Chinese walker

Although China`s assistant minister of foreign affairs, Hu Zhengyue, has said that “China does not have an Arctic strategy”, the country does appear to have a clear agenda. Hu made his statement while attending an Arctic forum organised by the Norwegian Government on the Arctic archipelago of Svalbard in June 2009. His speech at the forum, along with his comments to Chinese journalists afterwards, forms the most up-to-date and comprehensive official articulation of China`s thinking on the geopolitics of the Arctic and resulting sovereignty issues.

In line with the country`s oft-stated governing principles in international affairs, Hu emphasised China`s wish to see disputes related to sovereignty resolved peacefully through dialogue. He expressed China`s support for Arctic countries` sovereign and judicial rights, endowed by international legislation, but said these laws should to be refined and developed due to new circumstances arising from the melting of the ice.

Hu has also stressed the need for cooperation between Arctic and non-Arctic states. In his speech at Svalbard, he acknowledged that the Arctic is primarily a regional issue but said concerns over climate change and international shipping gave it inter-regional dimensions. He did not mention energy and other natural resources.

Unsurprisingly, China would like to see the Arctic states recognise the interests of non-Arctic states. In Hu`s words: “When determining the delimitation of outer-continental shelves, the Arctic states not only need to handle relationships between themselves properly, but must also consider the relationship between the outer-continental shelf and the international submarine area that is the common human heritage, to ensure a balance of coastal countries` interests and the common interests of the international community.”

After the publication of the original SIPRI report, admiral Yin Zhuo of the People`s Liberation Army Navy made a stronger assertion of Chinese rights in the region in comments carried by official media on March 5. Yin is reported to have stated that, “Under the provisions of the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the Arctic does not belong to any particular nation and is rather the property of all the world`s people” and that “China must play an indispensable role in Arctic exploration as it has one-fifth of the world`s population.”

Associate professor Guo Peiqing of the Ocean University of China has said: “Circumpolar nations have to understand that Arctic affairs are not only regional issues but also international ones.” Guo has estimated that about 88% of the Arctic seabed would be under the control of the Arctic littoral states if the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf were to approve all the existing or expected claims to the Arctic Ocean continental shelf. However, when considering the concerns of China and other non-Arctic states, it is worth bearing in mind that the vast majority of known but untapped energy resources lie in undisputed areas, that is within the legitimate exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of the Arctic littoral states.

Canada and Norway are the only countries to have thus far engaged with China in a formal bilateral dialogue on Arctic issues. At the first China-Norway dialogue meeting in June 2009, climate change and polar research were identified as the issues of strongest common interest, although the two sides also exchanged views on Arctic policies, energy issues and sea routes. The two countries have agreed to hold follow-up talks in 2010.

It is unclear if and when China will issue a more formal Arctic strategy. The precise targets for polar expeditions and polar research projects of the 12th Five-Year Plan, which will cover the period from 2011 to 2015, were set to be finalised following the China`s 26th Antarctic expedition, which completed in March. In October 2009, on the eve of the expedition, Chen Lianzeng, deputy director of the State Oceanic Administration (SOA), shed some light on the next Five-Year Plan`s general targets. These will be: to deepen China`s knowledge of the impact of climate change on the two polar regions, expand China`s scientific exploration activities and “take an active part in polar affairs and establish China`s strategic position”. To accomplish these goals, the SOA intends to build both “soft power and hard power”.

Several Chinese academics are encouraging their government to “Grasp this historical opportunity and recognise the political, economic and military value of the Arctic and then re-evaluate China`s rights in the Arctic region and adjust its strategic plan.” Chinese decision makers, on the other hand, advocate cautious Arctic policies for fear of causing alarm and provoking countermeasures among the Arctic states. Professor Guo Peiqing has even raised the alarmist possibility of an alliance of Arctic states.

China is aware that its size and rise to major-power status evoke jitters but at the same time it is striving to position itself so that it will not be excluded from access to the Arctic. China appears to be particularly wary of Russia`s intentions in the Arctic. Chinese observers made note of Russia`s decision in August 2007 to resume long-distance bomber flights over the Arctic and the planting of a Russian flag on the Arctic seabed that same month.

China and the rest of the world would be at a disadvantage if Russia`s claims over the underwater terrain between the Lomonosov and Mendeleev ridges were legitimised, giving Russia alone rights to the resources in that area. It is important to note, however, that Arctic issues have thus far been approached in a “spirit of cooperation, with outstanding disputes managed peacefully”. Media reports of competition in an ice-free Arctic that emphasise potential disputes and a scramble for the Arctic`s resources give rise to scenarios of armed conflict breaking out in the region, especially a conflict involving Russia. However, there is no evidence that Russia is failing to play by the rules or that it would not want to find multilateral solutions to disputes regarding sovereignty.

While the melting of the Arctic ice could create tension in China-Russia relations, the new opportunities that will arise from an ice-free Arctic could deepen cooperation between east Asian states. As non-Arctic states, China, Japan, North Korea and South Korea are all in the same boat. Each of them stands to benefit enormously from shorter commercial shipping routes and possible access to new fishing grounds and other natural resources. A unified Arctic strategy would be in their mutual interest. Finding ways to use an ice-free Arctic jointly has the potential to create a genuine win-win situation for both China and Japan, the two east Asian powers that, in so many other areas, find it difficult to find common ground.

From China`s viewpoint, an ice-free Arctic will increase the value of strong ties with the Nordic countries that otherwise struggle to be noticed by the rising power. China already has the largest foreign embassy in Reykjavik, in anticipation of Iceland becoming a major shipping hub. By actively engaging Chinese officials and academics on Arctic issues – ranging from climate change and polar research to commercial shipping routes and maritime rescue operations – Nordic countries can start laying the foundations for a special Arctic-orientated relationship with China.

Norway, with its deep-sea drilling expertise, has an advantage in this regard. Finding ways for Chinese and Norwegian companies to cooperate in Arctic energy resource extraction – in, for example, the ongoing project in the Shtokman field – would be of great interest to Chinese companies and would undoubtedly strengthen China-Norway relations. The notion that China has rights in the Arctic can be expected to be repeated in articles by Chinese academics and in comments by Chinese officials until it gradually begins to be perceived as an accepted state of affairs.

However, under international law, China`s rights in the Arctic are limited. Moreover, China`s insistence that respect for state sovereignty be a guiding principle of international relations makes it difficult for the country to question the Arctic states` sovereignty rights. There is some irony in the statements by Chinese officials calling on the Arctic states to consider the interests of man-kind so that all states can share the Arctic. These statements appear to be contrary to China`s long-standing principles of respect for sovereignty and the internal affairs of other states. Based on official statements by the Chinese government and the open-source literature written by Chinese Arctic scholars, China can be expected to continue to persistently, yet quietly and unobtrusively, push for the Arctic, in spirit, being accessible to all.

Linda Jakobson is the director of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) China and Global Security Programme.

An earlier version of this article was published as “China prepares for an ice-free Arctic”, SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security, No. 2010/2, March 2010. It is used here with permission.

Homepage image from NASA

Part one: China’s growing interest in the thawing north

Part two: The commercial lure of melting ice

As China`s economy is reliant on foreign trade, there are substantial commercial implications if shipping routes are to shorten during the summer months each year. Nearly half of China`s gross domestic product (GDP) is thought to depend on shipping. The trip from Shanghai to Hamburg via the Northeast Passage – which runs along the north coast of Russia from the Bering Strait in the east to Novaya Zemlya in the west – is 6,400 kilometres shorter than the route via the Strait of Malacca, a strip of water between Malaysia and Sumatra, and the Egypt`s Suez Canal.

Moreover, due to piracy, the cost of insurance for ships travelling via the Gulf of Aden, in the Arabian Sea, towards the Suez Canal increased more than tenfold between September 2008 and March 2009, according to a new report, to be published by Martinus Nijhoff later this year.

Chinese research remains primarily focused on how the melting Arctic will affect China`s continental and oceanic environment and how, in turn, such changes could affect domestic agricultural and economic development. However, a small number of Chinese researchers are publicly encouraging the government to prepare for the commercial and strategic opportunities that a melting Arctic presents.

Li Zhenfu, associate professor at Dalian Maritime University, together with a team of specialists, has assessed China`s advantages and disadvantages when the Arctic-sea routes open up. “Whoever has control over the Arctic route will control the new passage of world economics and international strategies,” writes Li, referring both to the shortened shipping routes between East Asia and Europe or North America and to the abundant oil, gas, mineral and fishery resources presumed to be in the Arctic.

Commenting on the successful test voyages from South Korea to the Netherlands via the Northeast Passage by two German commercial vessels in the summer of 2009, Chen Xulong of the China Institute of International Studies writes that “the opening of the Arctic route will advance the development of China`s north-east region and eastern coastal area . . . It is of importance to East Asian cooperation as well.” Chen also says that China should have a long-term vision regarding Arctic shipping.

Li Zhenfu has criticised the fact that Chinese research on the Arctic-shipping route has not been planned and conducted in a comprehensive manner to enable China to protect its interests. According to Li, China`s research “fails to provide fundamental information and scientific references for China to map out its Arctic strategy” and, therefore, limits China`s power to speak out and protect its rights in the international arena.

Li`s article, which was published in a national journal administered by the prestigious China Association for Science and Technology (CAST), points out that the Arctic also “has significant military value, a fact recognised by other countries”. And, in a rare open-source article about the Arctic by an officer of the People`s Liberation Army, senior colonel Han Xudong warns that the possibility of military force cannot be ruled out in the Arctic due to complex sovereignty disputes.

The increasing military importance of an ice-free Arctic is, indeed, reflected in recent decisions by all five littoral states to strengthen their military capabilities in the Arctic. In August 2007, Canada announced that it was setting up an Arctic military-training centre in Resolute Bay; in March, 2009, Russia announced that it would establish a military force to protect its interests in the region; and, in July 2009, the Danish parliament approved a plan to set up an Arctic military command and task force by 2014, to take just three examples.

Another Chinese researcher on Arctic politics, Guo Peiqing of the Ocean University of China, has also voiced disapproval of China`s natural sciences-oriented Arctic research and said it is not in China`s interests to remain neutral. Guo has said that China, which is transitioning from a regional to a global power, should be more active in international Arctic affairs. He notes that “any country that lacks comprehensive research on polar politics will be excluded from being a decisive power in the management of the Arctic and, therefore, be forced into a passive position.”

Chinese Arctic specialists acknowledge the same uncertainties as many of their western counterparts when contemplating how lucrative the Arctic routes would ultimately be in comparison to the current routes through the Suez and Panama canals. Although passing along the Northeast Passage from eastern China to western Europe would substantially shorten the journey, high insurance premiums, lack of infrastructure and harsh conditions may make the Arctic routes commercially unviable, at least in the short term.

Drift ice will continue to be a problem for ships, even when the Arctic passages are officially deemed ice-free. As Greenland`s ice cap melts, the number of icebergs is also expected to increase, forcing ships to proceed slowly and make detours. Furthermore, the shallow depth of some of the passages along the shipping routes (in particular the Bering Strait) makes the Arctic unsuitable for big cargo ships.

The opening up of the Arctic will also provide access to new reserves of energy and other natural resources on which China`s economic growth increasingly relies. The US Geological Survey estimates that the Arctic contains up to 30% of the world`s undiscovered gas and 13% of the world`s undiscovered oil. Additionally, the region contains vast amounts of coal, nickel, copper, tungsten, lead, zinc, gold, silver, diamonds, manganese, chromium and titanium.

The technological challenges associated with extracting energy and mineral deposits in the Arctic have been noted by both Chinese and Western observers and China will need to partner with foreign companies in order to exploit the Arctic`s resources. As one Chinese scholar notes, “There is a rather large gap between Chinese and advanced foreign deep-sea oil extracting technology.” Russia, which controls many of the resources in Arctic waters, lacks both the technology and the capital needed to extract them – opening the way for tri-lateral joint ventures in Russian waters using Chinese capital and western or Brazilian technology. For example, when in late 2009 Russia`s state-owned oil company Rosneft announced plans to apply for the operating licences to develop 30 offshore sites on Russia`s Arctic continental shelf, industry experts predicted that it would not be able to develop these deposits on its own.

Another potential multilateral joint venture in which China`s capital could be used in exchange for the opportunity to gain the experience it seeks in deep-water drilling is the ongoing cooperation between Statoil, Total and Gazprom to develop the first phase of the Shtokman gas fields in the Barents Sea, a section of the Arctic Ocean north of Norway and Russia. This is regarded not only as a huge commercial opportunity but also a formidable technological challenge.

Linda Jakobson is the director of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) China and Global Security Programme.

An earlier version of this article was published as “China prepares for an ice-free Arctic”, SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security, No. 2010/2, March 2010. It is used here with permission.

NEXT: Charting political waters

Part one: China’s growing interest in the thawing north

Homepage image from Combat Camera shows a Canadian military training exercise in Resolute Bay.

China is paying increasing attention to the melting of the ice in the Arctic Ocean as a result of climate change. The prospect of the Arctic being navigable during summer months, leading to both shorter shipping routes and access to untapped energy resources, has impelled the government to allocate more resources to Arctic research. Chinese officials have also started to think about what kind of policies would help the country to benefit from an ice-free Arctic environment.

China is at a disadvantage because it is neither an Arctic littoral state – it has no Arctic coast and so no sovereign rights to underwater continental shelves – nor an Arctic Council member state with the right to participate in the discussion of regional policies. Despite its seemingly weak position, China can be expected to seek a role in determining the political framework and legal foundation for future Arctic activities.

The formerly ice-covered Arctic is undergoing an extraordinary transformation as a result of the unprecedented rate at which the ice is diminishing. According to one report, the annual average extent of Arctic Ocean ice has shrunk by 2.7% per decade, with a decrease of 7.4% per decade during the summer months since 1979. Estimates about when the Arctic Ocean could be consistently ice-free during the summer season vary greatly, ranging from 2013 to 2060.

The melting of the Arctic ice poses economic, military and environmental challenges to the governance of the region. In 2008 the five littoral states, Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia and the United States, committed themselves to the existing legal framework of the Arctic and the “orderly settlement of possible overlapping claims”. Despite these assurances, the evolving situation in the Arctic could potentially lead to new geopolitical disputes, also involving non-littoral states, especially regarding issues related to free passage and resource-extraction rights. Consequently, policymakers – not only in China but across Asia, Europe and North America – are turning their attention to the region in order to assess this transformation and its economic, territorial and geopolitical implications.

To date, China has adopted a wait-and-see approach to Arctic developments, wary that active overtures would cause alarm in other countries due to its size and status as a rising global power. Chinese officials and researchers have told me privately that they are very cautious when formulating their views on the country`s interests in the Arctic. They stress that China`s Arctic research activities remain primarily focused on the climatic and environmental consequences of the ice melting. However, in recent years, the academic and policymaking communities have also started to assess the commercial, political and security implications of a seasonally ice-free Arctic region.

China has one of the world`s strongest polar research capabilities. Since 1984, the country has organised 26 expeditions and established three research stations in the Antarctic. The Arctic became a focus from 1995, when a group of Chinese scientists and journalists travelled to the North Pole on foot and conducted research on the Arctic Ocean`s ice cover, climate and environment. China`s first Arctic research expedition by sea took place in 1999 and, since then, it has carried out two more expeditions, in 2003 and 2008, with a fourth planned for the summer of 2010.

China`s first Arctic research station, Huanghe (Yellow River), was founded at Ny-%26Aring;lesund in Norway`s Svalbard archipelago in July, 2004. Since 1994, China has conducted polar exploration onboard the research vessel Xue Long (Snow Dragon), which was purchased from Ukraine in 1993.

The 163-metre-long vessel, with a displacement of 21,000 tonnes, is the world`s largest, non-nuclear icebreaker. However, in October 2009, the State Council (the Chinese cabinet) decided that Xue Long alone no longer met the demand of the country`s expanding polar research activities and needed “brothers and sisters”. After months of deliberating between purchasing a second-hand foreign vessel and building a Chinese one, the government approved the building of a new high-tech ice-breaker. Preliminary plans to order a Chinese-built ice-breaker at a cost of 2 billion yuan (US$300 million) had been under way within the Chinese Arctic and Antarctic Administration (CAA) since at least early 2009. The new vessel, expected to become operational in 2013, will be co-designed by Chinese and foreign partners and built in China. It will be smaller than Xue Long, with a displacement of only 8000 tonnes.

Besides its own scientific expeditions, China has collaborated with international partners to monitor the Arctic`s environmental changes. In 1997, China joined the International Arctic Science Committee (IASC), a nongovernmental organisation that aims to facilitate multidisciplinary research on the Arctic region and its role in the earth system. At the 2005 Arctic Science Summit Week, held at Kunming, in China`s south-western Yunnan Province, China was also invited to join the Ny-%26Aring;lesund Science Managers Committee, which was established in 1994 to enhance cooperation among the research centres at Ny-%26Aring;lesund.

China has several Arctic-focused research institutions of its own. The primary ones are: the Shanghai-based Polar Research Institute of China (PRIC), which is in charge of polar expeditions on Xue Long and conducts comprehensive studies of the polar regions; the China Institute for Marine Affairs, the research department within the State Oceanic Administration (SOA) in Beijing, which concentrates on international maritime law and China`s ocean-development strategy; and the Institute of Oceanology, a multidisciplinary marine science research and development institute within the Chinese Academy of Sciences. Other organisations conducting Arctic-related research include: the Ocean University of China, Dalian Maritime University, Xiamen University, Tongji University, the Chinese Antarctic Centre of Surveying and Mapping and the Research Centre for Marine Developments of China.

Although there is no Chinese institution devoted specifically to research on Arctic politics, there are a handful of individuals who have published articles and book chapters that focus on Arctic strategies and geopolitics. Since the mid-2000s, Chinese researchers and officials have expanded their participation in international seminars focusing on commercial, legal and geopolitical Arctic issues.

In a major step to enhance China`s understanding of the political, legal and military dimensions of the Arctic, in September 2007 the Chinese government launched a project entitled Arctic Issues Research, which involved scholars and officials from around China and included such research topics as “Arctic resources and their exploitation”, “Arctic scientific research”, “Arctic transportation”, “Arctic law” and “military factors in the Arctic”. The research project, organised by the CAA, was completed by 2009, but the reports were not made public.

Linda Jakobson is the director of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) China and Global Security Programme.

An earlier version of this article was published as “China prepares for an ice-free Arctic”, SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security, No. 2010/2, March 2010. It is used here with permission.

NEXT: The commercial lure of melting ice

Part 3: Charting political waters

Homepage image from Xilin Gol Meteorological Bureau

Hilary Benn, British secretary of state for environment, food and rural affairs, and Sun Zhengcai, China`s minister for agriculture, recently launchedthe Sustainable Agriculture Innovation Network (SAIN) to address the link between farming and global warming. Here Hilary Benn talks to chinadialogue editor Isabel Hilton about food security, agriculture and climate change.

Isabel Hilton (IH): What does the SAIN agreement aim to achieve?

Hilary Benn (HB):In China the concern is to ensure that 1.4 billion people have enough to eat. In the world we are heading towards, we are going to have to feed another 2.5 billion people in a sustainable way. In China and in the UK there is a growing awareness of the problems of making sure that we can do that. We don`t have all the answers, but we are both asking the same questions, so sharing experience and ideas is extremely valuable.

IH: The issue of food security is producing new phenomena such the purchase of land in Africa by other countries to grow food for their own populations. What do you think of this?

HB:It demonstrates that the world is now thinking more about where food in the future is going to come from and is responding accordingly. Individual nations will take their own decisions about the most effective way to secure future food supplies. Africa hasn`t seen the kind of green revolution that we have seen in Asia in the last 20 years. There are a lot of reasons for that: firstly, you`ve got to create a market for farmers to invest in agriculture; they have to see there`s a way of earning a living. Secondly, transport infrastructure is important: food rots and goes to waste because of transport difficulties. In some countries it`s the very high price of fertiliser. In Ethiopia I was told that a 100-kilogram bag of fertiliser would cost a family half of their annual income. Not many families could invest in improving the land.

IH: How does the purchase of land in Africa help with any of this?

HB: It will depend what they do with it, what kind of agriculture takes place and how the benefits are distributed. But the world is going to need astonishingly large increase in agricultural production to feed a growing world population. It`s for the governments of African countries to determine whether it`s in their interest or not. But we need investment in agriculture, and we need more research, in particular as the climate changes, to find crops that are more drought resistant.

IH: Many of China`s agricultural problems are to do with acid rain and water pollution. Isn`t there a danger that buying land overseas might take the pressure off fixing these problems at home?

HB:I don`t think so. China has gone through rapid industrialisation and come face-to-face with the environmental consequences. It`s the same journey that we have been on. Those pressing reasons for dealing with it at home don`t go away just because decisions may have been made about securing production in other parts of the world in the future. In Britain we are about 70% self-sufficient in food. Europe is about 90% self-sufficient. But we export and import a lot of food. I don`t think global policy of self sufficiency, with each country trying to produce enough for itself would be right. Recently some countries put export bans in place. That is not the direction in which to go. Finally, in terms of people feeding themselves, there`s the fundamental problem that there may be enough food in the country but not everyone can afford it. That`s why development – increasing people`s incomes, improving their lives – is fundamental to solving the problem.

All countries faced with today`s financial and economic difficulties are thinking about what they do and when. But part of the difficulty we face is comes from the unsustainable use of natural resources, raw materials and water, and from thinking that energy is always going to be available at a price that we can readily afford. We`re already facing the consequences of that with the volatile price of oil. That is not an argument for putting off changes that ensure a more sustainable model of development. It`s an argument for getting on with it. The price of raw materials and the climate consequences of not tackling greenhouse-gas emissions are going to be felt by all of us. China looks at its cities on the sea and thinks about water supply; India looks at Bangladesh and wonders what will happen when sea levels rise there. The dilemma is that developing countries want to develop to improve the lives of their citizens. But we also know that even if the rich countries were, by some miracle, to stop emitting greenhouse gases tomorrow, the world would still face dangerous climate change because of rising emissions from the developing economies. In the end we need a contribution from everybody, according to their stage of development.

Up to now the world has divided into two parts under the UNFCCC [United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change]: Annex I countries [industrialised countries]: “you caused the problem, you have to be doing something” – and the rest. But “the rest” spreads from China to Mali, from India to Burkina Faso. Can you say that “common but differentiated responsibilities” means a common commitment from that second group? That is not sustainable. How do you construct a series of contributions which you can add up and ask, have we got enough? That is what the negotiations have got to do.

IH: Are you saying that countries like India and China should take on taking on mandatory commitments?

HB: Well, the negotiations will determine in what form they are expressed. But I think that all countries are going to have to make a contribution. Part of the challenge will be what confidence we have in each other about the nature of the contributions that others are prepared to give. We clearly have to move from where we were, with the Annex I/Non-Annex I binary divide – and we need to differentiate. We have to flesh out what “common but differentiated responsibilities” actually means. Everyone is in favour of it, but what does it mean when Ethiopia emits 0.1-tonne-per-head of population, India 1.5, China 4.5, Europe 11 and the United States 21?

IH: The Non-Annex I countries made a commitment to a substantial, measurable and verifiable deviation from business-as-usual.

HB: That was an extremely important part of the agreement in Bali, but the task now is to demonstrate that any agreement we reach will be sufficient to deal with the problem. It`s the negotiators` task, but in the end it`s all going to have to add up, which means we are all going to have to make a contribution. The fundamental question is: what`s fair?

Finance flowing from the better-off bits of the world to pay for adaptation, mitigation and low-carbon development is fundamental to unlocking contributions the other way. There needs to be confidence. The developing world will look at the better-off and say: “we remember you making commitments before on development assistance,” and will ask if the money actually turned up. Some countries have better records than others, but you need to create a mechanism that gives those who are signing up the confidence that we will get real commitments the other way.

IH: Don`t we need a revolution in the way we do things, rather than the kind of incremental change the British government is pursuing: buying in carbon savings, rather than changing the nature of the economy?

HB: From the climate`s point of view, it doesn`t matter where the carbon is saved. If you can save a tonne of carbon in a most cost-effective way, there can`t be anything wrong with that.

IH: But changing an advanced economy into a low-carbon economy will not be achieved by buying emissions

HB:There`s no question about the pace of change. I know we have less time than we thought, but 10 years ago if someone had proposed a bill that put cutting emissions on the statute book, with an independent climate-change committee and a target of reducing our emissions by 80% by 2050, most people wouldn`t have known what they were talking about. In those 10 years we have come a very long way, and that shows that the political process can respond. The fact that the British Climate Change Bill is the first in the world reflects some credit on the UK.

Any business looking at the future knows – as Nick Stern`s work showed – that emissions are going to cost. The Confederation of British Industry`s strong backing for the bill tells me that business understands that if they continue to expose themselves to carbon-intensive development and high energy costs, they are not doing the best for the future. Ten years ago, what investor would have asked about carbon exposure going forward?

There is market pressure because people want to know what they are investing in, in a world in which carbon will become more expensive. How do you redirect investment – which is taking place anyway – from a high-carbon future to a low-carbon future? The government`s job is to create a framework and incentives: the Climate Change Bill, ETS [European Emission Trading Scheme], regulation on light bulbs and cars, landfill levy, these are all examples of government helping people to make the right decisions.

Our renewable energy strategy is a firm commitment and we have overtaken Denmark in offshore wind. We are going to introduce a feed-in tariff for microgeneration and we are one of a small number of countries that will meet our Kyoto commitments. We have demonstrated that an economy can grow without its emissions growing.

Hilary Benn is UK secretary of state for environment, food and rural Affairs

Isabel Hilton is editor of chinadialogue

Homepage photo by romainguy

Food price riots across the world, a new geopolitical “Great Game” in the Arctic, a global race to secure cropland and the official predictions of peak oil by 2012; the past year has seen the politics of resource scarcity rise to the top of the global security agenda. Though currently overshadowed by the impact of the global economic downturn, there has been a fundamental shift in perceptions away from the unrealistic assumption of never-ending future abundance towards a grudging recognition of the rapid approach of natural limits.

Above all, the full implications of climate change are beginning to enter into mainstream security analysis — from the abstraction of discussions in the United Nations Security Council in April 2007 to the brutal reality of drought-driven conflict in Africa. These are just the first signs of how climate change — and our responses to it — will fundamentally change the strategic-security context in the coming decades.

Perhaps the most compelling evidence of this shift has come from the most unexpected source: the United States intelligence community. After eight years of ideologically driven climate-change denial by the administration of George W Bush, the final months of the Bush presidency saw the appearance of two different pieces of analysis by the National Intelligence Council. Both of these highlighted climate change and resource scarcity as critical strategic threats to American security and interests. Without the useful shield of US climate denial, many other countries will have no excuse not to take a more clear-headed look at the implications of climate change for their national security and future prosperity.

Conflict over natural resources, whether driven by need or greed, has always been a part of human society. The past shows us that social tensions driven by climatic change destroyed many advanced societies, such as the droughts which drove the collapse of early civilisations in Mesopotamia and Peru. The coming decades will see rising resource scarcity, greater environmental degradation and increasingly disruptive climatic change at levels never experienced before in human history. In an increasingly uncertain world, these trends are disturbingly predictable.

Climate change already is creating hard security threats, but it has no hard security solutions. Climate change is like a ticking clock: every increase in greenhouse gases in the atmosphere permanently alters the climate, and we can never move the clock`s hands back to reclaim the past. Even if we stopped emitting pollution tomorrow, the world already is committed to levels of climate change unseen for hundreds of thousands of years. If we fail to stop polluting, we will be committed to catastrophic and irreversible changes over the next century, which will directly displace hundreds of millions of people and critically undermine the livelihoods of billions.

There is some scientific uncertainty over these impacts; but the uncertainty is over when they will occur, not if they will occur, unless climate change is slowed. Preventing catastrophic and runaway climate change will require a global mobilisation of effort and co-operation seldom seen in peacetime.

In the next decades, climate change will drive as significant a change in the strategic security environment as the end of the cold war. If uncontrolled, climate change will have security implications of similar magnitude to the world wars, but which will last for centuries. The past will provide no guide to this coming future; a robust response will require clear assessments based on the best scientific projections.

Despite these threats, current responses to climate change are slow and inadequate. Even Europe, which leads global efforts to move to a low-carbon economy, is spending only the equivalent of around 0.5% of its combined defence budget on tackling climate change, though this does not count the action achieved through direct regulation. There is a need for more direct and interventionist action to prevent climate risks. One reason for this is that economic analysis has systematically undervalued the potential extreme impacts of climate change, underplaying to policy makers the implication of the most severe risks. But a failure to acknowledge and prepare for the worst-case scenario is as dangerous in the case of climate change as it is for managing the risks of terrorism or nuclear weapons proliferation.

Security-sector actors must not just prepare to respond to the security challenges of climate change; they also must be part of the solution. Partly, this means reducing the climate impact of their operations and activities. Much more importantly, it means communicating the security implications and costs of uncontrolled and extreme climate change to political leaders and the public. Unless achieving climate security is seen as a vital and existential national interest, it will be too easy to delay action on the basis of avoiding immediate costs and perceived threats to economic competitiveness.

But climate change is also a security opportunity. A low-carbon global economy will be a far more energy-secure economy. Trillions of dollars — otherwise would be invested in oil and gas production increasingly concentrated in unstable regions – instead will deliver new technology and local clean-energy sources. This will lower geopolitical tensions over fossil-fuel reserves and greatly reduce the security impact of “peak oil” when it arrives.

The security sector also has the vital — and expensively acquired — experience of how government can drive technological development and infrastructure deployment at a similar scale to that needed to respond to climate change. Security actors should promote dramatically increased investment in the development and deployment of technologies critical for energy and climate security. This will be expensive, but is achievable. Recent estimates suggest this would require technology investment commensurate with current spending on the “war on terror”, and if a crash response is needed in response to extreme climate-change scenarios, investment at levels similar to the Apollo moon-landing programme.

The reality of climate change will require fundamental changes in how international relations are conducted, and will alter much of the focus of international security policy. It will change strategic interests, alliances, borders, threats, economic relationships, comparative advantages and the nature of international co-operation, and will help determine the continued legitimacy of the United Nations in the eyes of much of the world. Climate change geopolitics will extend far outside the environmental sphere, and will link old problems in new ways.

Managing the complexity of our collective climate security will become an ever more important part of foreign policy. Climate change will require member countries of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to revisit their international industrial policies by sharing advanced energy technologies and funding large-scale investment in economic competitors such as China and India. OECD countries must recognise that achieving climate security is a more vital national interest than the narrow maximisation of domestic company profits.

Energy security interests will be increasingly delivered through co-operation with energy consuming countries on technology development and diffusion, rather than through relationships with producing countries on fossil-fuel discoveries and delivery. Declining use of imported fossil fuels may cause tensions with many producer countries, and instability inside them. Countries will not be able to achieve national energy security through undermining other countries` climate security by using coal without capturing the carbon. There will be no agreement on climate security without guaranteeing all countries` energy security.

Nuclear proliferation mechanisms will need to be greatly strengthened if nuclear power is to be deployed at a scale which would make a real difference to climate change. Climate change will be used as a political mask for some states to acquire nuclear technology for military purposes, and development and sharing of more benign energy alternatives is the best protection against this. A major climate-change-driven disaster in the next decade would drive pressure for a “crash programme” of rapid deployment of nuclear power worldwide — at rates which would compromise the ability of the current nuclear industry supply chain to preserve safety or security.

NEXT: Geopolitics, justice and instability

Nick Mabey is a founding director and the chief executive of E3G, an independent not-for-profit organisation working in the public interest to accelerate the global transition to sustainable development. He is the author of Delivering Climate Security: International Security Responses to a Climate Changed World, a report published on behalf of the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI).

Homepage photo by Alex Lichtenberger

Rising sea levels and melting ice caps in the Arctic already are leading to territorial disputes between major powers. The disappearance of small islands could release valuable marine resources into the already contested waters of the Indian Ocean, the Pacific and the South China Sea. The rights of environmental refugees and migrants will become a source of national and international tensions, especially in delta regions such as Bangladesh, Nigeria and Egypt. Fisheries stocks will collapse or move, destroying millions of people`s livelihoods and undermining delicately negotiated international management regimes. The European Union`s Common Fisheries Policy will not survive in its present form.

Countries will respond to the forecasts of more erratic water flows in all major river basins by building new upstream dams and water storage. Such “climate change adaptation” will drive cross-border tensions in the next decade, including the potential for armed interstate conflict. Strengthened international rules and more activist preventative diplomacy from the international community will be needed to peacefully manage changes in shared water and fisheries resources, and to preserve the rights of displaced people and states.

Issues of justice and ethics lie at the heart of climate change; the rich have caused the problem but the poor are bearing the brunt of the impact. Global resentment against the current international order will rise if there is a failure to agree and deliver aggressive emission reduction goals, or adequately help the victims of climate change adapt and obtain compensation.

Radical protest movements are building around the globe, and direct action against new airports and power stations is growing. Violent extremists will use these tensions to fuel existing causes and Osama bin Laden already has spoken several times on the inequities of climate change and highlighted the lack of action by the United States. Muslim countries will be among the hardest hit by climate change. If frustrated by global inaction to slow climate change, radical environmental movements may spawn eco-terrorist groups in a way analogous to the violent evolution of extreme left-wing movements in the 1970s.

Failure to act effectively in concluding a post-Kyoto UN agreement to control climate change will undermine the legitimacy of the international system, reducing its effectiveness in tackling other security threats. This agreement must protect the interests and rights of the poorest who are least able to adapt to climate change — not just the interests of the more prosperous in all countries who generate the vast majority of greenhouse gas emissions. This means preventing temperature increases beyond the 2-degrees Celsius threshold at which point levels of mortality from infectious diseases and water shortages rise dramatically.

In general, climate change could drive a more collaborative approach in inter-state relations or it could exacerbate tensions between and within countries, leading to a “politics of insecurity” as countries focus on protecting themselves against the impact. The pattern of cooperation which arises will depend on how effectively climate change is incorporated into mainstream foreign policy and is perceived as changing the balance of national interests in major countries across a wide range of security and geopolitical issues.

Climate change already is increasing conflict risks in unstable regions — especially Africa — as fragile governance systems are overwhelmed by the social stresses released by drought, famine, flood, migration, extreme weather events and rising sea levels. At moderate levels of change, conflict is preventable and conflict causality is complex as climate change acts as a stress multiplier of existing tensions. But this complexity should not be an excuse for inaction. The growing information on present and future climate security impacts is as good, if not better, than other information routinely used in security planning and assessment. If climate change is not slowed and critical environmental thresholds are exceeded, then it will become a primary driver of conflicts between and within states.

Over the next decades while climate change is still relatively moderate, the determinant of whether climate change drives serious conflict will lie in how political systems respond to the tensions it creates. Too often, analysis of climate-change impacts assumes that all governments will act to maximise the common good in response to change. But resource management regimes in much of the world already are built upon communal divisions and conflict, and are highly unlikely to respond in a predictable, rational and inclusive manner to climate stresses.

Experience of current instability in the Sahel — especially in Darfur — shows how quickly disputes over access to resources in times of environmental stress can become politicised and exacerbate existing communal conflicts based on ethnic, religious or other lines. These conflicts develop their own internal dynamics, but will see no sustainable solutions unless the root causes of resource grievances are addressed.

Achieving security in a climate-stressed world will require a more pro-active and intensive approach to tackling instability in strategically important regions with high climate vulnerability and weak governance. This will require changes across the security sector, with a stronger incorporation of long-term and structural risk factors into planning and a willingness to engage effectively with tough governance challenges — bringing diplomatic, development, intelligence and law enforcement capabilities to bear. This does not just require implementation of some general “conflict prevention” agenda, but direct focus on the strategic necessity of managing increased resource-use tensions.

This also should not be seen as just an adjunct to the development agenda, but as a critical part of achieving core security interest. There will be no long-term stability in Afghanistan unless rural livelihoods and water management are robust to climate change. Attempts to build a “hearts and minds” coalition against Islamist extremism will be crucially undermined when many of the main sources of job creation for young men in North Africa are being undermined by warmer temperatures and declining rainfall.

The impact of climate change on instability also will require changes to how climate adaptation is handled in the international climate-change regime. To date, climate adaptation has mainly been framed as a technical development activity, but in reality it will involve complex political and diplomatic interventions in difficult and highly charged internal resource-management issues. The political economy of resource management must lie at the heart of all adaptation measures as they deal with the resources delivering subsistence and identity: land, water and security. More controversially, access to international adaptation finance may need to be made conditional on countries implementing reforms to internal resource management policies to improve social resilience and prevent conflict and reduce marginalisation of vulnerable groups.

All these impacts already are occurring as the earth gradually warms in the early stages of climate change. If climate change is not controlled before we meet critical “tipping points” in natural systems, the impact will become catastrophic, with large parts of the world becoming uninhabitable for their current populations by the middle of the century. Such an outcome would overwhelm current security and humanitarian capacity to respond, and would make a mockery of the international community`s commitments to a “Responsibility to Protect” and the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. The security community must be honest with its political masters: that under these all-too-likely scenarios, no country would be able to provide the type of secure environment enjoyed today, no matter how much hard and soft security investment is allocated.

The world has the financial resources and technological potential to deliver a secure and low-carbon energy economy. The question is whether we are capable of making the political choices to mobilise these resources in pursuit of our collective climate security, especially in time of economic downturn. Security issues are fundamental for making the political case for urgent action. Security-sector reform will be central to managing the consequences of the changes we are undergoing already. Security actors should be a powerful voice in overcoming the current dangerous tendency to lower expectations and ambitions for the Copenhagen climate change negotiations (COP15) in December 2009.

Half-solving the climate problem (for example, by aiming to stabilise temperatures at 3 to 4 degrees Celsius rather than 2 degrees) may reduce short term political and financial costs, but it will produce no meaningful reduction in the risk of extreme and runaway climate change. Only a Copenhagen agreement which effectively puts the world on a pathway to climate security for all is worth agreeing.

Security actors have a strong additional interest in ensuring a bold and rapid transformation to a secure and low-carbon economy, as this also will reduce tensions over access to dwindling fossil-fuel reserves and the destabilising impact of high energy prices.

The changing security context driven by climate change requires an imaginative and forthright response from security actors if we are to preserve our vital interests and values in this century. The first signs of this response are emerging, but the necessary changes will need to happen much faster than in the past if they are to match the remorseless ecological timetable of a changing climate.

Nick Mabey is a founding director and the chief executive of E3G, an independent not-for-profit organisation working in the public interest to accelerate the global transition to sustainable development. He is the author of Delivering Climate Security: International Security Responses to a Climate Changed World, a report published on behalf of the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI).

Homepage photo by Michael von Bergen

As in much of the world, the current security discourse in Asia and Australasia is dominated by what might be called the “control paradigm”, based on the premise that insecurity can be controlled through military force or balance of power politics and containment. The most obvious global example is the so-called “war on terror”, which aims to “keep the lid” on terrorism, without addressing the root causes.

Such approaches to national, regional and international security are flawed — particularly if not complemented by diplomatic efforts — and are distracting the world`s politicians from developing sustainable solutions to non-traditional threats.

There is an alternative approach, that of “sustainable security”. The central premise of sustainable security is that you cannot control all the consequences of insecurity, but must work to resolve the causes: “fighting the symptoms” will not work, so policies must instead “cure the disease” through an integrated analysis of security threats and a preventative approach to responses.

Sustainable security focuses on the interconnected, long-term drivers of insecurity, including:

* Climate change — loss of infrastructure, resource scarcity and the mass displacement of peoples;

* Competition over resources, including food, water and energy;

* Marginalisation of the majority world — the political, economic and cultural marginalisation of the vast majority of the world`s population.

* Global militarisation — the increased use of military force

Asia is a region in transition, and transition creates uncertainty. The political, economic and societal landscape is shifting and, at the same time, climate change and other long-term emerging threats to security will require regional responses. All of these trends are present in the Asian security dynamic.

The sustainable security analysis makes a distinction between these trends and other security threats (for example, terrorism or organised crime). It promotes a comprehensive, systemic approach, taking into account the interaction of different trends which are generally analysed in isolation by others. It also places particular attention on how the current behaviour of international actors and western governments is contributing to, rather than reducing, insecurity.

Sustainable security takes global justice and equity as the key requirements of any sustainable response, together with progress towards reform of the global systems of trade, aid and debt relief; a rapid move away from carbon-based economies; substantial steps towards nuclear disarmament and the control of biological and chemical weapons; and a shift in defence spending to the non-military elements of security. This links long-term global drivers to the immediate security pre-occupations of ordinary people.

Sustainable security is inherently preventative in that it addresses the likely causes of conflict and instability before the ill-effects are felt. It builds on elements of previous attempts to reframe thinking on security to include the concepts of common, comprehensive, human, just and non-traditional security. Many of these approaches have long been recognised in Asia, though national security policies continue to be dominated by the “control paradigm”.

While there are many immediate security concerns in the region, there are three principal drivers of insecurity over the medium- to long-term: maintaining state integrity, particularly against internal instability; a regional power shift; and environmental and humanitarian disasters. The economic downturn of recent months may aggravate some of these sources of insecurity, since economic growth in Asia has been a major factor in mitigating conflict.

While the United States may remain the ultimate guarantor of security for many for some time, it is undeniable that it is experiencing a relative decline in economic and military power and is heavily bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan. The exact implications of waning US influence in the region are not yet clear, but the shifting power dynamic is itself a potential source of uncertainty and instability.

Among the most serious challenges facing Asia are the numerous environmental and humanitarian disasters to affect the region. In the last few years, there have been three major environmental disasters in Asia: the December 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and resulting tsunami which devastated costal regions in Indonesia, Sri Lanka, India and Thailand; the catastrophic Cyclone Nargis in Burma in May 2008; and, in the same month, the terrible earthquake and aftershocks that hit Sichuan province in China.

These three disasters alone caused nearly half a million deaths, with massive destruction to property and infrastructure. But, in addition, the region is hit by many smaller tropical storms, earthquakes, landslides and floods every year, each one killing hundreds and displacing many tens of thousands.

Events such as these place massive demands on governments, threatening internal stability and potentially displacing peoples across borders, adding to pressure on neighbouring countries. They are often made worse by inadequate or slow responses, which can turn an environmental disaster into a humanitarian catastrophe. There has already been much comparison of the differing responses of the Chinese and Burmese governments in May 2008. The Chinese authorities were quick to put rescue plans into action and commit 130,000 troops to a massive relief effort. Had the Chinese government response not been so prompt and efficient, many more would have died.

In contrast, the Burmese junta failed to recognise the scale of the emergency, and, at first, refused to accept foreign aid. It is likely that this government failure caused further unnecessary deaths and suffering.

Such disasters may occur more frequently with climate change over the coming decades. The latest findings of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) suggest that coastal areas will be hit by more frequent tropical storms and increased flooding, particularly the heavily populated megadelta regions in south, east and south-east Asia. They are also predicting a shift in rainfall patterns and a decrease in freshwater availability in most of Asia (particularly for those states dependent on Himalayan glacier melt water).

In addition, serious food and water security problems can be expected in Australia and New Zealand within the next twenty years. With Tuvalu and other Pacific islands set to disappear under rising sea levels and Bangladesh likely to lose a third of its land mass to flooding, perhaps the biggest problem for the region will be managing huge numbers of environmental refugees. New Zealand has agreed to accept the Tuvaluan population once the island becomes uninhabitable, but India has accelerated the building of a 2,500-mile [4,000-kilometre] security fence along its border with Bangladesh. The problem of environmental refugees will hit Asia hard and regional responses should be developed with some urgency.

Many of the drivers of insecurity outlined above can be addressed and mechanisms put in place to resolve the long-term causes, but there are impediments. These include the regional focus on sovereignty, the lack of inclusive and effective regional security architecture and the absence of a powerful, neutral country to take the lead.

Many of the post-colonial countries in the region are understandably reluctant to compromise their own sovereignty in any way, even if this creates difficulties in addressing pan-regional issues. Often national security takes precedence over regional stability and global security. Furthermore, there are still many unresolved historical grievances that make cooperation difficult and feed unhelpful political rhetoric.

Co-operation is made more difficult by the lack of an inclusive regional security architecture with the strength to implement a new security agenda. Asian integration and intra-regional cooperation would surely help to address the long-term drivers of insecurity in the region. The Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) does encourage such regional communication and has been successful in many respects, but its makeup is perhaps too localised to have any wider impact (despite the ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN Security Community and ASEAN+3 processes). This lack of effective security architecture means that policy responses will continue to be formed at national level, even though regional cooperation is vital to address these sustainably.

If the blockages to change were addressed, mechanisms could be developed to prevent the growth of insecurity and conflict in the longer term. Specific initiatives could include:

*Climate change: Countries in the region that are not signatories to the Kyoto Protocol need to recognise that they too have a responsibility to stabilise then cut their greenhouse gas emissions and accept that economic development cannot come at the expense of social and environmental stability. The United States and other developed countries must negotiate a fair post-Kyoto agreement that includes radically reducing their own emissions.

* Regional architecture: International institutions such as the United Nations and European Union, and other influential players both within and outside the region, should support the development of a strong, inclusive regional security architecture.

*Power shift: President Barack Obama`s new administration should accept the rise of China and move from balance-of-power politics to policies of engagement and trust-building, particularly in the areas of trade, environmental protection and regional security.

*Taking the initiative: Given the lack of one powerful, respected and neutral country, Asian civil society organisations might draw together an independent, high-level panel of respected individuals, including security experts and elder statesmen, to promote a sustainable security framework for Asia and Australasia, with a particular focus on preventative diplomacy and educating publics and governments on the seriousness of the threats the region faces.

Over the next five to ten years, a radical shift towards sustainable approaches to security will be hugely important. If there is no change in thinking, security policies will continue to be based on the mistaken assumption that environmental problems can be marginalised. A change in thinking could lead to an era of substantial progress in developing a socially just and environmentally sustainable regional order for Asia and Australasia.

Chris Abbott is the deputy director of Oxford Research Group (ORG).

Sophie Marsden is an ORG research assistant.

This article is an edited version of the report Tigers and Dragons: Sustainable Security in Asia and Australasia, published by the Oxford Research Group (ORG) and the Singapore Institute of International Affairs (SIIA), following a consultation that ORG and SIIA held in Singapore in September 2008.

Homepage photo by uncultured

Half of the world’s population could face severe food shortages by the end of the century as rising temperatures take their toll on farmers’ crops, scientists have warned.

Harvests of staple food crops such as rice and maize could fall by between 20% and 40% as a result of higher temperatures during the growing season in the tropics and subtropics. Warmer temperatures in those zones also are expected to increase the risk of drought, further reducing crop losses, according to a new study.

The worst of the food shortages are expected to hit the poor, densely inhabited regions of the equatorial belt, where demand for food already is soaring because of a rapid growth in population.

A study published in the American journal Science found there was a 90% chance that by the end of this century, the coolest temperatures in the tropics during the crop-growing season would exceed the hottest temperatures recorded between 1900 and 2006.

More temperate regions such as Europe could expect to see previous record temperatures become the norm by 2100.

“The stress on global food production from temperatures alone is going to be huge, and that doesn’t take into account water supplies stressed by the higher temperatures,” said David Battisti, at the University of Washington, who led the study.

Battisti and Rosamond Naylor, at Stanford University in California, combined climate models from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and historical examples of the impact of heat waves on agriculture and found severe food shortages were likely to become more common.

Among the periods they examined was the record heat wave across western Europe in 2003, which killed an estimated 52,000 people and also cut yields of wheat and fodder by a third. In 1972, a prolonged hot summer in south-east Ukraine and south-west Russia saw temperatures rise by between two and four degrees Celsius above the norm, driving down wheat and coarse grain yields for the whole of the then Soviet Union by 13%. The disruption affected the global cereal market for two years.

Naylor, who is director of the food security and the environment programme at Stanford, said the study emphasised the need for countries to invest in adapting to a changing climate. To develop new crops to withstand higher temperatures could take decades, she added.

“When we looked at our historical examples, there were ways to address the problem within a given year,” Naylor said. “People could always turn somewhere else to find food. But in the future there’s not going to be any place to turn unless we rethink our food supplies.”

The tropics and subtropics — which stretch from the southern United States to northern Argentina and southern Brazil, from northern India and southern China to southern Australia, and cover all of Africa — are currently home to three billion people. Future temperature rises are expected to have a greater impact in the tropics because the crops grown there are less resilient to changes in climate.

According to the study, many local populations now live on less than US$2 a day and depend on agriculture. The need for food is due to become more urgent as populations are expected to nearly double by the end of the century.

“When all the signs point in the same direction — and in this case it’s a bad direction — you pretty much know what’s going to happen,” Battisti said. “You’re talking about hundreds of millions of additional people looking for food because they won’t be able to find it where they find it now.”

“You can let it happen and painfully adapt, or you can plan for it. You could also mitigate [climate change] and not let it happen in the first place, but we’re not doing a very good job of that.”

Naylor added: “We have to be rethinking agriculture systems as a whole — not only thinking about new varieties [of crops], but also recognising that many people will just move out of agriculture, and even move from the lands where they live now.”

In many countries, a combination of poor farming practices and deforestation, exacerbated by climate change, may steadily degrade soil fertility, leaving vast areas unsuitable for crops or grazing. In 2007, scientists warned that poor soil fertility meant a global food crisis was likely in the next half-century.

Homepage photo by gbaku

www.guardian.co.uk

Copyright Guardian News and Media Limited 2009

(Republished with permission from the Worldwatch Institute`s 2009 “State of the World” report, Into a Warming World.)

The world`s small island developing states (SIDS) are often cited as the most vulnerable countries to climate impacts and the first nations on earth to face critical climate-change thresholds. Yet they have contributed least to the growing concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere and so have the least responsibility for the crisis the world now faces. They are least likely to be heard at the negotiating table, as they lack the political weight of the major emitters. As a result, their vulnerability goes unnoticed and their voices go unheard.

They are also least likely to be the beneficiaries of climate funds, most of which get spent on mitigation (particularly energy projects) rather than adaptation. And when action is taken, they are least likely to be involved in the consultations.

The Caribbean states provide a good example of the vulnerability of small islands states. According to the New Economics Foundation (nef), the increased strength of storms and hurricanes and the surge in their destructive forces have affected hundreds of thousands of victims and led to multimillion-dollar damages. In 2004, Grenada, an island considered to be outside the hurricane belt, was devastated when Hurricane Ivan struck, destroying over 90% of the country`s infrastructure and housing stock and causing over US$800 million in damages, the equivalent of 200% of Grenada`s gross domestic product. The increase in frequency and intensity of these storms expected due to climate change could well place further strain on political, social, and economic systems and act as an additional constraint on development in the region.

These islands depend on fragile eco-systems such as coral reefs. Globally, coral reefs provide critical habitat for more than 25% of marine species and contribute more than US$30 billion in annual net economic benefit. Recent studies estimate that a third of the world`s reef-building coral species are facing extinction. Climate change, coastal development, overfishing and pollution are the major threats. A new analysis shows that before 1998, only 13 of the 704 coral species assessed would have been classified as threatened. Now the number in that category is 231.

The Caribbean has the largest proportion of corals in high extinction-risk categories, but reefs in the Indian Ocean and the Pacific are also likely to be decimated. Sea level rises, flooding and storm surges are a particular concern for the atoll states in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. If the projections of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) prove correct, these island nations will effectively disappear by the end of this century.

SIDS also suffer from a lack of natural resources, often have limited freshwater supplies, and are constrained by poor transport and communication infrastructure. This means they are particularly susceptible to even small changes in the global climate. Furthermore, the chronic lack of adaptive capacity, including financial, technical and institutional resources, means they are ill prepared to deal with these multiple threats.

Today small island states are striving to achieve long-term sustainable development and implement the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Climate change impacts are already undermining their efforts, however.

The first MDG%26mdash;to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger%26mdash;is being affected by changing patterns of food production and the gradual undermining of livelihoods.

Many of these islands depend heavily on tourism and natural resources for their economic livelihood. They also depend on local staples and species for the bulk of their food. Threats to biodiversity and coral reef systems will reduce these livelihood assets, undermine economic performance and threaten regional food security.

The second goal%26mdash;to achieve universal primary education%26mdash;is being compromised by extreme weather events that create a cycle of destruction and reconstruction and that reduce the amount of investment flowing into long-term development. Tropical cyclones destroy schools and hospitals, damage public utilities and infrastructure (including energy, water and transport connections), and so reduce access to education, health care and other public services. Loss of national revenue from associated impacts may also undermine public spending on education.

The third MDG%26mdash;to promote gender equality and empower women%26mdash;is jeopardised, as women living in poverty are often the most threatened by the dangers that stem from climate change. Cultural norms can mean that women do not have the appropriate skill sets to deal with myriad impacts. The statistics indicating fatalities from extreme weather events are revealing in this regard. Moreover, as resources become scarcer, women and young girls spend more time collecting food and water and less time caring for their health and education.

Three of the MDGs deal with health and aim to reduce child mortality, improve maternal health and combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases. The World Health Organisation (WHO) and leading health providers are anticipating an increase in waterborne and vector-borne diseases, in diarrhoeal diseases and in malnutrition as a result of associated climate impacts. This could lead to increases in child mortality, a reduction in maternal health and the undermining of nutritional health needed to combat HIV/ AIDS.

In the Maldives, a small-islands nation in the southern Indian Ocean, the human drama of climate change is a daily reality for 300,000 residents. In 1987 the president of the Maldives, Maumoon Abdul Gayoom, became the first world leader to draw attention to the threat of climate change. In a landmark speech to the United Nations General Assembly, he warned that this would result in the death of his nation and others like it. Twenty years on and the effects of climate change are already evident: storm surges and coastal erosion destroy homes, pose dangers to infrastructure and utilities, and divert limited resources from strategic development.

In the medium term, rising ocean temperatures, coupled with growing acidification, threaten the survival of coral reefs in the Maldives%26mdash;the very lifeblood of the economy. The island`s two principal industries, tourism and fisheries, are entirely dependent upon the reefs. They account for 40% of the national economic output and more than 40% of the jobs. Together, these industries have fueled the sustained and enviable economic development that has enabled the Maldives to grow from being one of the poorest countries in South Asia in the 1970s to the richest country per capita in the region today.

In the long term, it is not economic development but the country`s very survival that is threatened. With most of the islands lying less than one metre above sea level, this generation%26mdash;the most fortunate one to have ever lived on these islands%26mdash;may be the last one to live in the Maldives.

Since some degree of climate change is already inevitable as the effects of current concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere continue to be felt for the next few decades, the government of the Maldives has developed a comprehensive program of domestic adaptation. Work has concentrated on reinforcing vital infrastructure, particularly related to transport and communications. Public services ranging from water supply and electricity generation to the provision of health care and education are being strengthened against climate threats. Flood defenses have been constructed, and measures are being taken to minimise coastal erosion.

Perhaps the most innovative adaptation measure is the development of the “safe island” concept. This initiative is designed to minimise climate vulnerability by resettling communities from smaller islands that are more vulnerable onto larger, better-protected ones. This lets the government concentrate limited resources on protecting the more viable islands. It also allows for public services to be strengthened and economic opportunities to be developed.

Domestic adaptation in the Maldives and throughout other vulnerable societies will involve significant engineering projects and large financial investments. It will also require large-scale capacity-building to strengthen institutional capacity, to enhance knowledge, human and financial resources, and to encourage an awareness-raising programme to prepare people for the inevitable changes.

Adaptation without mitigation will result in little more than a temporary respite, postponing catastrophic climate change to a later date. Urgent and ambitious action must be taken to reduce greenhouse-gas emissions. Small island states have been active in attempts to find a global consensus on climate action from the very beginning. Indeed, the momentum to create the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol was in part a result of moral and ethical arguments advanced by members of the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), earning the organisation the title of “Conscience of the Convention.”

AOSIS members are participating actively in the Bali process, which seeks to find an appropriate global climate regime to succeed the Kyoto Protocol`s first commitment period, which expires in 2012. The AOSIS negotiating position for the Bali process is entitled “No Island Left Behind”. It outlines three long-term strategic objectives:

* An ambitious long-term goal for reducing greenhouse-gas emissions should be the organising point for all other processes within the Bali process. This implies deep and aggressive cuts in emissions to levels that keep long-term temperature increases as far below 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels as possible.

* More funding for adaptation is needed, with priority access given to SIDS on an expedited basis, based on their specific vulnerabilities and lack of capacity.

* SIDS need support and technical assistance to build capacity and gain access to technologies to respond and adapt to climate change across a wide range of socio-economic sectors.

AOSIS favors an expanded and broadened Kyoto Protocol, with clear opportunities for developing countries that may wish to enter into full Kyoto commitments. The overall outcome should use impacts on SIDS as a benchmark for effectiveness and success. Although AOSIS has had a legitimate and important voice in the climate change process, the organisation has often suffered from its own capacity constraints and from division among its members.

Many countries have become frustrated at the lack of urgency and ambition in international negotiations and believe that the time has come to change the dynamic by introducing new approaches to solving the climate crisis. In March 2008, the government of the Maldives, working closely with a number of other island nations and drawing on the support of more than 70 countries, introduced a resolution on climate change and human rights at the United Nations Human Rights Council in Geneva. It called on the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights to conduct an analytical study exploring the interface between human rights and climate change. This groundbreaking and innovative initiative seeks to import the rhetorical, normative and operational force of international human rights law into the climate change discourse.

A rights-based approach to climate change holds a great deal of promise for small island states as they seek to inject urgency and ambition into mitigation policy while simultaneously lobbying for increased financial flows to support mitigation.

First, a rights-based approach could help improve analysis of the human impacts of climate change by linking it to realising more than 50 international human-rights laws, such as the right to life, health and an adequate standard of living.

Second, a rights-based approach replaces policy preferences with legal obligations and turns the communities most vulnerable to climate change from passive observers of climate negotiations into rights holders. This will give voice to the vulnerable and compel the major emitters to act on climate change before the clock runs out on small island states.

Edward Cameron is a Washington-based climate change specialist who has worked extensively with small island states.

Copyright 2009 Worldwatch Institute

(Republished with permission from the Worldwatch Institute`s 2009 “State of the World” report, Into a Warming World.)

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Along one wall of Jim Hansen`s wood-panelled office in Manhattan, the distinguished climatologist has pinned 10 photographs of his three grandchildren: Sophie, Connor and Jake. They are the only personal items on display in an office otherwise dominated by stacks of file folders, bundles of papers and cardboard boxes filled with reports on climate variations and atmospheric measurements.

The director of Nasa’s Goddard Institute for Space Studies (GISS) in New York, James E Hansen is clearly a doting grandfather as well as an internationally revered climate scientist. Yet his pictures are more than mere expressions of familial love. They are reminders to the 67-year-old scientist of his duty to future generations, children whom he now believes are threatened by a global greenhouse catastrophe that is spiralling out of control because of soaring carbon-dioxide emissions from industry and transport.

“I have been described as the grandfather of climate change. In fact, I am just a grandfather and I do not want my grandchildren to say that grandpa understood what was happening but didn’t make it clear,” Hansen said in early January. Hence his warning to Barack Obama, who became president of the United States on January 20. Obama`s four-year administration offers the world a last chance to get things right, Hansen said. If it fails, global disaster — melted sea caps, flooded cities, species extinctions and spreading deserts — awaits mankind.

“We cannot now afford to put off change any longer,” said Hansen. “We have to get on a new path within this new administration. We have only four years left for Obama to set an example to the rest of the world. America must take the lead.”

After eight years of opposing moves to combat climate change, thanks to the policies of president George W Bush, the United States had given itself no time for manoeuvre, he said. Only drastic, immediate change can save the day and those changes proposed by Hansen — who appeared in former US vice president Al Gore’s film An Inconvenient Truth and is a winner of the environmental organisation WWF`s top conservation award — are certainly far-reaching. In particular, the idea of continuing with “cap-and-trade” schemes, which allow countries to trade allowances and permits for emitting carbon dioxide, must now be scrapped, he insisted. Such schemes, encouraged by the Kyoto climate treaty, were simply “weak tea” and did not work. “The United States did not sign Kyoto, yet its emissions are not that different from the countries that did sign it.”

Thus plans to include carbon-trading schemes in talks about future climate agreements were a desperate error, he said. “It’s just greenwash. I would rather the forthcoming Copenhagen climate talks fail than we agree to a bad deal,” Hansen said.

Only a carbon tax, agreed by the west and then imposed on the rest of the world through political pressure and trade tariffs, would succeed in the now-desperate task of stopping the rise of emissions, he argued. This tax would be imposed on oil corporations and gas companies and would specifically raise the prices of fuels across the globe, making their use less attractive. In addition, the mining of coal — by far the worst emitter of carbon dioxide — would be phased out entirely along with coal-burning power plants, which he called factories of death.

“Coal is responsible for as much atmospheric carbon dioxide as other fossil fuels combined and it still has far greater reserves,” he said. “We must stop using it.” Instead, programmes for building wind, solar and other renewable energy plants should be given major boosts, along with research programmes for new generations of nuclear reactors.

Hansen’s strident calls for action stem from his special view of our changing world. He and his staff monitor temperatures relayed to the institute – housed in an anonymous brownstone building near Columbia University — from thousands of sites around the world, including satellites and bases in Antarctica. These have revealed that our planet has gone through a 0.6%26ordm; Celsius rise in temperature since 1970, with the 10 hottest years having occurred between 1997 and 2008: unambiguous evidence, he believes, that Earth is beginning to overheat dangerously.

In January, however, Hansen revealed his findings for 2008 which show, surprisingly, that last year was the coolest this century, although still hot by standards of the 20th century. The finding will doubtless be seized on by climate-change deniers, for whom Hansen is a particular hate figure, and used as “evidence” that global warming is a hoax.

However, deniers should show caution, Hansen insisted. Most of the planet was exceptionally warm last year. Only a strong La Ni%26ntilde;a — a vast cooling of the Pacific that occurs every few years — brought down the average temperature. La Ni%26ntilde;a would not persist, he said. “Before the end of Obama’s first term, we will be seeing new record temperatures. I can promise the president that.”

Hansen’s uncompromising views are, in some ways, unusual. Apart from his senior post at the US space agency, he holds a professorship in environmental sciences at Columbia and dresses like a tweedy academic. Yet behind his unassuming, self-effacing manner, the former planetary scientist has shown surprising steel throughout his career. In 1988, he electrified a congressional hearing, on a particular hot, sticky day in June, when he announced he was “99% certain” that global warming was to blame for the weather and that the planet was now in peril from rising carbon-dioxide emissions. His remarks, which made headlines across the United States, pushed global warming on to news agendas for the first time.

Over the years, Hansen persisted with his warnings. Then, in 2005, he gave a talk at the American Geophysical Union in which he argued that the year was the warmest on record and that industrial carbon emissions were to blame. A furious White House phoned Nasa and Hansen was banned from appearing in newspapers or on television or radio. It was a bungled attempt at censorship. Newspapers revealed that Hansen was being silenced and his story, along with his warnings about the climate, got global coverage.

Since then, Hansen has continued his mission “to make clear” the dangers of climate change, sending a letter last December from himself and his wife, Anniek, about the urgency of the planet’s climatic peril to Barack and Michelle Obama. “We decided to send it to both of them because we thought there may be a better chance she will think about this or have time for it,” Hansen said. “The difficulty of this problem [of global warming] is that its main impacts will be felt by our children and by our grandchildren. A mother tends to be concerned about such things.”

Nor have his messages of imminent doom been restricted to US politicians. The heads of the governments of the United Kingdom, Germany, Japan and Australia all have received recent warnings from Hansen about their countries’ behaviour. In each case, these nations’ continued support for the burning of coal to generate electricity has horrified the climatologist. In Britain, Hansen has condemned the government’s plans to build a new coal plant at Kingsnorth — south-east of London, in the county of Kent — for example, and he even appeared in court as a defence witness for protesters who occupied the proposed new plant’s site in 2007. [Read his full statement here.]

“On a per capita basis, Britain is responsible for more of the carbon dioxide now in the atmosphere than any other nation on earth because it has been burning it from the dawn of the industrial revolution,” Hansen said. “America comes second and Germany third. The crucial point is that Britain could make a real difference if it said no to Kingsnorth. That decision would set an example to the rest of the world.” These points were made clear in Hansen’s letter to the prime minister, Gordon Brown, though he says he is still awaiting a reply.

As to the specific warnings he makes about climate change, these concentrate heavily on global warming’s impact on the ice caps in Greenland and Antarctica. These are now melting at an alarming rate and threaten to increase sea levels by one or two metres over the century, enough to inundate cities and fertile land around the globe.

The issue was simple, said Hansen: would each annual increase of carbon dioxide to the atmosphere produce a simple proportional increase in temperature or would its heating start to accelerate?

He firmly believes the latter. As the Arctic’s sea-ice cover decreases, less and less sunlight will be reflected back into space. And as tundras heat up, more and more of their carbon dioxide and methane content will be released into the atmosphere. Thus each added tonne of carbon will trigger greater rises in temperature as the years progress. The result will be massive ice-cap melting and sea-level rises of several metres: enough to devastate most of the world’s major cities.

“I recently lunched with Martin Rees, president of the Royal Society [the United Kingdom`s independent scientific academy], and proposed a joint programme to investigate this issue as a matter of urgency, in partnership with the US National Academy of Sciences,” he said. [Whether that will happen remains to be seen.]

The world of science has got used to the fact that Hansen is as persistent as he is respected in his work and will continue to press his cause: a coal-power moratorium and an investigation of ice-cap melting.

The world was now in “imminent peril”, he insisted, and nothing would quench his resolve in spreading the message. It is the debt he owes his grandchildren, after all.

www.guardian.co.uk

Copyright Guardian News and Media Limited 2009

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