Chinese walker

All too often Western commentators have presented the environmental costs of China`s development as the final straw that will break the planet`s already burdened carrying capacity. Over the past year, however, a new theme has been emerging from the business and investment community, one that emphasizes the profound commercial opportunity that this crisis presents. As leading investment bank, CLSA, noted this May in a special report on sustainable energy, “if environmental legislation in Asia were a stock, it would be a raging Buy”. China lies at the heart of this burgeoning market for environmental goods and services, driven by the pressing need to respond to its twin %26lsquo;resource crunch` of getting access to sufficient quantities of clean energy and clean water.

Far-sighted investment analysts such as Stephen Roach at Morgan Stanley are seeing signs of a new %26lsquo;commodity lite` model of development in China, “in effect, retrofitting China`s commodity-guzzling production platform with more commodity-efficient technologies.” China`s 11th Five-Year Plan contains an explicit target of reducing the energy intensity of growth by 4% each year through to 2010 – a target that is eminently achievable by adopting good practice standards from across the globe. For example, a recent assessment from the World Bank and the UN Environment Programme concluded that China – along with Brazil and India – could reduce energy demand by a quarter.

Until recently, reports such as these would probably have gathered dust on bureaucrats` shelves. But the rapid rise in world energy costs, increasing import dependency for energy and the emergence of new carbon markets has generated real demand for clean energy options. Installed wind power grew by 65% in China last year, and is forecast to expand by an annualised rate of 44% by end-2010 (CLSA, Clean and Green, May 2006). Growth rates such as these are underpinned by falling costs of energy from wind generation and government incentives flowing from the new Renewable Energy law. The momentum is such that industry executives believe that China`s official target to increase wind capacity to 5 giga-watts (GW) by 2010 could be exceeded by as much as 100%. Leading international wind developers, such as Spain`s Acciona and Iberdrola, are now positioning themselves to take a slice of this attractive market.

Burgeoning oil prices are also providing an additional stimulus for an expansion in bio-fuel production. China is already the third largest bio-ethanol producer in the world, and has prioritised clean fuels as a priority for the %26lsquo;green` Olympics in 2008. One sign of the growing investment opportunities in this area was the listing of the China Biodiesel International group on London`s Alternative Investment Market (AIM) in June. Importantly, this company produces its fuel predominantly from waste, thereby avoiding some of the growing environmental concerns about the conservation and water consumption impacts of increased biofuel production.

On top of this, China has also become a centrepiece of the emerging global carbon market thanks to the UN`s Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). Through the CDM, international capital is being deployed to achieve reductions in carbon emissions in emerging markets which then count against the industrialised world`s domestic carbon targets. China is projected to account for more than 40% of expected emission reductions under the mechanism, thanks to its competitive business environment which means that carbon savings can be made at a fraction of the equivalent cost in the developed world. Projects that will cumulatively help to achieve this target include a landfill gas to electricity initiative in the southern city of Nanjing. In August 2006, the world`s largest CDM project worth over US$1 billion was agreed between the World Bank and two Chinese chemical companies. For James Cameron, founder of Climate Change Capital, a London-based carbon bank, “choosing to put money in China to reduce emissions is simply an efficient allocation of capital on a global scale.”

With an unprecedented drought affecting China this summer, the severity of the country`s water crisis cannot be underestimated. With less than a quarter of the world`s average per capita water availability, China currently squanders what it has, using five times as much water to produce each and every dollar of national income. Not surprisingly, water shortages are already reducing industrial output by an estimated US$ 25 billion each year, with a further US$ 19 billion lost in terms of agricultural production. But rising demand and declining supply – exacerbated by local pollution and global climate change – is prompting an unprecedented national investment programme, worth perhaps US$ 61 billion by 2010. Serving this market offers major opportunities for international engineering companies such as General Electric, which is deploying advanced membrane and desalination technologies as part of its ecomagination initiative. International investors are also showing increased interest both in China`s stock-market listed water utilities – such as Shanghai Municipal Raw Water, Guangdong Investment and Tianjin Capital – as well as technology providers, including Hyflux and Sinomem.

The scale of China`s %26lsquo;green` opportunity means that it is enticing %26lsquo;mainstream` as well as specialist SRI investors from across the globe. And in China itself, the Bank of China International Investment Managers (BOCIIM) launched its Sustainable Growth Equity Fund in May to tap into the potential. Much still needs to be done to ensure that China`s growth is compatible with sustainability. But the early signs of the commercial bonanza this represents are already with us.

The author: Nick Robins is head of sustainable and responsible investment (SRI) funds at Henderson Global Investors in London where he has a particular focus on the investment implications of climate change. Previously, Nick worked at the International Institute for Environment and Development (IEED), at the European Commission’s Environment Directorate in the run-up to the 1992 Earth Summit and as an adviser to a range of government bodies in the UK, as well as the OECD, UNEP and UNIDO.

Homepage photo by Doreamon

chinadialogue: How has the political attitude to climate change evolved since 1997?

Elliot Diringer: In many countries, political support for addressing climate change has grown significantly since 1997. A principal reason is that the scientific consensus on climate change has grown stronger. Scientists are now agreed that the earth is warming, in large because of the dramatic increase in greenhouse gas emissions from human activities. Also, there is growing evidence that global warming impacts, such as melting of glaciers and changes in ecosystems, are occurring faster than predicted. Economists also have developed a better understanding of the economic risks of climate change. A recent review by Sir Nicholas Stern, the United Kingdom`s chief economist, concluded that strong action to reduce emissions would cost approximately 1% of global GDP by 2050, but if action is not taken, the impacts of climate change could reduce global GDP by 5% to 20%. While political support for action is growing, it must become much stronger, particularly in the United States and in the major emerging economies, in order for governments to undertake the actions necessary to avoid dangerous climate change.

cd: What has the Kyoto Protocol achieved?

Tiger bone wine (also known as “bone-restoring wine”) has recently appeared on the market in China. Does this mean that the 20-year ban on the trade in tiger bones has been lifted? This question has aroused great interest among animal protection activists in China and the rest of the world.

On August 25, China Youth Daily carried a report about tiger skeletons seen soaking in alcohol, and the resulting wine being sold, at the Xiongsen Distillery in Guangxi, southern China.

The Xiongsen Distillery is a subsidiary of Guilin`s Xiongsen Bear and Tiger Park, located in Pingnan county. It produces tiger bone wine and bear bile wine. The distillery has a storage capacity of 8,000 tonnes; it has already used over 400 skeletons from farmed tigers – and plans to expand. A company spokesperson confirmed that Xiongsen`s “bone-restoring wine” is indeed made with tiger bones.

Amazingly, the company`s sale of these products has been approved by the State Forestry Administration and Industrial and Commercial Bureau. But the wildlife conservation status that the two organisations have issued is written in English, and reads “lion”, rather than “tiger”. Perhaps this was meant to avoid international repercussions. After all, not many people in China would understand the English. Clearly, the company is aware of international sensitivity to the trade in tigers.

The plight of wild tigers is currently a great cause for concern. In July, a scientific survey found that tigers` habitats worldwide have been reduced by 40% over the last decade. China is home to only 50 wild tigers, any form of poaching or trade could quickly result in their extinction.

Tiger pelt seized in Thailand, October 2003

For all those desirous to see greater flow of foreign direct investments into Africa, the year 2006 opened on a very optimistic note. China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) announced an investment of US$2.3 billion in Nigeria, the continent`s most populous nation. The deal, China`s biggest investment foray into Africa, gives the corporation a 45% stake in an off-shore oil field. China now has partial control over a Nigerian oil field that has the capacity to produce as much as 180,000 barrels per day.

China`s investment in that African country is just one out of many of such moves into the continent in last few years, one driven – among other things – by the increasing conflicts and uncertainties in Iraq and other parts of the middle east. Angola, another of Africa`s major oil producers, has now overtaken Saudi Arabia as China`s biggest single provider of oil.

Zambia, South Africa, Gabon, Cameroun and the Democratic Republic of Congo are some other African countries that have witnessed surging Chinese economic interest. From South Africa, China seeks iron ore and platinum. From DR Congoand Zambia, it seeks copper and cobalt; and from Cameroun and Congo Brazzaville, it seeks timber. All of these are raw materials that China needs to drive its ever growing industrial sector. And the results are already beginning to show. From a US$3 billion mark in 1995, trade between China and Africa last year stood at US$32 billion. Projections are that the figures will hit US$50 billion by the end of this year and will triple by 2015, the UN`s target year to halve poverty worldwide.

The “new scramble for Africa”, as some have christened China`s romance with the continent, has been more dramatic in some countries than others. Despite its lingering political crisis, which has attracted international attention and calls for sanctions, Sudan`s exports to China have soared from 10% in 1995 to 70% of its total exports as of 2005. Beijing also said earlier this year that it will plough US$35 million into the construction of west Africa`s biggest theatre in Senegal, its first major foray into the continent`s entertainment industry.

But China`s growing interest in Africa, which has attracted criticisms from other global players such as the US, has been most profound in the continent`s oil-producing states. China has promised to commit US$4 billion to building refineries and power plants in Nigeria. Similar largesse is in the offing for Angola, where China has also promised to raise another US$4 billion to help the reconstruction of roads and other infrastructure.

Does the “new scramble” share any resemblance with that of the 17th and 18th century, which saw the massive shipment of African youths to Europe and America? I don`t think so. Western imperialism had no “business” colouration at all. It was simply a rape predicated on ignorance for which some Africans still seek reparation. But today`s oil deals are business: legitimate business consciously entered into by the parties involved, and from which all parties can benefit. For Nigeria, the principal challenge is how to ensure that a greater majority of its 130 million population benefits from the huge inflow of petrodollars.

Experience from the past has not been particularly heart-warming. Half a century of oil exploration in the Niger Delta has left the people of the region poorer than they were before the discovery of oil in their neighborhood. Even more worrisome is the ecological damage that the reckless acts of oil spillage and gas flaring have caused in the region.

Goodluck Diigbo, an activist from Ogoni, an oil-producing community in the Niger Delta, believes that oil has done his community more harm than good. “All you see in Ogoni is agony,” he told me in New York last month. He has been living in New York since 1995, when the military regime of Sani Abacha made attempts on his life. Diigbo was a close ally of Ken Saro Wiwa, leader of the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP), who was killed by Abacha`s government 11 years ago.

A high level of resentment exists in the Niger Delta against all individuals and institutions that people perceive as instrumental to the ecological disaster they currently face. Another Niger Deltan, whom I spoke with during a visit to the region in March, was as rhetorical as Diigbo. “The presence of Shell in Niger Delta has made the place nothing but hell for its people,” he said. I felt a little bit of the hell when I toured some gas flaring sites in the region.

photo by Karlsruhe

Nigeria currently flares 75% of its daily gas production. Experts say that in Nigeria, an average of around 1000 standard cubic feet of gas is produced for every barrel of oil. With a production rate of about 2.2 million barrels per day, that equals 2.2 billion cubic feet of gas wasted daily. By all assessments, this is a monumental waste and a significant contribution to global greenhouse-gas emissions. According to a World Bank 2002 report, “the most striking example of environmental neglect [in Africa] has been in the oil sector, where natural gas flaring has contributed more emissions of greenhouse gases than all other sources in sub-Saharan Africa combined.”

Gas flares release a cocktail of toxic substances into the atmosphere, including the greenhouse gases carbon dioxide (CO2) and methane (CH4). Scientists say methane has higher global-warming potential than carbon dioxide. Assessments by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) indicate that after 20 years, 1 kg of methane is 62 times more potent than 1kg of carbon dioxide.

What do these facts mean for the latest bride of Nigeria`s oil sector? For one, it calls to attention the need to be an environmentally-friendly operator right from the very beginning. Shell began operations in the Niger Delta at a time when the country was still under colonial rule. Many people in the region believe that the company has yet to shed that colonial attitude, decades after Nigeria became an independent state.

CNOOC cannot afford to carry out its operation with the same arrogance that Shell has exhibited in the region over the years. To do so will be very counter-productive. The desire of every investor is gain, not pain. And real gain is that which benefits all the stakeholders in the deal. No matter who signs the contract papers authorising its operations in Nigeria, CNOOC must see its immediate host community as stakeholders in its operations.

Last year`s series of hurricanes in the United States and Latin America, which some scientists blame on global warming, show that the consequences of oil companies` reckless environmental activities are no longer just a problem for the communities directly impacted by acts of environment recklessness. There are many consequences that are faced by all. Evidence linking global warming and hurricane intensity might still appear fuzzy, but it is a potential danger worth taking very seriously.

Neglecting these responsibilities would ultimately be self-defeating. Prosperity built on the despoilment of the natural environment is no prosperity at all. It is only a reprieve from future disaster. The issue is not environment versus development or ecology versus economy; the two can and should be integrated. This is a challenge that CNOOC must show a strong commitment to meeting.

Godwin Nnanna is Assistant Editor at Business Day Nigeria and winner of the Kalaam Award for Consumer Journalism 2005.

I describe myself these days as an escaped diplomat who has been recaptured. I was enjoying life outside government running an independent organisation when the call came. It was an offer I had to take very seriously. So I am recaptured by government, but actually happily recaptured because it is a tremendous privilege to have this role.

There`s one force, whether you are Chinese or African or European or American, which, more than any other is shaping the world that we live in, and that is the rapid growth of interdependence. It means that there is very little now that we can sensibly deal with, very few actions that we can take, that we can take in isolation from everybody else.

One of the scary things about the modern world is the sudden appearance of increasingly nasty epidemics. We have learned the hard way that the choices that are made by the institutions and governments in the places where they first appear have enormous importance all over the world. Such choices might make the difference between a local epidemic and a rampant global pandemic that wreaks enormous havoc.

And that`s just an example of the reality of interdependence. There really are no borders. Interdependence forces us to understand that today`s challenges represent not just a dilemma for us, but a shared dilemma for everybody. The environment brings that into a very tangible focus: there`s no such thing as a stable climate for one country or one continent unless the climate is stable for everybody. Climate security is a global public good. It is not a typical public good because if it is not there then governments will find it increasingly difficult to deliver the other public goods.

There is interdependence, too, in natural resources. Most markets are global, which means that a sudden change in market conditions or a sudden increase in demand in one part of the world, there are immediately consequences for everybody else who needs those resources.

The very enlightened decision, for instance, that the Chinese government took in 1998 to ban logging domestically was very successful in its own terms. In fact it was one of the most successful interventions that any government has made to deal with illegal logging. But I doubt that the people who took that decision anticipated that another consequence of it would be to prolong the civil war in Liberia, or to enrich the Russian mafia, or to have any of the knock on effects that resulted from the fact that, while it was possible to switch off the domestic supply of timber in China, it was not possible to switch off the Chinese demand for timber from the world market.

The result was an intensification of, mostly illegal, logging in Siberia, southeast Asia and west Africa – in other words, lots of unintended consequences.

It`s an illustration of the fact that one of the features of this more interdependent world is that somehow we need to build a broader politics of accountability. We need to understand the consequences of our actions outside the domain in which we have a natural understanding, and we need to work out how to take responsibility for those consequences.

The rise of China sharpens that shared dilemma. It sharpens it because of the sheer scale and the pace of what is happening in China. China is building infrastructure and deploying resources faster than any society ever has in human history. The migration that is taking place between the countryside in China and its rapidly growing cities is probably the biggest mass migration in human history.

That means two things: firstly that along with all that change, enormous stresses are being created and felt in China. These stresses are social and economic, and environmental. They are also very well recognised by Chinese leaders, who understand that unless they can contain them, then they will be hugely destabilising. You just have to read more or less any speech by members of the Chinese leadership in recent years and that theme emerges in one way or another. So there`s a very strong sense internally that there`s a shared dilemma.

But there`s also an external dimension: the decisions that China takes, at all levels, including for instance anyone whose decisions affect China`s carbon footprint, have enormous consequences for everybody in the world.

Similarly the decisions that we take in Europe, North America and Japan, have enormous consequences for China. We shape the limits of the possible for China in ways we don`t fully understand. But it is important to realise that this is a set of opportunities as well as a set of threats.

One of the propositions that I`m working on in my current role is to challenge our colleagues in Europe to say to China that we have very similar interests when it comes to energy. We are all increasingly dependent on imported oil and gas from potentially unstable sources. We both have some of the world`s most aggressive policies on energy efficiency and renewable energy, driven not only by climate change but also by a more old-fashioned desire for energy security. So why don`t we get together and see whether we can build a single market in low carbon technologies between the world`s largest single market and the world`s fastest growing economy? Let`s just look across and see whether we can remove all of the tariff barriers in order to grow the market, and to bring down the price of technologies that we say we want to promote.

That`s an example of an opportunity arising from interdependence. I don`t know whether we will take it. When I discuss this with senior Chinese officials they immediately understand the attraction, but they are also sceptical about whether the European Union is capable of responding with the ambition and the coherence necessary to bring that proposition to life.

In any case what matters in responding to the shared dilemma is that we have debates that are as open and transparent and as inclusive as possible. All of us, in Europe, in China and elsewhere, depend on systems in which institutions have a tendency to disappear within their silos. We, for very understandable historical reasons, have had silo-based governments. The big challenge in dealing with interdependence is to get out of silos. To break down the barriers of communication between cultures, between sectors, between societies, and try and build a common language for dealing with interdependence. Because if we don`t have a common language we won`t come up with shared solutions.

In short we need to build a global politics of interdependence. That`s the biggest political challenge we that have and arguably the biggest political challenge that humanity has ever faced. China is an enormously important piece of that jig-saw.

Breaking down the barriers between different voices inside and outside China is a crucial job: there are barriers between people outside China who need to understand what is going on there and need to have a dialogue about the reciprocal consequences of the decisions that are being taken, and those inside China who are taking them. Breaking those barriers is as important as is breaking down the barriers within China.

We need to do that with all the means at our disposal. Fortunately the internet provides us some very powerful new tools. I am delighted that the vision and determination of chinadialogue.net has taken shape because I think that this is a major intervention in the politics of interdependence. It brings enormous value to us as we struggle with these problems, each in our own small silo. I`m delighted to have a chance to be here on this auspicious day and to extend my very best wishes and my congratulations for what I think is a hugely important venture. Its importance is probably not yet as widely understood as it deserves to be, but will rapidly become much more widely understood.

Thank you very much and congratulations.

The Stern Review`s report on the economics of climate change published on 30 October 2006 is an impressive document that calls for action to meet a global challenge on a civilisational scale. It is also unlikely – on present evidence – to have the effect required, for one simple reason.

Today`s vested political and economic interests are likely to prevent us from effectively addressing climate change, and so securing a decent future on this planet. It`s ghastly, it sticks in the throat, and it`s awesome to think it even as I write it. But it`s probably true.

This prognosis is suggested by Jared Diamond`s best-selling analysis of why societies collapse. Societies are endangered, he argues, when their elites insulate themselves from the negative impact of their own actions in pursuit of power and privilege. His paradigmatic case is of Easter Island, where the overuse of wood products in the production of competing religious totems eventually destroyed its inhabitants` survival prospects.

At an afternoon press conference during the International Olympic Committee`s visit last summer, Hein Verbruggen, the Dutch chairman of the committee, described the city`s Olympic preparations as “stunning.” Another official said he had never, in two decades, seen such an organized plan for the Games. Even as a thick haze covered the city, Jiang Xiaoyu, the vice president of the city`s Olympic committee, explained to journalists that pollution would be brought under control, reassurances that were backed by the sanguine visiting officials. Then someone asked about the traffic.

The glow on Mr. Jiang`s face seemed to fade. Mr. Verbruggen skipped a beat before making a carefully worded assessment. “I can imagine it should be a problem for the people who have to plan for the traffic system. It’s an uphill battle for them.” He explained: “The traffic is rather busy.”

For a city that often looks more like a giant car park than a bustling metropolis, “busy” was not only an understatement, but also lacked a certain accuracy – “idle” might have been a better word. Even as Beijing scrambles to pave new roads to sustain a growing automotive yen – 1,000 new cars hit the streets daily – congestion continues to grow. And for the millions of commuters who rely on a highly-burdened subway and bus system, just getting to work can mean a daily struggle against cars, crowds and carcinogens. When Beijing slipped 10 notches to number 14 in a recent quality of life ranking of Chinese cities, bad transportation beat pollution as the biggest complaint. In July, a report by the World Bank slammed Beijing and similar cities for a “piecemeal and ad-hoc” transit planning that was not only wrecking the city`s quality of life but also clogging its economy.

Even upper-level officials – their black sedans not immune to the slow chaos of Beijing`s streets – have abandoned typical understatement. Once the threat of SARS faded in 2004, Beijing mayor Wang Qishan shifted his sights to a much more difficult target: “The contradiction between real estate development and traffic regulations is the biggest problem now facing Beijing,” he said.

China has seen rapid economic growth since the start of the reform era in 1979. Annual GDP growth averaged 9.6% between 1979 and 2004. In 2004, GDP growth reached 10.1%, an achievement that attracted global attention. Over this period the population has grown sharply; huge quantities of resources have been consumed; environmental pollution has worsened; ecosystems have been wrecked; and vast areas of land have been lost. This has given rise to all manner of environmental problems. The economy has grown, but the environment has suffered. Over the past 27 years, China has adhered to an economic model characterised by high levels of pollution, emissions and power consumption, combined with low levels of efficiency. It has repeated the “pollute first, clean up later” model that Western nations adhered to during their early stages of capital accumulation.

The Tang-dynasty poet Du Fu once wrote: “Though a country be sundered, hills and rivers endure,” yet we can only reflect that while our country endures, our hills and rivers have been devastated. Environmental degradation harms public health, affects social stability and holds back China`s sustainable economic growth. It is a major problem, one which threatens not only the development but also the survival of the Chinese people.

Decreases in cultivated land

Remote-sensing surveys show that China`s cultivated land area plummeted between 1988 and 2000, from 1,307,400 square kilometres in 1991 to 1,282,400 square kilometres in 2000 – from 1.8 mu (0.0012 square kilometres) per head to 1.5 mu (0.0010 square kilometres) per head. Construction accounted for 56.6% of the decrease, 21% of land was forested, 16% was flooded and 4% became grassland.

During the 1990s, the number of cities in China`s east increased from 315 to 521. Each year, an average of 767.42 square kilometres is built on, with this figure growing at an average of 5.76% every year. The land around Beijing has borne the brunt of this, with the city expanding by about 20 square kilometres per year. Besides urban construction, the effects of industry and mining account are also significant. Statistics from the provinces of Jilin, Jiangsu, Fujian, Henan, Hubei and Hunan show that land given over to mining development increased 1.96 times between 1986 and 2000, and the land area that was damaged increased by 4.71 times.

Over this period some cultivated land was added: 24.2% of it by reclaiming woodland, 66% from grasslands and 1.9% from bodies of water. But this was all obtained at the expense of natural ecosystems. Over the last 40 years, land reclamation has lead to the loss of 11,900 square kilometres of coastal shallows, with industry taking more than 10000 square kilometres of coastal wetlands. Half of China`s coastal shallows are now completely destroyed. And despite this, the trend of overall loss of cultivated land has not been reversed.

Where the loss of cultivated land is due to a change in usage, the soil itself at least remains, though sealed below concrete and asphalt. However, soil that is swept away by wind and water is lost forever. In 1999, 3.56 million square kilometres of land were affected by erosion due to wind, water and freeze-thaw cycles. Of this land, 82.53% lies in China`s west. The country has 1.74 million square kilometres of desert spread across 30 provinces, over 90% of which is in the west. An astonishing 1.6 billion tonnes of soil is swept into the Yellow River every year, approximately 400 million tonnes of which is deposited on the riverbed downstream, causing it to rise between eight and 10 centimetres annually. During the past 40 years, the riverbed in the lower reaches of the Yellow River has risen by two metres, and on average it stands three to five metres higher than the land that it flows through. In places it is as much as 10 metres higher. The Yangtze River basin also loses 2.4 billion tonnes of soil per year.

With the loss of soil, valuable nutrients are lost. In the Yellow River basin alone, about 40 million tonnes of nitrogen, phosphorus and potassium are lost annually – more than the total consumption of China`s fertiliser industry in 2003 (39.9 million tonnes). A conservative estimate, factoring in soil lost to water erosion in the Yangtze River basin and wind erosion in arid and semi-arid regions, puts annual loss at five times that figure. The lost nutrition is replaced artificially, atmospherically and with ore, resulting in serious environmental pollution. China`s government should take urgent and effective measures to prevent the further loss of soil.

Photo by vailpost

The threat to China`s forests

According to State Forestry Administration figures, forestry coverage in China rose from 12.98% in 1986 to 16.55% in 1999, a growth of 33%. But we need to be clear about what went into those figures. Many areas adjusted the canopy density rate used to define a “forest” downwards from 0.3 to 0.2. Bushes and shrubs were also added to the figures. It is possible that the amount of forest did not actually increase – only the figures did. In China no old-growth forest remains, and forests over a century old are extremely rare. Even if the above figures are accurate, China`s huge population means that the per capita average is extremely low – only 21.3% of the global average. In terms of volume, China has only 12.5% of the global per capita average of 72 cubic metres.

It should be noted that although central government`s investment in forestry has been gradually increasing, forest management policy`s disregard for the environment has led to a potential threat from weak and unsustainable single-species forests. Between the 1950s and 1990s, the forested area affected by disease and pests increased six-fold. This increase was greatest in the 1990s, 196% of the increase during the 1980s. If China`s vast subtropical mountainous areas were sealed off and human interference reduced, their broadleaf evergreen forests would recover. But tragically, paper manufacturers have felled natural forests in order to plant the invasive eucalyptus tree. Intervention by the authorities has been too weak to prevent this destruction, and some local forestry authorities have even profited from collusion with interest groups.

China`s water crisis

China consumed a total of 556.7 billion cubic metres of water in 2001, 13.2 billion cubic metres more than in 1998. Most of this increase came not from replenishable surface water, but from groundwater obtained by drilling – water that should be left for future generations. Water usage rates for major river basins such as the Huai River, Liao River and Yellow River have reached 60%; the rate in the Hai River is 90% and for the Hei River the rate is 110%. The internationally-recognised warning level is between 30% and 40%.

An inefficient use of water resources and a lack of water conservation awareness mean that even this massive overuse does not meet our so-called “needs.” A total of 60% of China`s 669 cities face water scarcity, and of these, 110 face serious water shortages. Around 60 areas suffer from lowered groundwater levels, with a zone measuring 30,000 to 50,000 square kilometres in the North China Plain being the world`s largest. Over-extraction of groundwater not only happens in China`s arid north, but also in the water-rich south. Subsidence affects 46 cities in 16 provinces, including Shanghai, Tianjin, Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Shanxi. In south China`s Suzhou, 180 square kilometres of land has subsided over 60 centimetres since 1949. In Wuxi, 59.5 square kilometres has subsided by the same amount, and 43 square kilometres in Changzhou.

The relatively water-rich Sanjiang Plain, in northeast China, has also seen a large-scale extraction of water and soil degradation, has led to the loss of wetlands. In the past decade, the northern part of the plain lost 105 square kilometres of wetland. The Songnen Plain and Liao River delta have lost 1,820 square kilometres and 230 square kilometres hectares respectively.

But China’s water crisis is not a purely underground phenomena, it also manifests itself in the loss of glaciers on high plateaus. Glaciers are China`s “solid reservoirs” and an important source of water for arid regions. Global warming caused glaciers north of the Sichuan-Tibet highway in Nyingtri (Lingzhi) to shrink by 100 metres between 1986 and 1998. This retreat will directly impact the progress of the western branch of China`s South to North Water Transfer project.

The destruction of China’s ecosystems

There are ten main types of land ecosystem in the world, and China has nine: tropical rainforest, evergreen broadleaf forests, deciduous broadleaf forests, conifer forest, mangrove forest, grasslands, alpine meadows, desert and tundra. The only ecosystem it lacks is the African savannah, though regions such as the Hunsandake, Keerqin, Mu-us and Hunlun Buir have the same structure and function. China is therefore the only country in the world which may feature all of the world’s ecosystems.

But unfortunately, every one of these ecosystems is suffering. Aside from China`s well-documented loss of forests and expanding deserts, alpine meadows, temperate grasslands and mangrove forests are also being seriously degraded. The Qinghai-Tibetan Plateau is one of the worlds largest, highest and most unique ecosystems. But long-standing over-grazing and misuse has caused serious degradation of its alpine meadows, mainly demonstrated by the drop in hay production from 300 kilograms per mu (667 square metres) in the 1960s, to 100 kilograms today. This destruction is also attested to in the region`s increasing mole-rat infestation: from eight to 10 mole rats per hectare in the past, to more than 30 today.

Ninety percent of China’s usable grasslands display varying degrees of damage, and this area is expanding by 20,000 square kilometres per year. Of this lost grassland, 55% is being used for cultivation, and 30% has simply become unusable. The majority of grasslands in the west of China are over-used; in Xinjiang the rate of overuse is 121%, in Ningxia is 72% and in Inner Mongolia is 66%.

Mangrove forests are globally recognised as one of the world`s most productive and diverse ecosystems. China’s mangrove forests are mostly located to the south of the Fujian coast and at one time covered 2,500 square kilometres. In the 1950s, they covered 500 square kilometres. Now they only cover 150 square kilometres. Since 1949, exploitation, felling and inefficient usage of coastal mangrove forests has brought unprecedented destruction, especially in the past 20 years.

The UN’s Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna (CITES) lists 740 endangered species. Of these, 189 are in China, around a quarter of the total. Between 4,000 and 5,000 of China`s plant species are endangered or approaching endangerment, from 15 to 20% of the country`s total number of plant species. Environmental changes and the fragmentation of habitats are causing this loss of biodiversity. For instance, in the natural forests of Nenjiang county in northeast China`s Heilongjiang province, endangered species were distributed across 240 different locations, with an average size of 0.8 square kilometres. By 2000 this had fragmented to 343 different locations with an average size of 0.68 square kilometres.

NEXT: How can China strengthen environmental protection?

Jiang Gaoming is a chief researcher at the Chinese Academy of Sciences` Institute of Botany and a doctoral candidate tutor, vice secretary-general of UNESCO`s China-MAB Committee and director of the China Environmental Culture Promotion Association. He is recognized for his introduction of the concepts of “urban vegetation” and “using natural forces to restore China`s ecosystems.”

Jixi Gao is chief specialist and head of the Institute of Ecology at the ChinaAcademy of Environmental Sciences. He has long been involved in the evaluation of functional ecologies, environmental assessments of regional development strategies and research into environmental pollution testing.

The last decade has been particularly eventful for Africa. On the political front, the continent has witnessed many transitions that were unprecedented in its entire post-colonial history. For instance, the exit of such strong political figures as Charles Taylor, Gnassingbe Eyadema and Jerry Rawlings in west Africa has changed the face of governance in the region.

On the economic front, many African countries have embarked on reforms aimed at giving a new face to the continent’s economy. Not a few African leaders celebrated in 2005 when their countries secured relief for the huge debt profile that was fast strangulating their economies.

A number of hitherto state-controlled economies in Africa have introduced liberalisation and privatisation policies that are fast redefining the way business is being done. These include Egypt, Angola, Nigeria, Ghana, South Africa and Algeria, which together form the bulk of the continent’s new economic power brokers.

Most of the leaders of these nations believe their countries are on the path to a genuine economic renaissance.

China`s rise

In 1970, 39% of the world’s poorest people lived in China and 37% lived in other parts of Asia. But the Asian economic miracle of the 1980s and 1990s lifted the living standards of huge numbers of people. The percentage of those scraping by on less than US$2 a day in Asia fell from 48% in 1980 to 16% in 1998.

In contrast, Africa only accounted for 16% of the world’s extreme poor in 1980, but made up two-thirds of the global poor in 1998. By the World Bank’s US$3 per day standard, 64% of Africans were poor in 1998, up from 55% in 1980.

But all is not gloomy on the continent. Figures from the African Development Bank (AfDB) indicate that the continent maintained an average economic growth rate of 5% in 2004 and 2005. And the bank predicts an even higher average of 5.8% and 5.5% for 2006 and 2007 respectively. “Two thirds of the 30 countries surveyed showed a net growth in investment that was by far the best in seven years. If the good weather holds up, along with world commodity prices, the improvement could continue into 2007″, AfDB notes in its Africa Economic Outlook.

Africa can learn a lot from China. China`s transformation shows that poverty can be tackled and extreme poverty can be eliminated. From a growth rate that was virtually stagnant in the 1970s, China has risen to become the world`s fourth-largest economy. “We can learn from them how to organize our trade policy, to move from low to middle-income status, to educate our children in skills and areas that pay off in just a couple of years,” said Donald Kaberuka, AfDB president.

China gave a new impetus to its relationship with Africa when, at the beginning of the year, it dubbed 2006 the “year of Africa.” Unlike many international declarations, evidence abounds that proves the impact of that statement. In 2006, Nigeria alone benefited from over US$3 billion of Chinese investment in its oil and gas sector, and is looking forward to another investment of US$4 billion in its railways that would help revamp a sector that has remained moribund since the 1960s. China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation (CCECC) is to build a 1,315 kilometre railway from Lagos, in southern Nigeria, to Kano, the commercial hub in the country`s north. CCECC president Lin Rongxin said the five-year project will generate employment for 50,000 Nigerian young people.

In Angola, an oil boom that might see the country overtake Nigeria as the continent’s biggest oil producer is already underway, and China is at the forefront of this revolution. With increased investment and aid from Beijing, Angola is rebuilding its infrastructure on a massive scale, most of which had long been overwhelmed by an upsurge in the population.

Angola currently produces an average of 1.4 million barrels per day (bpd). But some experts have projected that the country’s production will hit 3.4 million bpd by 2011. Angola joined the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) on January 1, 2007, as the second member from sub-Saharan Africa and the first new member since Nigeria joined in 1971 (Gabon had joined the cartel in 1975 but pulled out). Angola’s new profile is one of the success stories of China’s year of Africa.

Observers say the massive Chinese investment into infrastructure in Angola and other countries in Africa may create atmosphere for development. “Africa`s need for infrastructure investments, estimated at US$20 billion a year for the next decade, is understood and supported by China. This is an area considered too risky by many of Africa`s traditional partners,” says Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, Nigeria`s former minister of finance.

For Kwesi Aye, a Ghanaian economist, “even if unintended, China`s effort in building roads, schools, bridges, hospital and power infrastructure in Africa is most likely to jump-start the countries that harbour them on the path to change.” Aye is delighted that the China-Africa summit in Beijing last November secured a hydro-electric dam deal for the country with the Sino Hydro Corporation. The US$600 million 400-megawatt hydro-electric project is expected to help improve the electricity supply in the west African country.

A unique opportunity

2006 was a disastrous year for China`s environment, and it saw yet more green issues troubling China`s leaders. In the past year, politicians issued even more statements on the environment than in 2005, and called repeatedly for the strict enforcement of environmental laws. Yet they have failed to slow the rot. Last year, accidents causing serious pollution occurred every two days on average. Central government missed its annual targets to reduce energy consumption by 4% and to reduce pollution emissions by 2%.

Meanwhile, the Chinese people found their surroundings increasingly unbearable, and submitted 1,650 complaints every day, a total of 600,000 and a 30% rise on the previous year. An opinion poll found that more than one in 10 of China`s urban residents consider the cities they inhabit “unfit for living.” Four in 10 are unhappy with their local air quality and believe pollution is affecting their family`s health.

1.3 billion people are suffering. But who is at fault?

On January 15, I interviewed the deputy director of China`s State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA), Pan Yue, and asked him who is damaging China`s environment.

In response to this question, many officials will point an accusing finger at poverty. China is poor, they say, and in need of economic growth. And this will mean environmental sacrifices. In some heavily-polluted areas, officials will even tell you that it is better to choke to death than starve to death.

While this may ring true to the uninformed, in reality, those suffering the worst pollution are clothed and at no risk of starving. But the pollution they face on a daily basis causes all kinds of illnesses, including cancer. Without medical insurance they die penniless – and the tainted profits of factory owners fail to trickle down to their pockets.

Pan Yue, outspoken as ever, rejects the claim that living with pollution is a “humane” alternative to poverty, and holds that China`s bureaucracy is at fault. In China, he says, economic growth trumps all else and local government officials, who rely on their superiors – rather than an electorate – for jobs and advancement, are judged according to their contribution to GDP. As a result, they pursue economic growth at any cost to the environment.

Pan`s explanation is closer to the truth, but it is still not the whole story. It assumes that these cadres wish to do well, but are forced by circumstances to favour the economy over the environment.

However, simple economic success is no guarantee of political approval. For example, last year the central government halted construction of an illegal power station in Inner Mongolia and disciplined the provincial official who had supported the project.

Central government is not fond of officials who achieve economic growth at the expense of the environment. There is great political will backing environmental protection. When Hu Jintao came to power in 2002, he proposed a “new path to industrialisation” and “putting a renewed emphasis on sustainable development.” The following year saw the advent of the “scientific concept of development,” and in 2006, targets were set for the reduction of energy consumption and pollution. Yet 2006 was still the worst year China`s environment has known, and the frenzied construction of illegal factories continues across the country. With this in mind, I asked Pan Yue where the root of the problem lies.

He replied by revising his initial response. A “coalition of special interests,” combined with the flawed evaluation of officials` performance, is what is causing environmental degradation, he said. Officials aim to boost their records by supporting heavy industry, while the businesses they protect convert our shared, environmental resources into profits. As a consequence, they not only interfere with central government`s macroeconomic controls but also infringe on the rights of the public.

This is the truth of the matter. Although Pan did not say explicitly that local government and business form a special interest group, the Chinese reader can understand that this is the case, simply by observing what is done to China`s environment on a daily basis.

Consider the controversy caused by the waterproofing of the lakebeds at the Old Summer Palace in Beijing. The park is run by a government organisation, which launched an illegal project, undertaken by a commercial company it had itself founded – all with local government support. Or the situation in west China`s Kangding, where six Tibetan herders were arrested for opposing a mining company`s occupation of their pastures and pollution of their water supply. The owner of the mine did not even need to put in an appearance; the local government simply sent the police along. Such cases are all too common.

Early this year, Pan Yue used a new method of environmental protection, the “regional permit restriction,” to block new projects by four major energy providers in four cities. Despite this crackdown on the special interest groups formed by local government and business, some officials and their allies still tried to resist. Southern Weekend journalist, Xiaojian Zhao, quoted a deputy mayor with responsibility for the environment, who vowed to: “Check each and every company one by one.” And added: “This will not happen again.” But at the same time, SEPA officials caught a local coking plant secretly discharging its toxic effluent.

Collusion between local governments and business is nothing new. Massive power stations, huge chemical plants, mines and paper-making factories may wreck the environment, but they are very profitable – and kickbacks make their way to local government. Many cadres are engaged in blatant profiteering, they are not aiming for promotions. But the higher they rise in government the bigger the companies they deal with – and the greater harm they do.

This is becoming better recognised, and SEPA has worked hard to prevent it. Pan Yue launched major environmental protection crackdowns in 2005 and 2006, which hit the corporation responsible for constructing the Three Gorges dam and the oil giant Sinopec. But despite these moves, China`s environment is still worsening.

SEPA alone is inadequate. All central government departments need to fulfill their duties to environmental protection, but these duties are fragmented across numerous departments. The National Development and Reform Commission promotes sustainable development. The Meteorology Bureau publishes data on sandstorms, while the Forestry Bureau fights the desertification that causes them. The Ministry of Construction manages urban wastewater, while the State Oceanic Administration monitors pollution in the oceans and the Ministry of Water Resources manages China`s rivers. The Ministry of Agriculture oversees pesticide and fertiliser use. But the Ministry of Land and Resources manages the soil. There is precious little authority left for SEPA itself, and when it comes into conflict with interest groups other government departments remain silent.

But in my opinion, the most important question to ask is this: what should the Chinese government do at this critical time?

Liu Jianqiang, born in 1969, is a senior reporter with Guangzhou-based weekly, Southern Weekend. He has a long-standing interest in environmental issues.