management, tells me about his work to protect the river%26rsquo;s four endangered fish species %26ndash; the bonytail, the Colorado pikeminnow, the humpback chub, and the razorback sucker. Images of these are two a penny in Colorado; found everywhere from newspapers and tourist brochures to restaurants, schools and even the family fridge. Their numbers are seen as a measure of how well the biodiversity of the Colorado River is recovering and they are a major part of the work of TNC%26rsquo;s Colorado office.

On the way to Flaming Gorge, we pass a 20-metre high dam on the Yampa River, which is now defunct. The structure reached the end of its working life years ago and is no longer needed to keep the river navigable, generate electricity or irrigate fields. But in response to TNC pleas, its operators have kept the water flowing to allow fish to pass through. Most importantly, the dam raises the water level downstream every spring in line with scientific advice, allowing fish %26ndash; including those four endangered species %26ndash; to reach their spawning grounds more easily.

The dam is said to have survived because the locals like to see it standing there; it has become a part of the landscape. Plus, it would cost US$2 million (13 million yuan) to dismantle. But, while it has hung on through the dams debate, some now say its days are numbered. One TNC project worker tells me it will be %26ldquo;demolished soon%26rdquo; %26ndash; the costs of maintenance and ensuring it is safe are now as much as the costs of demolition.

The Flaming Gorge Dam was completed in 1964, bringing 50 years of regular flooding to an end. Photos in its exhibition hall record two major inundations that killed dozens and left many more homeless when riverside towns and homes were swept away.

There may have been no floods since the dam was built, but there are a lot less fish. By the 1970s, monitoring data found that the populations of the four endangered species mentioned above had fallen by 99% %26ndash; and the remaining 1% was unsustainable.

According to fish experts, dams cause extinction by blocking routes to spawning grounds. They also create a steady, year-round flow of water, putting an end to the seasonal fluctuations that tell the fish when it is time to reproduce. And, as the waters at the base of a dam are very cold, the fish are forced to swim further to find warm waters in which to spawn.

After the last of these problems was identified in 1978, the way in which water is released at Flaming Gorge began to change, explains Morgan. %26ldquo;We realised we couldn%26rsquo;t just raise the sluice gate and let water out of the bottom of the dam any more, as that water is cold,%26rdquo; he says. %26ldquo;We needed to find a way to give the fish warmer water.%26rdquo;

Their solution was to install three extra gates in the dam, at different heights. During the spring floods, water is released from the top of the reservoir at about 18 degrees centigrade; the natural temperature of the river water and just what mating and spawning fish need.

A document put together by the US Bureau of Reclamation, TNC, and a number of conservation groups, says that water released by the dam in winter should be no colder than 6%26deg; Celsius and, in summer, no colder than 18%26deg; Celsius. Nor should the water released be more than 5%26deg; Celsius colder than the natural river temperature.

The fruits of this strategy are being seen %26ndash; the populations of the four endangered species have clearly increased and other, less endangered species are also benefitting.

China also has a story about endangered fish %26ndash; this time relating to three species %26ndash; but it has a very different ending. When dams were being built on the upper reaches of the Yangtze River, fish experts and conservationists called for efforts to be made to save the Chinese sturgeon, Chinese high fin sucker fish and the Yangtze River dolphin, which are all unique to China. But one advocate for the dams summed up the response: %26ldquo;It%26rsquo;s just three fish! Are there not enough to eat in the fish farms?%26rdquo;

Zhang Kejia is a reporter for China Youth Daily

NEXT: Recognising the value of a nation%26rsquo;s rivers

Homepage image from Wikipedia

Until the 1980s the Mekong River flowed freely for 4,900 kilometres from its 5,100-metre-high source in Tibet to the coast of Vietnam, where it finally poured into the South China Sea. The Mekong is the world%26rsquo;s twelfth longest river, and the eighth or tenth largest, in terms of the 475 billion cubic metres of water it discharges annually. Then and now it passes through or by China, Burma (Myanmar), Laos, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam. It is south-east Asia%26rsquo;s longest river, but 44% of its course is in China, a fact of capital importance for its ecology and the problems associated with its governance.

In 1980 not only were there no dams on its course, but much of the river could not be used for sizeable, long-distance navigation because of the great barrier of the Khone Falls, located just above the border between Cambodia and Laos, and the repeated rapids and obstacles that marked its course in Laos and China. Indeed, no exaggeration is involved in noting that the Mekong%26rsquo;s overall physical configuration in 1980 was remarkably little changed from that existing when it was explored by the French Mekong Expedition that travelled painfully up the river from Vietnam%26rsquo;s Mekong Delta to Jinghong in southern Yunnan in 1866 and 1867. This was the first European expedition to explore the Mekong from southern Vietnam into China and to produce an accurate map of its course to that point.

Since 2003, the most substantial changes to the Mekong%26rsquo;s character below China have related to navigation. Following a major program to clear obstacles from the Mekong begun early in the present decade, a regular navigation service now exists between southern Yunnan and the northern Thai river port of Chiang Saen. It is not clear whether the Chinese, who promoted the concept of these clearances and carried out the work involved, still wish to develop navigation further down the river, as was previously their plan. To date, the environmental effects of the navigation clearances have been of a limited character.

The Mekong plays a vital role in the countries of the Lower Mekong Basin (LMB): Laos, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam. (Burma is not within the basin). In all four LMB countries the Mekong is a source of irrigation. In Vietnam%26rsquo;s Mekong Delta the annual pattern of flood and retreat insure that this region contributes over 50% of agriculture%26rsquo;s contribution to the country%26rsquo;s GDP. For all four LMB countries the Mekong and its associated systems, particularly Cambodia%26rsquo;s Great Lake (Tonle Sap), are a bountiful source of fish, with the annual value of the catch conservatively valued at US$2 billion. More than 70% of the Cambodian population%26rsquo;s annual animal protein consumption comes from the river%26rsquo;s fish. Eighty per cent of the Mekong%26rsquo;s fish species are migratory, some travelling many hundreds of kilometres between spawning and reaching adulthood. Overall, eight out of 10 persons living in the LMB depend on the river for sustenance, either in terms of wild fish captured in the river or through both large and small-scale agriculture and horticulture.

Since the 1980s, the character of the river has been steadily transformed by China%26rsquo;s dam-building program in Yunnan province. The important changes that had taken place on the course of the river since 1980 and up to 2004 were outlined in the Lowy Institute Paper, River at Risk: The Mekong and the Water Politics of Southeast Asia. In 2010 three hydroelectric dams are already in operation and two more very large dams are under construction and due for completion in 2012 and 2017. Plans exist for at least two further dams, and by 2030 there could be a %26ldquo;cascade%26rdquo; of seven dams in Yunnan. Even before that date and with five dams commissioned, China will be able to regulate the flow of the river, reducing the floods of the wet season and raising the level of the river during the dry. In building its dams, China has acted without consulting its downstream neighbours. Although until now the effects of the dams so far built have been limited, this is set to change within a decade, as discussed below.

For despite the limited environmental costs of the dams China has so far completed, and of the river clearances to aid navigation, this state of affairs will change once China has five dams in operation. And the costs exacted by the Chinese dams will be magnified if the proposed mainstream dams below China are built.

Even if no dams are built on the mainstream below China, the cascade to which it is committed will ultimately have serious effects on the functioning of the Mekong once the dams are used to control the river%26rsquo;s flow. This will be the case because the cascade will:

* Alter the hydrology of the river and so the current %26ldquo;flood pulse%26rdquo;, the regular rise and fall of the river on an annual basis which plays an essential part in the timing of spawning and the migration pattern. This will be particularly important in relation to the Tonle Sap in Cambodia, but will have an effect throughout the river%26rsquo;s course;

* Block the flow of sediment down the river which plays a vital part both in depositing nutrients on the agricultural regions flooded by the river and also as a trigger for fish migration %26mdash; at present well over 50% of the river%26rsquo;s sediment comes from China;

* At least initially cause problems by restricting the amount of flooding that takes place most importantly in Cambodia and Vietnam; and

* Lead to the erosion of river banks.

Proposed dams below China

So China%26rsquo;s dam-building plans are worrying enough, but the proposed new mainstream dams would pose even more serious concerns. In contrast to what has occurred in China, and until very recently, there have been no firm plans for the construction of dams on the mainstream of the Mekong below China. This situation has changed over the past three years. Memoranda of Understanding have been signed for 11 proposed dams: seven in Laos; two between Laos and Thailand; and two in Cambodia. The proposed dams are being backed by foreign private capital or Chinese state-backed firms. Government secrecy in both Cambodia and Laos means that it is difficult to judge which, if any, of these proposed dams will actually come into being. Attention and concern have focused on two sites: Don Sahong at the Khone Falls in southern Laos and Sambor in north-eastern Cambodia. The reason for this attention is that if built these dams would block the fish migrations that are essential to insure the food supplies of Laos and Cambodia.

Those built at sites higher upstream would cause the least damage to fish stocks, but if, as currently seems possible, the most likely dams to be built would be at Don Sahong and Sambor, the costs to fish stocks could be very serious. This is because unanimous expert opinion judges that there are no ways to mitigate the blocking of fish migration that would occur if these dams are constructed. None of the suggested possible forms of mitigation %26mdash; fish ladders, fish lifts, and alternative fish-passages %26mdash; are feasible for the species of fish in the Mekong and the very large biomass that is involved in their migratory pattern. Fish ladders were tried and failed at the Pak Mun dam on one of the Mekong%26rsquo;s tributaries in Thailand in the 1990s.

Why are the governments of Laos and Cambodia contemplating the construction of dams that seem certain to have a devastating effect on their populations%26rsquo; food security? The answers are complex and include some of the following:

* A lack of knowledge at some levels of government;

* A readiness to disregard available information on the basis that it may be inaccurate; and

* A belief or conviction that fishing is %26ldquo;old-fashioned%26rdquo;, whereas the production of hydroelectricity is %26ldquo;modern%26rdquo;.

In Cambodia%26rsquo;s case, and in particular in relation to the proposed dam at Sambor, the fact that a Chinese firm is seeking to construct the dam raises the possibility that prime minister Hun Sen is unready to offend the country that has become Cambodia%26rsquo;s largest aid donor and Cambodia%26rsquo;s %26ldquo;most trusted friend%26rdquo;. In Laos, the proposal for a dam at Don Sahong is very much linked to the interests of the Siphandone family for whom southern Laos is a virtual fief. Of all the proposed dam sites, Don Sahong is the most studied in terms of knowledge of fisheries so that it can be safely said that the planned dam would wreak havoc on a migratory system that involves fish moving through the Hou Sahong channel throughout the year, movement that takes place in both directions, upstream and downstream.

In the face of the threats posed by both the Chinese dams and those proposed for the downstream stretches of the river, there is no existing body able to mandate or control what individual countries choose to do on their sections of the Mekong. The agreement establishing the Mekong River Commission (MRC) in 1995 does not include China or Burma, and though the latter%26rsquo;s absence is not important, the fact that China is not an MRC member underlines the body%26rsquo;s weakness. In any event, the MRC members%26rsquo; commitment to maintaining the Mekong%26rsquo;s sustainability has not overcome their basic commitment to national self-interest. A prime example of this is the manner in which the Lao government has proceeded in relation to the proposed Don Sahong dam. For at least two years while the dam was under consideration there was no consultation with Cambodia. Similarly, so far as can be judged, Cambodia%26rsquo;s consideration of a possible dam at Sambor has taken place without consultation with the governments of either Laos or Vietnam.

At the moment the best hope is that both the Cambodian and Lao governments will abandon their plans for Sambor and Don Sahong. If they do not, the future of the Mekong as a great source of food, both through fish and agriculture, is in serious jeopardy. At the time of writing the intentions of the Lao and Cambodian governments remain uncertain.

Concern about dams in China and the LMB is given added importance in the light of worries associated with the likely effects of climate change in the region through which the river flows. Research suggests there will be a series of challenges to the Mekong%26rsquo;s future ecological health. Until recently concerns about the likely impact of climate change tended to focus on the ongoing reduction in the size of the glaciers from which its springs in the Himalayas and which feed it as the result of snow melt. But while there is no doubt that a diminishment in size of the glaciers feeding the Mekong is taking place, recent research has suggested that a more immediate serious threat to the river%26rsquo;s health will come from sea-level changes, particularly as rising levels could begin to inundate large sections of Vietnam%26rsquo;s Mekong Delta. To what extent the threat posed by rising sea levels will be affected by another predicted development linked to climate change %26mdash; greatly increased precipitation leading to more flooding during the wet season %26mdash; is not yet clearly established. But research is pointing to a greatly increased precipitation that is likely to cause major increases in flooding in the future, possibly as early as 2030.

Against the pessimistic views outlined in this article perhaps the best that can be hoped for is that once serious consequences begin to become apparent advice can be offered to mitigate the worst effects of the developments taking place. Where once it was appropriate to write of risks, when assessing the Mekong%26rsquo;s future it is now time to write of fundamental threats to the river%26rsquo;s current and vital role in all of the countries of the Lower Mekong Basin.

Milton Osborne is visiting fellow at the Lowy Institute. He has been associated with the south-east Asian region since being posted to the Australian embassy in Phnom Penh in 1959. Osborne is the author of 10 books on the history and politics of south-east Asia, including The Mekong: turbulent past, uncertain future (2006) and Southeast Asia: an introductory history.

An earlier version of this article was published as %26quot;The Mekong River Under Threat,%26quot; The Asia-Pacific Journal, 2-2-10, January 11, 2010. It is used here with permission.

This article draws on the author%26rsquo;s Lowy Institute Paper 27, 2009. See the complete paper here. To read the complete paper, it is necessary to type in the current year after entering the site.

Homepage image shows the proposed location of the Sambor Dam, Kratie province, Cambodia. Photograph by Carl Middleton, International Rivers.

Greenpeace recently discovered genetically modified (GM) ingredient Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) in Nestl%26eacute;-branded baby cereal in China. According to the organisation, Nestl%26eacute; has promised not to use GM ingredients in the European Union, Australia, Russia and Brazil, but has different standards in China, where it refuses to make the same commitment. Its report has sparked off another round of public debate over the safety of GM food.

The Chinese authorities are pushing ahead with research into, and application of, GM technology. Many experts believe its benefits outweigh any harm it may cause, describing the changes as a %26ldquo;second green revolution%26rdquo; that will ensure food security. Faced with this blind optimism, I find I must protest. Besides the potential impact on ecosystems and food safety, I fear that the large scale planting of GM crops, particularly those controlled by multinationals, will affect China%26rsquo;s food sovereignty and even food security. Poorly managed, it may rock the very foundations of China%26rsquo;s ability to feed itself. A look at agriculture in Argentina will illustrate.

Until 1996, traditional agriculture in Argentina provided food security for the nation, with no need for government subsidy. But the introduction of GM soya beans has virtually destroyed the industry. Fields used for growing lentils, peas and mung beans have been turned over wholesale to GM soya-bean production. Crops from Monsanto, an agriculture biotech company based in the United States, accounted for 99% of soya bean production in Argentina by 2002. The country%26rsquo;s unthinking adoption of foreign inventions meant it ignored the need to develop its own technology and, by the time it woke up to the threat to its own food security, it was too late to stop using Monsanto%26rsquo;s crops.

In fact, the widespread use of GM crops did not, as experts imagined, cut down on the use of pesticides and herbicides and improve rural environments; quite the opposite. GM soya-bean crops actually need special treatment; besides the usual liberal quantities of chemicals and fertiliser, a weed-killer named Roundup is used. This chemical treats wild plants and even other crops as weeds, leaving only the biotech firm%26rsquo;s own soya-bean plants alive. Roundup killed off Argentina%26rsquo;s other crops and, according to some, caused mutations in livestock. In humans, long-term contact with the chemical has also been found to causes health problems, including nausea, diarrhoea, vomiting and skin damage.

Argentina is the proof that multinational biotech firms can cause a nation to lose its food sovereignty. But this has not halted the advance of such firms; rather, they are continuing their global expansion. For long, Brazil resisted GM technology but the companies have allegedly bought off officials, planted large areas with GM crops and put pressure on government. Today, traditional agriculture in Brazil is under immediate threat.

Having conquered Argentina and Brazil, the GM giants started their attack on China%26rsquo;s farming sector, where there are huge profits to be made. The US Department of Agriculture supports the overseas expansion of biotech firms such as Monsanto and DuPont and even helps promote their products in countries including China, where they claim their %26ldquo;Roundup Ready 2%26rdquo; will increase harvests by up to 11%. In the second quarter of 2009, Monsanto%26rsquo;s sales income reached US$4 billion (27 billion yuan), up 8% year-on-year. Gross profits were US$2.5 billion (17.1 billion yuan), up 14% on the previous year.

Huge quantities of GM seeds have %26ldquo;invaded%26rdquo; China, causing great damage to local agriculture. China is the largest market for US soya-bean exports and, according to an industry website, imported 15.4 million tonnes of GM-soya beans in 2008 %26ndash; 41% of total imports. Meanwhile, higher costs mean domestic soya-bean crops fail to sell. Last year non-GM soya-bean crops in Heilongjiang, in north-east China, were selling for less than the cost of planting, and 40% of the harvest did not sell at all. Sixty-eight soya-bean processing firms in the province have ceased work, while supermarkets in provincial capital Harbin stock GM-soya bean products almost exclusively.

Once the United States has control of China%26rsquo;s staple foods, China will have little say in the matter. The GM seeds imported by China are planting problems for the future. But the GM giants%26rsquo; ambitions do not stop with the seeds %26ndash; it is China%26rsquo;s 1.2 million square kilometres of farmland that gets them excited. If they can extract a few extra yuan for each kilogram of seeds sold, there will be hundreds of millions of US dollars in profit to be made, even before they start selling the associated chemicals, pesticides, fertilisers and herbicides.

This is another Opium War; an expropriation taking place behind a high-technology smokescreen. The GM giants estimate that, by 2012, the agricultural biotechnology market will allow them to take home US$7.3 billion to US$7.5 billion (49.8 billion yuan to 51.2 billion yuan), leaving China with the ecosystem and food security risks inherent in an addiction to a %26ldquo;new opium%26rdquo;.

So what should China do? The government has already invested 26 billion yuan (US$3.8 billion) in attempting to keep up with US biotech firms but this does not get to the root of the problem. The real threat to food security is not in the seeds, but in the people. Cheap grain prices and high production costs mean that farmers abandon their fields for urban jobs; that is the real threat to food security. When frost, drought and pest-resistant GM seeds appear on the market, farmers are naturally happy to spend a little extra to save some work. But, even if yields increase in line with expert predictions, there will still only be an extra US$6 (41 yuan) of income per 667 square metres of rice. There will be no great changes in food production and we will have paid the licensing fees for nothing.

China has always been an agricultural nation; a state built on the soil, by the farmers. Increasing food production requires restoration of degraded land, the recirculation of nutrients, better ecological balance and increased incomes for farmers, who will then grow more crops. If we ignore these facts and blindly adopt GM technology, we are simply giving up our food sovereignty. We need to learn lessons from Argentina and Brazil and be alert to the dangers of %26ldquo;biological invasion%26rdquo; by the GM giants.

Jiang Gaoming is a professor and PhD tutor at the Chinese Academy of Sciences’ Institute of Botany. He is also vice secretary-general of China Society of Biological Conservation and board member of China Environmental Culture Promotion Association.

Homepage image by DawnOne

In Japan, the government has only recently reached the point where it is finally willing to recognise the causal relationship between reservoirs and landslides.

The Ōtaki Dam in southern Honshu was completed in 1977 after more than two decades of construction, the expenditure of 23 billion yen (US$251million), and the relocation of 475 homes. After years of delay, workers began to fill the reservoir up with water in March 2003.

The following month, a slope to the right of the dam in an area known as Shiroya began to creep downward. %26ldquo;In the middle of the village, a crack appeared in the ground, and it was clear that it was very deep,%26rdquo; says president of the neighbourhood community association, 75-year old Isaka Kanshiro.

Isaka recalls that, before the dam was constructed, the government determined that the area was in danger of landslides and researchers recommended that all the households in the village be moved to a safe location.

But this did not happen. %26ldquo;Government officials decided that the village did not need to be moved if certain measures were taken to prevent the land from sliding,%26rdquo; says Isaka. %26ldquo;But once they began to design the dam, they decided that it would be okay and simply drove some piles into the ground at a depth of 20 metres. This was like beating the air. When they started filling up the reservoir and the water level rose, of course the land slid.%26rdquo;

Soon afterwards, the construction ministry, now part of the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, recognised that the dammed water was the cause of the landslide. In May 2003, it created a committee to investigate the fissure in the Shiroya area, which cited other examples of reservoirs triggering landslides such as Ōdo Dam, on the southern Japanese island of Shikoku in 1982 and Vajont Dam in Italy in 1963. The Construction Ministry was clearly aware of dam-caused landslides.

There is evidence in parliamentary records that the government knew about the danger of landslides at Ōtaki Dam. During a session of the Lower House Budget Committee in March 1990, questions were raised about sections of a local soil survey report that indicated there was a possibility of landslides.

Even though Italian engineers were aware there was a danger of a mountain collapsing into a newly-created reservoir behind the Vajont Dam, once the dam was completed and the reservoir filled, a massive landslide occurred, creating a tsunami that swept downstream and took the lives of 2,000 people. Likewise, the damage at Shiroya happened because the government ignored survey results and the concerns of residents and concentrated on cutting costs while continuing to push forward the project.

MLIT has now emptied the reservoir and is carrying out projects to prevent further landslides. Truly, the criticism that public works projects are %26ldquo;born small but grow huge%26rdquo; aptly fits landslide prevention measures. In August 2008, the government amended its dam legislation, extending construction projects to 2012, and allocating funds of 364 billion yen (US$4 billion). Projects that were supposed to take 15 years will now take half a century and cost 16 times more than originally expected.

Landslide prevention measures at JWA%26rsquo;s Takizawa Dam in central Honshu have continued for three years. The first landslide occurred on November 2, 2005. The previous month, while the reservoir was being filled, a slope 1.5 kilometres above the dam shifted one centimetre and fissures appeared in four separate spots. Landslide prevention procedures were conducted for nine months at a cost of 3 billion yen (US$32.8 million).

In August 2006, soon after those measures completed, workers began to fill the reservoir again. In May 2007, the slope right next to the one that had been strengthened collapsed. Half a month later, the slope %26mdash; now 90 metres wide, 27 metres deep, and 15 metres long %26mdash; slid further. JWA had taken preventative measures in no less than 40 different places. Yet this was insufficient.

Prevention measures continued and, in August 2007, another attempt was made to fill the reservoir. This time, workers were able to fill it to capacity but, as they began to lower the water in April 2008, a crack was discovered in a city road near the reservoir bank. As the water level continued to decline, other fissures appeared. Even when the water level was maintained, the land continued to slump. It was an obvious disaster.

Could this all have been avoided? A JWA official reported: %26ldquo;In November 2003, a public works committee at the Kanto Region Development Bureau evaluated the cost-benefit of the landslide prevention measures and recommended that we %26lsquo;continue%26rsquo;. We did not arrive at this decision internally.%26rdquo; But an investigation of the committee%26rsquo;s minutes reveals that there was not a single geologist among its 12 members. No one takes responsibility, no one makes rational decisions and tax monies continue to be wasted.

There may be nothing as perverse as building a dam in an area that you know is susceptible to landslides. Japan%26rsquo;s Landslide Prevention Law places limits on %26ldquo;increasing, attracting, or retaining ground water%26rdquo; above areas deemed vulnerable to landslides. Dams constructed in such areas present a stark violation of this law. One example of this is the JWA%26rsquo;s Shimokubo Dam on the Kanna River, the westernmost branch of the Tone River.

Just below the dam is an area that was designated a protected zone in 1962 because landslides had occurred there in 1910, 1938, and 1947. Despite this, the Shimokubo Dam was constructed there in 1968.

About two years after the dam was completed in 1991, a concentrated downpour triggered a huge landslide, which destroyed 40 homes. Cracks and bumps appeared in other houses and roads. A motorway was completely closed for six days, and one lane was closed for a further 565 days. The following year, heavy rains intensified the landslide problems and, in 1995, the area was declared one of 12 %26ldquo;landslide zones under direct control of the central government%26rdquo;.

These problems have transformed the area into one of the country%26rsquo;s largest public works projects, currently expected to complete in 2025 and to cost 38 billion yen (US$415 million). Though the project is under central government control, the prefecture is expected to bear one-third of the cost.

What is the relationship between the dam and the landslides? The hypothesis that the reservoir, which seeps into the groundwater causing its level to rise, is a contributing factor seems reasonable. However, officials are unwilling even to investigate this relationship. Planning officials at the Kanto Region Development Bureau appear to have been unaware that a landslide zone under the direct control of the central government lay just below the Shimokubo Dam. Perhaps they would like to deny any relationship between the dam and landslides, but they should at least investigate the possibility and the risks involved.

Even as questions about the possibility of landslides go unanswered, the Asakawa Dam in central Honshu %26ndash; a venture that was once cancelled %26ndash; is moving ahead. The site of the project is on the south-west side of the one-time volcano Mount Iizuna, located between the epicentre of the 7.4 magnitude Zenkoji Earthquake, which rocked the area in 1847, and the Mount Chizuki Landslide, that occurred in July 1985. All three locations lie on the western edge of the Nagano Basin, where volcanic tuff is widely distributed.

One of the first people to realise the danger of the Asakawa Dam was Uchiyama Takurō, who was forced to relocate his house by the Chizuki Landslide from a hill on the right side of the Asakawa River to one on the left side. He decided to build a pond on his new property, but was told that he could not because the area was susceptible to landslides. Why then, he wondered, is a dam being planned in this area? After investigating, Uchiyama discovered workers had been drilling bore samples for twenty years and had failed to find a site that was appropriate for a dam.

Suddenly, however, the project began to accelerate. In preparation for the 1998 Nagano Winter Olympics, the prefecture decided it needed a road to replace a toll road that had been devastated by the Chizuki Landslide. The prefecture, which was short of money, combined the road with the Asakawa dam project as a last ditch measure to obtain additional funding. In this way, the dam project was restarted.

In 2000, Uchiyama led newly-elected prefectural governor Tanaka Yasuo on a tour of the dam site. He informed him that the current location was the fourth or fifth that had been proposed and that it had initially been abandoned as inadequate. By the end of the day, Tanaka had decided to pull the plug on the project.

But in June 2007, a number of prefectural assembly members suggested that another investigation be conducted into the geology of the proposed site. In response, the director of the construction department declared that %26ldquo;sufficient surveys had been conducted%26rdquo; and that the prefecture would proceed %26ldquo;using the best designs and workmanship%26rdquo;. Such statements have been heard before in the cases of the Ōtaki Dam and the Takizawa Dam.

When dams are constructed in areas with volcanic geology or that have been designated as landslide prevention areas, they often lead to serious human and economic costs. When will the government learn from all these examples that %26ldquo;using the best designs%26rdquo; will not be enough? Just what will it take for officials to cancel dangerous dam projects?

Masano Atsuko is a journalist specialising in environmental issues.

An earlier version of this article appeared in Sekai in December 2008 and was later published as %26ldquo;The Immense Cost of Japanese Dams and Dam-related Landslides and Earthquakes,%26rdquo; The Asia-Pacific Journal, 1-2-10, January 4, 2010, translated from Japanese into English by Aaron Skabelund. It is used here with permission.

Homepage image shows one of the many landslides triggered by the Iwate-Miyagi Nairuku Earthquake, which struck northern Honshu in June 2008.

The history of the forced removal of the Lakota Sioux from their lands, while it seems to have happened long ago, is vibrantly alive for the Indians living on the reservation today. Many of them can tell stories of how their parents were sent to faraway boarding schools and taught that their culture was inferior. The ban on Lakota culture and language was lifted only in 1971, well within the memory of many living adults.

The profound cultural trauma that these people have experienced has left many of them deeply hopeless and without a clear sense of their own future or destiny as a nation. Everywhere I went during a week I spent on the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation, I heard again the stories of the treaty of 1868, of the massacre at Wounded Knee, and of the theft of the sacred Black Hills which are held to be the origin of the Lakota people. I experienced the profound mistrust of outsiders, particularly white people. And I witnessed among some residents a sense of defeat far more profound than any I have observed in all my travels in less developed countries throughout the world.

On the reservation today, the only truly successful business is a gambling casino called Prairie Winds (Native Americans are exempt from state prohibitions on organised gambling). Unfortunately, but not surprisingly, many of those who lose money are themselves Native Americans. There is talk of developing wind power; so far these conversations have not led to substantial results. While there is also talk of oil and mineral resources, the Indians will not permit the sacred lands to be scarred with mines, and in a case of %26ldquo;environmental injustice%26rdquo;, new uranium mines off the reservation threaten to taint downstream Indian rivers with radioactive materials.

There are signs of hope, but these are few: two Native American brothers have been appointed to lead the Badlands National Park and Mount Rushmore. An image of the great Indian warrior Crazy Horse is being carved a few miles away from the images of the US presidents. A sacred Black Hills mountain, Bear Butte, is being closed to non-Indians during times when rituals are most important, although its peace is also gravely threatened by the opening of a nearby rifle range, and the bars, campgrounds, and concert venues have greatly offended the local tribes.

A college, the Oglala Lakota College, has been opened on the reservation, where it offers advanced degrees in Lakota studies, nursing, business, information science, social work and other relevant fields. A %26ldquo;Lakotafund%26rdquo; has been created to extend micro-credit to small businesses such as beadwork and other traditional handicrafts. Some who have left the reservation to pursue advanced degrees and learn skills in other parts of the country have returned to try to make a contribution back home.

Meanwhile, in Washington, DC, the National Museum of the American Indian, established in 1989 by an act of Congress in an effort to acknowledge the great wrong of our history, is managed by Native Americans, whose greatest desire is to convey the message that %26ldquo;we%26rsquo;re still here%26rdquo;. Whether the US president, Barack Obama, will encourage Congress to revisit the great question of ownership of the Black Hills, and whether there are symbolic measures that could be taken to help move the Sioux nation toward healing, remains to be seen.

What, then, are we to take as lessons from this horrific story, and what might be relevant for Chinese policy makers today? First, it is worth reflecting on the relationship between resources, land, nation-building, and power %26ndash; and reflecting seriously on the question of how to build a strong, prosperous nation while safeguarding justice for all citizens. Sometimes rigorous introspection and honesty may be required to discover whether one is using cultural superiority and stereotyping as a way to rationalise the seizure of other people%26rsquo;s land. In this case, resource extraction was a primary motivation for seizing Indians%26rsquo; land, but it was often cloaked in rhetoric about doing what was best for the Indians.

Second, good intentions can sometimes be highly destructive. The American missionaries and civilisers truly believed that in forbidding the use of Lakota language and the practice of Lakota customs they were doing the right thing %26ndash; even, perhaps, saving the Indians%26rsquo; %26ldquo;souls%26rdquo; and allowing them to find a place in heaven by converting them to Christianity. However, the deprivation of identity and pride has turned out to be devastating for the native people, who are now trying to recover some of their traditions by reviving rituals such as the Sun Dance and to re-learn their language in native-run schools.

Third, modern technologies such as the gun, the road and the railroad, and foreign diseases such as smallpox, were highly destructive to the native peoples, and created an %26ldquo;uneven playing field%26rdquo; such that the native peoples had little chance of preserving their way of life. As environmental historians such as Jared Diamond and Alfred Crosby teach us, the outcome of this sort of clash of cultures can be determined as much by technology, disease and introduced species as by more conventional measures of military superiority.

Fourth, one of the high prices of civilisation and resource extraction is often environmental degradation and ecosystem transformation. Instead of the buffalo, passenger pigeon and tall grass prairie, the central United States saw desertification and dust storms, especially in the 1920s, a heavy and enduring price to pay for our overly enthusiastic grazing and farming practices.

Finally, indigenous peoples%26rsquo; knowledge, while often not expressed in ways that modern %26ldquo;science%26rdquo; can hear and respect, nonetheless often can point the way toward more sustainable relationships with the land. Although some have warned against romanticising Native American wisdom and called %26ldquo;the ecological Indian%26rdquo; a myth, it is undeniable that the Sioux elders predicted that in the wasteful and over-consuming way of the white man lay ecological disaster.

I hope that this cautionary tale of the Pine Ridge Sioux provides fruit for reflection and discussion. Although there are obviously great historical differences between the United States and China, we have much to learn from each other, especially at this time when the gaps in our economic and social development are decreasing and we are coming more and more to resemble each other.

Judith Shapiro is director of the Natural Resources and Sustainable Development MA Program at the School of International Service, American University, Washington DC.

Homepage image by Serge Van Cauwenbergh

China%26rsquo;s National Audit Office (NAO) recently published a report on the last seven years of efforts to deal with pollution in the Liao, Hai and Huai rivers and the Tai, Chao and Dianchi lakes, known collectively as the %26ldquo;three rivers and three lakes%26rdquo;. According to the report, 91 billion yuan (US$13.3 billion) in government investment and bank loans was spent between 2001 and 2007 on 8,201 separate water-pollution projects, including environmental infrastructure in urban areas in the river and lake basins, ecological construction and general improvements. Yet the water quality remains very poor.

Almost 100 billion yuan were spent and 515 million yuan (US$75 million) were wasted on false reports and embezzlement. The ecological crisis, the public suffering and the constantly changing plans for megacities along these rivers and lakes all make one fear for the future of China%26rsquo;s environment and its cities.

I started researching the pollution of Dianchi Lake, in Yunnan province, as an investigative journalist and later completed a doctoral thesis on the matter, looking at the lake from an ecological and anthropological perspective. I focus on the paradoxes and conceptual risks at the heart of how China handles the ecological crisis %26ndash; in particular, the costs of foresight. The German sociologist Ulrich Beck was the first to propose the concept of the risk society, where decisions increasingly produce unforeseen future hazards. These hazards proliferate and can eventually overwhelm safety systems. A nation may fall into crisis due to a loss of foresight.

The NAO said that management of the rivers and lakes had failed because of inadequacies in these areas: environmental examination and approval; environmental compensation; water pollution statistics; assessment indices; implementation of pollution control plans; enforcement of environmental law; and treatment of urban waste-water. It also pointed to a lack of environmental concern in economic development zones.

But none of these are the crux of the issue. Faced with an unprecedented environmental crisis, the real danger arises from a contradiction between awareness and systems. The systems that exist for managing and investing in the environment perpetuate the pollution.

For instance, the authorities in charge of Dianchi Lake decided to bring water in from the Jinsha River to help control pollution in the lake and water shortages in the city of Kunming. By 2010, Kunming%26rsquo;s population will reach nearly 3.5 million, by 2020 almost five million; the urban area will expand from 201.5 to 470 square kilometres. Meanwhile, Yunnan%26rsquo;s government is working on creating a megacity, one part of which is the idea of a third land bridge between Asia and Europe. This %26ldquo;bridge%26rdquo; would run from China%26rsquo;s eastern port city of Shenzhen, through Kunming to Burma, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Iran and Turkey. It would end up in Rotterdam, in the Netherlands, after passing through 21 different cities %26ndash; a distance of around 15,000 kilometres (3,000 kilometres shorter than the sea route).

Yunnan %26ndash; a water-poor, inland province, with a rich yet fragile ecology %26ndash; has not yet developed an effective or intelligent environmental management system. Nor have policy-makers thought about how to create sustainable cities for the province, preferring to simply propose expansion. Hence long-term plans about land bridges and megacities are unpersuasive.

In dealing with pollution, solving social issues created by urbanisation and searching for sustainable modes of development, there is still a tendency to focus on technological fixes. But these do not clarify our plans for the future of cities or necessarily make them more scientific or advanced %26ndash; in fact, they often continue to create problems.

This lack of foresight means that many areas in need of assistance have become host to manoeuvring by various power groups. There is a tendency to ignore future dangers and confuse their relationships to current pollution problems. In many cases of dealing with pollution, the influence of power is becoming more complex, and the allocation of resources and interests is changing.

A large-scale plan to build a city and scenic area surrounding Dianchi Lake is already underway. Historic villages and semi-urban areas are being flattened. Under that kind of %26ldquo;long-term%26rdquo; guidance, both natural and social sciences need to provide research and analysis. The combination of technology and power in urbanisation will no doubt lead to controversial projects, such as waste incineration, the transportation of water and the construction of clusters of cities.

Dianchi Lake has been given many names through history, from the %26ldquo;Pearl of the Plateau%26rdquo;, to the %26ldquo;Sick Lake%26rdquo; and the %26ldquo;Geneva of the East%26rdquo;. The question is: which one will prove true in the future?

Zhou Lei is a postgraduate anthropology student at Yunnan University and Chevening Scholar at the London School of Economics.

Homepage image from Wikipedia

The Colorado River is one of the most dammed in the world. Over the last two hundred years, fortunes have been made harnessing its flow. But the Colorado%26rsquo;s role in supporting a unique and biodiverse ecosystem for long went unnoticed.

Recently, I was lucky enough to visit the area and see for myself its rivers, mountains, forests, grasslands and snowfields. But what made the greatest impression on me was the contrast between US and Chinese attitudes when it comes to dams and ecology; to development and conservation.

About 50 years ago, people in the United States realised that the country had made a huge blunder; too many dams were causing rivers to dry up, deltas to become deserts, and species to disappear, with many varieties of fish facing extinction. The idea of returning the rivers to nature took hold and, decades of hard work later, we are seeing the results: sluice gates opened according to the needs of fish; some dams demolished; nearby forests, grasslands and wetlands recovering; birds returning to their old haunts; and threatened alligator populations rising.

Unfortunately, the foolish errors made by the United States in the past are still happening in China.

The most important %26ndash; and last %26ndash; endangered fish reserve on the upper reaches of the Yangtze River is soon to be %26ldquo;moved%26rdquo; to allow the building of the Xiaonanhai Dam. Aquatic organisms unique to the river are, one after the other, being sacrificed, and this relocation of the reserve will prove a disaster for biodiversity.

Even more astonishing is a recent announcement by China%26rsquo;s Ministry of Environmental Protection. While construction of two dams on the Jinsha River, a western tributary of the Yangtze River, will cease, work is set to begin on a dam at Liyuan on the same river. This is close to Tiger Leaping Gorge, home to stunning rapids and the stretch of the Jinsha River least affected by humans. The Liyuan reservoir will partially submerge the Haba Snow Mountain nature reserve as well as Jade Dragon Snow Mountain and its celebrated scenery.

China%26rsquo;s rivers, lakes and wetlands are already in a sorry state. Despite the desperate pleas and unstinting efforts of scientists, conservation groups, the public and the media, the interest groups that thirst for profit from the rivers have not been stopped.

Robert Wigington is a freshwater conservation expert at The Nature Conservancy (TNC) and is based in its Colorado office, in the city of Boulder. He says his organisation aims to have one million kilometres of river under protection and flowing freely by 2020.

TNC has 170 river and freshwater experts and runs over 500 river recovery and protection projects worldwide. In the United States, it works with the US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), which is known for building dams, on ecology protection projects around 60 dams of particular importance for biodiversity.

According to Wigington, the Colorado River flows through many different ecosystems during its course from the mountains to the river basin, and is of huge ecological value. It irrigates some 23,000 square kilometres of farmland and provides water for many cities, including Phoenix, Las Vegas, Denver and Salt Lake City. Analysis of its 45 different ecosystems %26ndash; including comparative studies of soil constituents, fish, microorganisms and aquatic plants %26ndash; has shown that, while the upper reaches of the river are well-protected, downstream there are problems.

On the Colorado River, USACE and TNC have removed just one dam, concentrating instead on mimicking natural river flows. This allows fish to breed naturally and ensures the dams can continue to generate electricity and provide water for irrigation.

The next stop on the tour is the Flaming Gorge Dam in Utah. Looking down from the 229-metre high structure, you can see five metres into the clear waters below and watch the huge brown and rainbow trout swimming around. The Green River downstream is said to offer some of the best trout fishing in all of the US. These are not farmed fish and the dam operators are not even allowed to catch them %26ndash; local bylaws state that fishing must take place at least one kilometre downstream of the dam.

John Morgan, an official at the US Bureau of Land Management, tells me about his work to protect the river%26rsquo;s four endangered fish species %26ndash; the bonytail, the Colorado pikeminnow, the humpback chub, and the razorback sucker. Images of these are two a penny in Colorado; found everywhere from newspapers and tourist brochures to restaurants, schools and even the family fridge. Their numbers are seen as a measure of how well the biodiversity of the Colorado River is recovering and they are a major part of the work of TNC%26rsquo;s Colorado office.

On the way to Flaming Gorge, we pass a 20-metre high dam on the Yampa River, which is now defunct. The structure reached the end of its working life years ago and is no longer needed to keep the river navigable, generate electricity or irrigate fields. But in response to TNC pleas, its operators have kept the water flowing to allow fish to pass through. Most importantly, the dam raises the water level downstream every spring in line with scientific advice, allowing fish %26ndash; including those four endangered species %26ndash; to reach their spawning grounds more easily.

The dam is said to have survived because the locals like to see it standing there; it has become a part of the landscape. Plus, it would cost US$2 million (13 million yuan) to dismantle. But, while it has hung on through the dams debate, some now say its days are numbered. One TNC project worker tells me it will be %26ldquo;demolished soon%26rdquo; %26ndash; the costs of maintenance and ensuring it is safe are now as much as the costs of demolition.

The Flaming Gorge Dam was completed in 1964, bringing 50 years of regular flooding to an end. Photos in its exhibition hall record two major inundations that killed dozens and left many more homeless when riverside towns and homes were swept away.

There may have been no floods since the dam was built, but there are a lot less fish. By the 1970s, monitoring data found that the populations of the four endangered species mentioned above had fallen by 99% %26ndash; and the remaining 1% was unsustainable.

According to fish experts, dams cause extinction by blocking routes to spawning grounds. They also create a steady, year-round flow of water, putting an end to the seasonal fluctuations that tell the fish when it is time to reproduce. And, as the waters at the base of a dam are very cold, the fish are forced to swim further to find warm waters in which to spawn.

After the last of these problems was identified in 1978, the way in which water is released at Flaming Gorge began to change, explains Morgan. %26ldquo;We realised we couldn%26rsquo;t just raise the sluice gate and let water out of the bottom of the dam any more, as that water is cold,%26rdquo; he says. %26ldquo;We needed to find a way to give the fish warmer water.%26rdquo;

Their solution was to install three extra gates in the dam, at different heights. During the spring floods, water is released from the top of the reservoir at about 18 degrees centigrade; the natural temperature of the river water and just what mating and spawning fish need.

A document put together by the US Bureau of Reclamation, TNC, and a number of conservation groups, says that water released by the dam in winter should be no colder than 6%26deg; Celsius and, in summer, no colder than 18%26deg; Celsius. Nor should the water released be more than 5%26deg; Celsius colder than the natural river temperature.

The fruits of this strategy are being seen %26ndash; the populations of the four endangered species have clearly increased and other, less endangered species are also benefitting.

China also has a story about endangered fish %26ndash; this time relating to three species %26ndash; but it has a very different ending. When dams were being built on the upper reaches of the Yangtze River, fish experts and conservationists called for efforts to be made to save the Chinese sturgeon, Chinese high fin sucker fish and the Yangtze River dolphin, which are all unique to China. But one advocate for the dams summed up the response: %26ldquo;It%26rsquo;s just three fish! Are there not enough to eat in the fish farms?%26rdquo;

Zhang Kejia is a reporter for China Youth Daily

NEXT: Recognising the value of a nation%26rsquo;s rivers

Homepage image from Wikipedia

Until the 1980s the Mekong River flowed freely for 4,900 kilometres from its 5,100-metre-high source in Tibet to the coast of Vietnam, where it finally poured into the South China Sea. The Mekong is the world%26rsquo;s twelfth longest river, and the eighth or tenth largest, in terms of the 475 billion cubic metres of water it discharges annually. Then and now it passes through or by China, Burma (Myanmar), Laos, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam. It is south-east Asia%26rsquo;s longest river, but 44% of its course is in China, a fact of capital importance for its ecology and the problems associated with its governance.

In 1980 not only were there no dams on its course, but much of the river could not be used for sizeable, long-distance navigation because of the great barrier of the Khone Falls, located just above the border between Cambodia and Laos, and the repeated rapids and obstacles that marked its course in Laos and China. Indeed, no exaggeration is involved in noting that the Mekong%26rsquo;s overall physical configuration in 1980 was remarkably little changed from that existing when it was explored by the French Mekong Expedition that travelled painfully up the river from Vietnam%26rsquo;s Mekong Delta to Jinghong in southern Yunnan in 1866 and 1867. This was the first European expedition to explore the Mekong from southern Vietnam into China and to produce an accurate map of its course to that point.

Since 2003, the most substantial changes to the Mekong%26rsquo;s character below China have related to navigation. Following a major program to clear obstacles from the Mekong begun early in the present decade, a regular navigation service now exists between southern Yunnan and the northern Thai river port of Chiang Saen. It is not clear whether the Chinese, who promoted the concept of these clearances and carried out the work involved, still wish to develop navigation further down the river, as was previously their plan. To date, the environmental effects of the navigation clearances have been of a limited character.

The Mekong plays a vital role in the countries of the Lower Mekong Basin (LMB): Laos, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam. (Burma is not within the basin). In all four LMB countries the Mekong is a source of irrigation. In Vietnam%26rsquo;s Mekong Delta the annual pattern of flood and retreat insure that this region contributes over 50% of agriculture%26rsquo;s contribution to the country%26rsquo;s GDP. For all four LMB countries the Mekong and its associated systems, particularly Cambodia%26rsquo;s Great Lake (Tonle Sap), are a bountiful source of fish, with the annual value of the catch conservatively valued at US$2 billion. More than 70% of the Cambodian population%26rsquo;s annual animal protein consumption comes from the river%26rsquo;s fish. Eighty per cent of the Mekong%26rsquo;s fish species are migratory, some travelling many hundreds of kilometres between spawning and reaching adulthood. Overall, eight out of 10 persons living in the LMB depend on the river for sustenance, either in terms of wild fish captured in the river or through both large and small-scale agriculture and horticulture.

Since the 1980s, the character of the river has been steadily transformed by China%26rsquo;s dam-building program in Yunnan province. The important changes that had taken place on the course of the river since 1980 and up to 2004 were outlined in the Lowy Institute Paper, River at Risk: The Mekong and the Water Politics of Southeast Asia. In 2010 three hydroelectric dams are already in operation and two more very large dams are under construction and due for completion in 2012 and 2017. Plans exist for at least two further dams, and by 2030 there could be a %26ldquo;cascade%26rdquo; of seven dams in Yunnan. Even before that date and with five dams commissioned, China will be able to regulate the flow of the river, reducing the floods of the wet season and raising the level of the river during the dry. In building its dams, China has acted without consulting its downstream neighbours. Although until now the effects of the dams so far built have been limited, this is set to change within a decade, as discussed below.

For despite the limited environmental costs of the dams China has so far completed, and of the river clearances to aid navigation, this state of affairs will change once China has five dams in operation. And the costs exacted by the Chinese dams will be magnified if the proposed mainstream dams below China are built.

Even if no dams are built on the mainstream below China, the cascade to which it is committed will ultimately have serious effects on the functioning of the Mekong once the dams are used to control the river%26rsquo;s flow. This will be the case because the cascade will:

* Alter the hydrology of the river and so the current %26ldquo;flood pulse%26rdquo;, the regular rise and fall of the river on an annual basis which plays an essential part in the timing of spawning and the migration pattern. This will be particularly important in relation to the Tonle Sap in Cambodia, but will have an effect throughout the river%26rsquo;s course;

* Block the flow of sediment down the river which plays a vital part both in depositing nutrients on the agricultural regions flooded by the river and also as a trigger for fish migration %26mdash; at present well over 50% of the river%26rsquo;s sediment comes from China;

* At least initially cause problems by restricting the amount of flooding that takes place most importantly in Cambodia and Vietnam; and

* Lead to the erosion of river banks.

Proposed dams below China

So China%26rsquo;s dam-building plans are worrying enough, but the proposed new mainstream dams would pose even more serious concerns. In contrast to what has occurred in China, and until very recently, there have been no firm plans for the construction of dams on the mainstream of the Mekong below China. This situation has changed over the past three years. Memoranda of Understanding have been signed for 11 proposed dams: seven in Laos; two between Laos and Thailand; and two in Cambodia. The proposed dams are being backed by foreign private capital or Chinese state-backed firms. Government secrecy in both Cambodia and Laos means that it is difficult to judge which, if any, of these proposed dams will actually come into being. Attention and concern have focused on two sites: Don Sahong at the Khone Falls in southern Laos and Sambor in north-eastern Cambodia. The reason for this attention is that if built these dams would block the fish migrations that are essential to insure the food supplies of Laos and Cambodia.

Those built at sites higher upstream would cause the least damage to fish stocks, but if, as currently seems possible, the most likely dams to be built would be at Don Sahong and Sambor, the costs to fish stocks could be very serious. This is because unanimous expert opinion judges that there are no ways to mitigate the blocking of fish migration that would occur if these dams are constructed. None of the suggested possible forms of mitigation %26mdash; fish ladders, fish lifts, and alternative fish-passages %26mdash; are feasible for the species of fish in the Mekong and the very large biomass that is involved in their migratory pattern. Fish ladders were tried and failed at the Pak Mun dam on one of the Mekong%26rsquo;s tributaries in Thailand in the 1990s.

Why are the governments of Laos and Cambodia contemplating the construction of dams that seem certain to have a devastating effect on their populations%26rsquo; food security? The answers are complex and include some of the following:

* A lack of knowledge at some levels of government;

* A readiness to disregard available information on the basis that it may be inaccurate; and

* A belief or conviction that fishing is %26ldquo;old-fashioned%26rdquo;, whereas the production of hydroelectricity is %26ldquo;modern%26rdquo;.

In Cambodia%26rsquo;s case, and in particular in relation to the proposed dam at Sambor, the fact that a Chinese firm is seeking to construct the dam raises the possibility that prime minister Hun Sen is unready to offend the country that has become Cambodia%26rsquo;s largest aid donor and Cambodia%26rsquo;s %26ldquo;most trusted friend%26rdquo;. In Laos, the proposal for a dam at Don Sahong is very much linked to the interests of the Siphandone family for whom southern Laos is a virtual fief. Of all the proposed dam sites, Don Sahong is the most studied in terms of knowledge of fisheries so that it can be safely said that the planned dam would wreak havoc on a migratory system that involves fish moving through the Hou Sahong channel throughout the year, movement that takes place in both directions, upstream and downstream.

In the face of the threats posed by both the Chinese dams and those proposed for the downstream stretches of the river, there is no existing body able to mandate or control what individual countries choose to do on their sections of the Mekong. The agreement establishing the Mekong River Commission (MRC) in 1995 does not include China or Burma, and though the latter%26rsquo;s absence is not important, the fact that China is not an MRC member underlines the body%26rsquo;s weakness. In any event, the MRC members%26rsquo; commitment to maintaining the Mekong%26rsquo;s sustainability has not overcome their basic commitment to national self-interest. A prime example of this is the manner in which the Lao government has proceeded in relation to the proposed Don Sahong dam. For at least two years while the dam was under consideration there was no consultation with Cambodia. Similarly, so far as can be judged, Cambodia%26rsquo;s consideration of a possible dam at Sambor has taken place without consultation with the governments of either Laos or Vietnam.

At the moment the best hope is that both the Cambodian and Lao governments will abandon their plans for Sambor and Don Sahong. If they do not, the future of the Mekong as a great source of food, both through fish and agriculture, is in serious jeopardy. At the time of writing the intentions of the Lao and Cambodian governments remain uncertain.

Concern about dams in China and the LMB is given added importance in the light of worries associated with the likely effects of climate change in the region through which the river flows. Research suggests there will be a series of challenges to the Mekong%26rsquo;s future ecological health. Until recently concerns about the likely impact of climate change tended to focus on the ongoing reduction in the size of the glaciers from which its springs in the Himalayas and which feed it as the result of snow melt. But while there is no doubt that a diminishment in size of the glaciers feeding the Mekong is taking place, recent research has suggested that a more immediate serious threat to the river%26rsquo;s health will come from sea-level changes, particularly as rising levels could begin to inundate large sections of Vietnam%26rsquo;s Mekong Delta. To what extent the threat posed by rising sea levels will be affected by another predicted development linked to climate change %26mdash; greatly increased precipitation leading to more flooding during the wet season %26mdash; is not yet clearly established. But research is pointing to a greatly increased precipitation that is likely to cause major increases in flooding in the future, possibly as early as 2030.

Against the pessimistic views outlined in this article perhaps the best that can be hoped for is that once serious consequences begin to become apparent advice can be offered to mitigate the worst effects of the developments taking place. Where once it was appropriate to write of risks, when assessing the Mekong%26rsquo;s future it is now time to write of fundamental threats to the river%26rsquo;s current and vital role in all of the countries of the Lower Mekong Basin.

Milton Osborne is visiting fellow at the Lowy Institute. He has been associated with the south-east Asian region since being posted to the Australian embassy in Phnom Penh in 1959. Osborne is the author of 10 books on the history and politics of south-east Asia, including The Mekong: turbulent past, uncertain future (2006) and Southeast Asia: an introductory history.

An earlier version of this article was published as %26quot;The Mekong River Under Threat,%26quot; The Asia-Pacific Journal, 2-2-10, January 11, 2010. It is used here with permission.

This article draws on the author%26rsquo;s Lowy Institute Paper 27, 2009. See the complete paper here. To read the complete paper, it is necessary to type in the current year after entering the site.

Homepage image shows the proposed location of the Sambor Dam, Kratie province, Cambodia. Photograph by Carl Middleton, International Rivers.

Greenpeace recently discovered genetically modified (GM) ingredient Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) in Nestl%26eacute;-branded baby cereal in China. According to the organisation, Nestl%26eacute; has promised not to use GM ingredients in the European Union, Australia, Russia and Brazil, but has different standards in China, where it refuses to make the same commitment. Its report has sparked off another round of public debate over the safety of GM food.

The Chinese authorities are pushing ahead with research into, and application of, GM technology. Many experts believe its benefits outweigh any harm it may cause, describing the changes as a %26ldquo;second green revolution%26rdquo; that will ensure food security. Faced with this blind optimism, I find I must protest. Besides the potential impact on ecosystems and food safety, I fear that the large scale planting of GM crops, particularly those controlled by multinationals, will affect China%26rsquo;s food sovereignty and even food security. Poorly managed, it may rock the very foundations of China%26rsquo;s ability to feed itself. A look at agriculture in Argentina will illustrate.

Until 1996, traditional agriculture in Argentina provided food security for the nation, with no need for government subsidy. But the introduction of GM soya beans has virtually destroyed the industry. Fields used for growing lentils, peas and mung beans have been turned over wholesale to GM soya-bean production. Crops from Monsanto, an agriculture biotech company based in the United States, accounted for 99% of soya bean production in Argentina by 2002. The country%26rsquo;s unthinking adoption of foreign inventions meant it ignored the need to develop its own technology and, by the time it woke up to the threat to its own food security, it was too late to stop using Monsanto%26rsquo;s crops.

In fact, the widespread use of GM crops did not, as experts imagined, cut down on the use of pesticides and herbicides and improve rural environments; quite the opposite. GM soya-bean crops actually need special treatment; besides the usual liberal quantities of chemicals and fertiliser, a weed-killer named Roundup is used. This chemical treats wild plants and even other crops as weeds, leaving only the biotech firm%26rsquo;s own soya-bean plants alive. Roundup killed off Argentina%26rsquo;s other crops and, according to some, caused mutations in livestock. In humans, long-term contact with the chemical has also been found to causes health problems, including nausea, diarrhoea, vomiting and skin damage.

Argentina is the proof that multinational biotech firms can cause a nation to lose its food sovereignty. But this has not halted the advance of such firms; rather, they are continuing their global expansion. For long, Brazil resisted GM technology but the companies have allegedly bought off officials, planted large areas with GM crops and put pressure on government. Today, traditional agriculture in Brazil is under immediate threat.

Having conquered Argentina and Brazil, the GM giants started their attack on China%26rsquo;s farming sector, where there are huge profits to be made. The US Department of Agriculture supports the overseas expansion of biotech firms such as Monsanto and DuPont and even helps promote their products in countries including China, where they claim their %26ldquo;Roundup Ready 2%26rdquo; will increase harvests by up to 11%. In the second quarter of 2009, Monsanto%26rsquo;s sales income reached US$4 billion (27 billion yuan), up 8% year-on-year. Gross profits were US$2.5 billion (17.1 billion yuan), up 14% on the previous year.

Huge quantities of GM seeds have %26ldquo;invaded%26rdquo; China, causing great damage to local agriculture. China is the largest market for US soya-bean exports and, according to an industry website, imported 15.4 million tonnes of GM-soya beans in 2008 %26ndash; 41% of total imports. Meanwhile, higher costs mean domestic soya-bean crops fail to sell. Last year non-GM soya-bean crops in Heilongjiang, in north-east China, were selling for less than the cost of planting, and 40% of the harvest did not sell at all. Sixty-eight soya-bean processing firms in the province have ceased work, while supermarkets in provincial capital Harbin stock GM-soya bean products almost exclusively.

Once the United States has control of China%26rsquo;s staple foods, China will have little say in the matter. The GM seeds imported by China are planting problems for the future. But the GM giants%26rsquo; ambitions do not stop with the seeds %26ndash; it is China%26rsquo;s 1.2 million square kilometres of farmland that gets them excited. If they can extract a few extra yuan for each kilogram of seeds sold, there will be hundreds of millions of US dollars in profit to be made, even before they start selling the associated chemicals, pesticides, fertilisers and herbicides.

This is another Opium War; an expropriation taking place behind a high-technology smokescreen. The GM giants estimate that, by 2012, the agricultural biotechnology market will allow them to take home US$7.3 billion to US$7.5 billion (49.8 billion yuan to 51.2 billion yuan), leaving China with the ecosystem and food security risks inherent in an addiction to a %26ldquo;new opium%26rdquo;.

So what should China do? The government has already invested 26 billion yuan (US$3.8 billion) in attempting to keep up with US biotech firms but this does not get to the root of the problem. The real threat to food security is not in the seeds, but in the people. Cheap grain prices and high production costs mean that farmers abandon their fields for urban jobs; that is the real threat to food security. When frost, drought and pest-resistant GM seeds appear on the market, farmers are naturally happy to spend a little extra to save some work. But, even if yields increase in line with expert predictions, there will still only be an extra US$6 (41 yuan) of income per 667 square metres of rice. There will be no great changes in food production and we will have paid the licensing fees for nothing.

China has always been an agricultural nation; a state built on the soil, by the farmers. Increasing food production requires restoration of degraded land, the recirculation of nutrients, better ecological balance and increased incomes for farmers, who will then grow more crops. If we ignore these facts and blindly adopt GM technology, we are simply giving up our food sovereignty. We need to learn lessons from Argentina and Brazil and be alert to the dangers of %26ldquo;biological invasion%26rdquo; by the GM giants.

Jiang Gaoming is a professor and PhD tutor at the Chinese Academy of Sciences’ Institute of Botany. He is also vice secretary-general of China Society of Biological Conservation and board member of China Environmental Culture Promotion Association.

Homepage image by DawnOne