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April 27th, 2010

Forests have long been a hinterland: remote, “backward” areas largely controlled by external, often urban, actors and seen to be of little use to national development or the world except as a supply of low-valued natural resources. The year 2009 marked the beginning of the end of this era. Forest lands are booming in value for the production of food, fuel, fibre and now carbon. More than ever, forests are bargaining chips in global climate negotiations and markets.

This unprecedented exposure and pressure provides nations and the world at large tremendous opportunity to right historic wrongs, advance rural development and save forests. But the chaos at the United Nations climate conference in Copenhagen laid bare the looming crises that the world will face if long-term trends of ignored rights, hunger and climate change remain inadequately addressed in 2010. While the era of the hinterland is ending, the future of forest areas is not yet clear.

The year 2009 will be remembered for the global economic recession and the chaotic attempts to address climate change. But it might also be remembered as a year when governments were overthrown for ignoring local land rights and there was finally widespread realisation that addressing long-standing questions over forest and land rights and tenure is required for addressing global crises of food security, war and climate change.

In March the government of Madagascar was ousted, a move accelerated by widespread resistance to the government handover of half the island`s arable land to a South Korean corporation, Daewoo Logistics. This reality awoke many to the real political consequences of the volatile combination of insecure land rights, persistent government control of land and forests and booming demand for commodities like food, fuel and speculative forest carbon.

The Copenhagen summit neatly captured the contradictions and challenges of the year. Despite the unclear and limited outcomes, it was one of the most important global negotiations to date and indigenous and other community leaders were organised, influencing global decisions about the future of the planet.

Yet at the end of the summit, these same leaders returned home to forests where many do not have government-recognised rights to the land and trees they have used for generations. The flood of money now promised to their governments to help maintain tropical forests and secure additional carbon is putting unprecedented pressures on forest lands and also offering unprecedented opportunity to secure the rights and development of local people.

Forest communities have long been fighting for more control over their forests. Now, clarifying forest tenure and governance has become a priority for some global leaders and even carbon traders. If, and how, local, national and global actors deal with these issues will determine the future of forest areas.

Today, governments claim to own about 75% of the world`s forests, and just a little more than 9% are legally owned by communities and indigenous peoples. This unbalanced pattern of statutory ownership has begun to change over recent decades but state ownership claims remain particularly dominant in Africa. Latin America has done more to legally recognise the tenure rights of indigenous peoples and forest communities. In fact, at the present rate of change it would take 270 years for the tenure distribution in the Congo Basin to match that of the Amazon Basin.

Tenure transition from state to communities and households is both a reinstatement of traditional governance patterns and a modern development of more equitable governance, rule of law and defence of human rights. It can be peaceful and incremental but, more often than not, it has been confrontational.

The revolutions in Mexico in the early-twentieth century or China in the 1950s, for example, transferred the majority of forests from the state and large landholders to collectives and households. In Europe and the United States, communities and households own the majority of forestlands and in New Zealand and Canada, there are long processes of the indigenous Māoris and First Nations claiming their forest rights. But in a large part of the developing world, state domination over resources put in place during the colonial period has not given way to alternative models and post-colonial legislation continues to assign rights to governments at the expense of local peoples.

Conflicts between forest communities and outsiders are not a new phenomenon. Earlier in history, they were often limited in number and short in duration, with forest communities quickly overwhelmed by an external power. 2009 was different. Just as powerful global investors and national governments realised the enormous potential profit to be made from the remaining tropical forests, violent conflicts in and over forests sparked and raged anew.

Deadly conflicts in Peru and the repression of a longstanding insurgency in India are the most prominent examples but long-overlooked local disputes over resource rights have spun into major conflicts in Afghanistan and the Niger Delta. As the demand to control forest resources increases, so will violent conflict over these valuable resources.

Unready for REDD

As the dust settles from the chaos in Copenhagen, it is clear that REDD, the programme to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, is going forward with at least US$3.5 billion (23.9 billion yuan) of initial funding but without the framework or standards to guide it responsibly. The combination of new money and limited controls dramatically raises the risks and pressures on forests and forest peoples. The current lack of a comprehensive architecture for REDD means that the carbon market and funding will be global but justice and legal redress will have to be meted out locally.

REDD was held up as one of the rare points of consensus in Copenhagen: promoted by the “global north”, the world`s rich countries, because of the potential for easy and cheap emissions reductions and by the “global south”, or developing countries, for the lure of finance and investment. International programmes like the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) and the UN-REDD Programme were set up to have pilot results ready in time for the Copenhagen summit. But as these pilots got under way, the inherent complications of slowing deforestation came into focus: effective REDD will not be easy. The FCPF and UN-REDD have received donations and pledges of more than US$186 million (1.3 billion yuan) from a handful of governments but only a small fraction of the money has been allocated to actions on the ground to date.

Despite the doubts still haunting REDD, existing REDD-readiness funds have established innovative governance structures that include representatives of indigenous peoples and civil society. This progress cannot be discounted for it hints at the real issues that REDD will encounter in implementation. Yet even where this is recognised, the operational capacity to include local participation and ensure rights recognition in REDD is quite limited.

Where there is value and confusion, there is also high risk of corruption and 2009 may become known as the first year of major carbon crookedness. Just before the climate talks in Copenhagen, the government of Papua New Guinea quietly disbanded its Office of Climate Change and Environmental Sustainability after longstanding and well-publicised accusations that it had illegally sold carbon-ownership certificates valued at AU$100 million (616 million yuan) to an Australian company and egregiously neglected to consult with forest communities – the clear legal owners of the forests of the country.

Last year the widespread lack of legal clarity and enforcement and rising global value of REDD attracted the attention of Interpol, the intergovernmental police organisation, and international environmental crime experts globally. In the words of Peter Younger, environment crimes specialist at Interpol, “The potential for criminality is vast and has not been taken into account by the people who set it up%26hellip;Organised crime syndicates are eyeing the nascent forest carbon market.”

2010 is the beginning of a new era for the people and forests in developing countries. Northern governments, investors of all ilk and traders of all hues will inspect and vie for forest lands, negotiating, luring and potentially bribing developing country governments – who still lay claim to most forests – to make deals. The era of forest as hinterland is over. Forests will remain remote, but they will be carved up, controlled and used as global political bargaining chips like never before. Work to strengthen local rights, local organisations, and governance is more relevant, and urgent, than ever.

This article is a summary of an original report by the Rights and Resources Initiative, co-authored by Liz Alden Wily, David Rhodes, Madhu Sarin, Mina Setra and Phil Shearman. It is used here with permission.

Homepage image by Erwyn van der Meer

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Britain’s long road to clean coal

April 27th, 2010

Olivia Boyd: Six months ago, you launched a report urging the British government to speed up its carbon capture and storage (CCS) programme. How much progress has there been since then?

Geoff French: I`m not convinced that things have moved on much. Our government has said it wants to fund four trial projects to be phased in from 2014. But, to the best of my knowledge, only two candidates have come forward, both in Scotland. One is in Fife and one is in Hunterston. [German utility] E.ON also has a proposed plant at Kingsnorth in Kent, but has said it will delay an investment for up to two to three years, based on the global recession.

Given what the country has pledged to achieve by 2020 and 2050 in terms of emissions cuts, the Institution of Civil Engineers (ICE) has been trying to encourage ministers to move forward with a bit more urgency on this. We want government to support industry, we want the results to be produced as quickly as possible and we want carbon-pricing regulations that support the behaviour we need, irrespective of the fact that it will undoubtedly make energy more expensive – that`s just something we have to accept.

OB: Assuming all of that did happen, what would be a reasonable timescale in which to expect commercial-scale CCS to be implemented widely? People talk about new technologies taking 30 years to get established. Need it take that long?

GF: I would like to think it doesn`t have to take that long. But, realistically, it will be 20 years before it is widespread. If we are only now talking about implementing pilot schemes, it will probably be the late 2010s or 2020 before we get those up and running. And, after that, we need to scale up – to go from proving it works to implementing it on a mass scale.

That needs to happen as quickly as possible and we shouldn`t wait around to get a perfect solution. If we come up with a half reasonable idea, we should be implementing it and then improving it later. When Henry Ford made the first mass-produced car, which did all of 10 miles to the gallon, people didn`t sit around and say “Good idea Henry but come back in 50 years time when you`ve got the fuel consumption up to 40 miles a gallon.” The concept of grasping what you can and continually making improvements is a good one.

China is very good at that. It has really demonstrated an ability to take ideas and plans from concept to implementation much more quickly than we have in the west. The Olympics is one example. The implementation of a high-speed rail network is another. Whatever you can think of, the Chinese have done it at a scale and speed, which, frankly, the United Kingdom can only imagine. So I would have thought, for China in particular, there is an opportunity here.

OB: Other regions including North America and the Middle East seem to be pushing ahead with CCS more quickly than Britain. What`s the reason for that?

GF: It seems to me that some of the other countries have different drivers. Canada has implemented a bit of CCS but it had a vested interest because it was using the carbon dioxide it was pumping back into the ground to enhance oil and gas production. In the Middle East, there is some CCS but it is actually being used to reduce the carbon-dioxide content in the natural gas that`s coming out of the ground – they have to get rid of the carbon dioxide before they can sell it. So there`s a vested interest. This is an important point because, unless you can arrive at a situation where you`ve got the economic drivers encouraging the behaviour you want, you are trying to push water uphill.

Regulation can help with that. The European Union has said that, from 2013, permanently stored carbon dioxide will be considered “not emitted” under its revised Emissions Trading Scheme. That sounds like a fairly simple thing. But actually, if you`re going to start carbon trading, it`s a huge step forward – suddenly you`ve got a big incentive. Take waste management as an example. Recycling and waste-to-energy plants in Europe are much more common than in the United States, by a degree of magnitude. And when you get down to it, it`s actually the regulations that have been put in place – landfill tax or other regulations – which have affected behaviour.

OB: The UK recognised the potential of CCS very early and was the first country to launch a competition to build a full-scale system. But that programme is now running years behind schedule. What has gone wrong and what lessons are there for other countries?

GF: I think there is a slight mismatch between the stated intentions, which are very good, and doing the things that will actually encourage people to come forward with these schemes. That partly comes down to carbon pricing. People can see that CCS is a good thing and that it is required in the long-term. But they would rather do it if there was an economic benefit and the economic benefit depends on there being a carbon price with a sensible floor level. We don`t want a carbon price that fluctuates wildly and we certainly don`t want a carbon price that can float back to zero, because then there`s no economic driver.

That thought tends to send people into wild panics about distorting the free market but there is no way around it. You can`t have a situation where you invest in something now because you think the carbon price is going to be at one level and then the price plummets because of some technical issue. If you`re faced with that uncertainty and you`re a commercial business, why invest? It seems to me that, if Europe can come together to tell Greece what to do to stabilise the eurozone, it shouldn`t be beyond their wits to come together to sort out a carbon price.

OB: What else would you like to see from government at this point?

GF: We need a more realistic roadmap for CCS development in this country. We can`t keep having targets that don`t get met. Of course you have to set stretching targets but, if they go too far, they become counter-productive. People just say “that`s impossible” and you lose all the drive.

If necessary, I would also like to see more financial help to try to get some of these pilot projects started as quickly as possible. That`s politically difficult at the moment but, if you believe that climate change is a universal problem that needs to be addressed, then it`s a pretty good place to choose to put your money.

OB: I`ve heard the argument put forward in the United Kingdom that CCS is an expensive distraction and government should instead be focusing public funds on nuclear new-build, a programme that is currently being left to the private sector. Do you think that argument is at all justified?

GF: There`s more justification for that argument in the United Kingdom than there is in, say, India or China, where 70% of the power comes from coal. Here, it is around 30% of our electricity. But that is still a significant chunk. I think our energy policy should be diversified. I`m not a great fan of nuclear because of what it leaves behind but I don`t see any other option if we are to reduce our dependence on fossil fuels. I`m very much in favour of renewables but even when you take into account all of the installations that can sensibly be put in, it`s not enough – you need something else. And nuclear is the only thing I can see that can fill that gap.

However, we will still be using fossil fuels for some time and so we have got to do CCS as well. I don`t think we can afford to ignore one important aspect. It is better if our energy supply is diversified and not too reliant on one sector.

OB: How much room is there for international collaboration on CCS?

GF: Enormous room. It has almost become a clich%26eacute; but we are all affected by each other`s pollution so the response needs to be international. The issues are global and the opportunities are global.

Input from China will be vital, I think. In global climate talks and elsewhere, China is beginning, quite rightly, to exert its muscle, to make its voice heard. With that position comes responsibility. China has demonstrated a fantastic ability to convert ideas and concepts into reality. It has done it primarily for the economic wellbeing of its people and its succeeding incredibly well. But I would argue that it`s time to extend that into environmental wellbeing. We need the biggest contributors of carbon dioxide, the biggest nations and the biggest users of fossil fuels to stand up and really be counted on this one.

Olivia Boyd is assistant editor at chinadialogue.

Geoff French is vice president of the Institution of Civil Engineers, vice president of the International Federation of Consulting Engineers and chairman of Scott Wilson.

Homepage image from Scott Wilson Group

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Preparing for an ice-free Arctic (3)

April 27th, 2010

Although China`s assistant minister of foreign affairs, Hu Zhengyue, has said that “China does not have an Arctic strategy”, the country does appear to have a clear agenda. Hu made his statement while attending an Arctic forum organised by the Norwegian Government on the Arctic archipelago of Svalbard in June 2009. His speech at the forum, along with his comments to Chinese journalists afterwards, forms the most up-to-date and comprehensive official articulation of China`s thinking on the geopolitics of the Arctic and resulting sovereignty issues.

In line with the country`s oft-stated governing principles in international affairs, Hu emphasised China`s wish to see disputes related to sovereignty resolved peacefully through dialogue. He expressed China`s support for Arctic countries` sovereign and judicial rights, endowed by international legislation, but said these laws should to be refined and developed due to new circumstances arising from the melting of the ice.

Hu has also stressed the need for cooperation between Arctic and non-Arctic states. In his speech at Svalbard, he acknowledged that the Arctic is primarily a regional issue but said concerns over climate change and international shipping gave it inter-regional dimensions. He did not mention energy and other natural resources.

Unsurprisingly, China would like to see the Arctic states recognise the interests of non-Arctic states. In Hu`s words: “When determining the delimitation of outer-continental shelves, the Arctic states not only need to handle relationships between themselves properly, but must also consider the relationship between the outer-continental shelf and the international submarine area that is the common human heritage, to ensure a balance of coastal countries` interests and the common interests of the international community.”

After the publication of the original SIPRI report, admiral Yin Zhuo of the People`s Liberation Army Navy made a stronger assertion of Chinese rights in the region in comments carried by official media on March 5. Yin is reported to have stated that, “Under the provisions of the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the Arctic does not belong to any particular nation and is rather the property of all the world`s people” and that “China must play an indispensable role in Arctic exploration as it has one-fifth of the world`s population.”

Associate professor Guo Peiqing of the Ocean University of China has said: “Circumpolar nations have to understand that Arctic affairs are not only regional issues but also international ones.” Guo has estimated that about 88% of the Arctic seabed would be under the control of the Arctic littoral states if the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf were to approve all the existing or expected claims to the Arctic Ocean continental shelf. However, when considering the concerns of China and other non-Arctic states, it is worth bearing in mind that the vast majority of known but untapped energy resources lie in undisputed areas, that is within the legitimate exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of the Arctic littoral states.

Canada and Norway are the only countries to have thus far engaged with China in a formal bilateral dialogue on Arctic issues. At the first China-Norway dialogue meeting in June 2009, climate change and polar research were identified as the issues of strongest common interest, although the two sides also exchanged views on Arctic policies, energy issues and sea routes. The two countries have agreed to hold follow-up talks in 2010.

It is unclear if and when China will issue a more formal Arctic strategy. The precise targets for polar expeditions and polar research projects of the 12th Five-Year Plan, which will cover the period from 2011 to 2015, were set to be finalised following the China`s 26th Antarctic expedition, which completed in March. In October 2009, on the eve of the expedition, Chen Lianzeng, deputy director of the State Oceanic Administration (SOA), shed some light on the next Five-Year Plan`s general targets. These will be: to deepen China`s knowledge of the impact of climate change on the two polar regions, expand China`s scientific exploration activities and “take an active part in polar affairs and establish China`s strategic position”. To accomplish these goals, the SOA intends to build both “soft power and hard power”.

Several Chinese academics are encouraging their government to “Grasp this historical opportunity and recognise the political, economic and military value of the Arctic and then re-evaluate China`s rights in the Arctic region and adjust its strategic plan.” Chinese decision makers, on the other hand, advocate cautious Arctic policies for fear of causing alarm and provoking countermeasures among the Arctic states. Professor Guo Peiqing has even raised the alarmist possibility of an alliance of Arctic states.

China is aware that its size and rise to major-power status evoke jitters but at the same time it is striving to position itself so that it will not be excluded from access to the Arctic. China appears to be particularly wary of Russia`s intentions in the Arctic. Chinese observers made note of Russia`s decision in August 2007 to resume long-distance bomber flights over the Arctic and the planting of a Russian flag on the Arctic seabed that same month.

China and the rest of the world would be at a disadvantage if Russia`s claims over the underwater terrain between the Lomonosov and Mendeleev ridges were legitimised, giving Russia alone rights to the resources in that area. It is important to note, however, that Arctic issues have thus far been approached in a “spirit of cooperation, with outstanding disputes managed peacefully”. Media reports of competition in an ice-free Arctic that emphasise potential disputes and a scramble for the Arctic`s resources give rise to scenarios of armed conflict breaking out in the region, especially a conflict involving Russia. However, there is no evidence that Russia is failing to play by the rules or that it would not want to find multilateral solutions to disputes regarding sovereignty.

While the melting of the Arctic ice could create tension in China-Russia relations, the new opportunities that will arise from an ice-free Arctic could deepen cooperation between east Asian states. As non-Arctic states, China, Japan, North Korea and South Korea are all in the same boat. Each of them stands to benefit enormously from shorter commercial shipping routes and possible access to new fishing grounds and other natural resources. A unified Arctic strategy would be in their mutual interest. Finding ways to use an ice-free Arctic jointly has the potential to create a genuine win-win situation for both China and Japan, the two east Asian powers that, in so many other areas, find it difficult to find common ground.

From China`s viewpoint, an ice-free Arctic will increase the value of strong ties with the Nordic countries that otherwise struggle to be noticed by the rising power. China already has the largest foreign embassy in Reykjavik, in anticipation of Iceland becoming a major shipping hub. By actively engaging Chinese officials and academics on Arctic issues – ranging from climate change and polar research to commercial shipping routes and maritime rescue operations – Nordic countries can start laying the foundations for a special Arctic-orientated relationship with China.

Norway, with its deep-sea drilling expertise, has an advantage in this regard. Finding ways for Chinese and Norwegian companies to cooperate in Arctic energy resource extraction – in, for example, the ongoing project in the Shtokman field – would be of great interest to Chinese companies and would undoubtedly strengthen China-Norway relations. The notion that China has rights in the Arctic can be expected to be repeated in articles by Chinese academics and in comments by Chinese officials until it gradually begins to be perceived as an accepted state of affairs.

However, under international law, China`s rights in the Arctic are limited. Moreover, China`s insistence that respect for state sovereignty be a guiding principle of international relations makes it difficult for the country to question the Arctic states` sovereignty rights. There is some irony in the statements by Chinese officials calling on the Arctic states to consider the interests of man-kind so that all states can share the Arctic. These statements appear to be contrary to China`s long-standing principles of respect for sovereignty and the internal affairs of other states. Based on official statements by the Chinese government and the open-source literature written by Chinese Arctic scholars, China can be expected to continue to persistently, yet quietly and unobtrusively, push for the Arctic, in spirit, being accessible to all.

Linda Jakobson is the director of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) China and Global Security Programme.

An earlier version of this article was published as “China prepares for an ice-free Arctic”, SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security, No. 2010/2, March 2010. It is used here with permission.

Homepage image from NASA

Part one: China’s growing interest in the thawing north

Part two: The commercial lure of melting ice

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Preparing for an ice-free Arctic (2)

April 27th, 2010

As China`s economy is reliant on foreign trade, there are substantial commercial implications if shipping routes are to shorten during the summer months each year. Nearly half of China`s gross domestic product (GDP) is thought to depend on shipping. The trip from Shanghai to Hamburg via the Northeast Passage – which runs along the north coast of Russia from the Bering Strait in the east to Novaya Zemlya in the west – is 6,400 kilometres shorter than the route via the Strait of Malacca, a strip of water between Malaysia and Sumatra, and the Egypt`s Suez Canal.

Moreover, due to piracy, the cost of insurance for ships travelling via the Gulf of Aden, in the Arabian Sea, towards the Suez Canal increased more than tenfold between September 2008 and March 2009, according to a new report, to be published by Martinus Nijhoff later this year.

Chinese research remains primarily focused on how the melting Arctic will affect China`s continental and oceanic environment and how, in turn, such changes could affect domestic agricultural and economic development. However, a small number of Chinese researchers are publicly encouraging the government to prepare for the commercial and strategic opportunities that a melting Arctic presents.

Li Zhenfu, associate professor at Dalian Maritime University, together with a team of specialists, has assessed China`s advantages and disadvantages when the Arctic-sea routes open up. “Whoever has control over the Arctic route will control the new passage of world economics and international strategies,” writes Li, referring both to the shortened shipping routes between East Asia and Europe or North America and to the abundant oil, gas, mineral and fishery resources presumed to be in the Arctic.

Commenting on the successful test voyages from South Korea to the Netherlands via the Northeast Passage by two German commercial vessels in the summer of 2009, Chen Xulong of the China Institute of International Studies writes that “the opening of the Arctic route will advance the development of China`s north-east region and eastern coastal area . . . It is of importance to East Asian cooperation as well.” Chen also says that China should have a long-term vision regarding Arctic shipping.

Li Zhenfu has criticised the fact that Chinese research on the Arctic-shipping route has not been planned and conducted in a comprehensive manner to enable China to protect its interests. According to Li, China`s research “fails to provide fundamental information and scientific references for China to map out its Arctic strategy” and, therefore, limits China`s power to speak out and protect its rights in the international arena.

Li`s article, which was published in a national journal administered by the prestigious China Association for Science and Technology (CAST), points out that the Arctic also “has significant military value, a fact recognised by other countries”. And, in a rare open-source article about the Arctic by an officer of the People`s Liberation Army, senior colonel Han Xudong warns that the possibility of military force cannot be ruled out in the Arctic due to complex sovereignty disputes.

The increasing military importance of an ice-free Arctic is, indeed, reflected in recent decisions by all five littoral states to strengthen their military capabilities in the Arctic. In August 2007, Canada announced that it was setting up an Arctic military-training centre in Resolute Bay; in March, 2009, Russia announced that it would establish a military force to protect its interests in the region; and, in July 2009, the Danish parliament approved a plan to set up an Arctic military command and task force by 2014, to take just three examples.

Another Chinese researcher on Arctic politics, Guo Peiqing of the Ocean University of China, has also voiced disapproval of China`s natural sciences-oriented Arctic research and said it is not in China`s interests to remain neutral. Guo has said that China, which is transitioning from a regional to a global power, should be more active in international Arctic affairs. He notes that “any country that lacks comprehensive research on polar politics will be excluded from being a decisive power in the management of the Arctic and, therefore, be forced into a passive position.”

Chinese Arctic specialists acknowledge the same uncertainties as many of their western counterparts when contemplating how lucrative the Arctic routes would ultimately be in comparison to the current routes through the Suez and Panama canals. Although passing along the Northeast Passage from eastern China to western Europe would substantially shorten the journey, high insurance premiums, lack of infrastructure and harsh conditions may make the Arctic routes commercially unviable, at least in the short term.

Drift ice will continue to be a problem for ships, even when the Arctic passages are officially deemed ice-free. As Greenland`s ice cap melts, the number of icebergs is also expected to increase, forcing ships to proceed slowly and make detours. Furthermore, the shallow depth of some of the passages along the shipping routes (in particular the Bering Strait) makes the Arctic unsuitable for big cargo ships.

The opening up of the Arctic will also provide access to new reserves of energy and other natural resources on which China`s economic growth increasingly relies. The US Geological Survey estimates that the Arctic contains up to 30% of the world`s undiscovered gas and 13% of the world`s undiscovered oil. Additionally, the region contains vast amounts of coal, nickel, copper, tungsten, lead, zinc, gold, silver, diamonds, manganese, chromium and titanium.

The technological challenges associated with extracting energy and mineral deposits in the Arctic have been noted by both Chinese and Western observers and China will need to partner with foreign companies in order to exploit the Arctic`s resources. As one Chinese scholar notes, “There is a rather large gap between Chinese and advanced foreign deep-sea oil extracting technology.” Russia, which controls many of the resources in Arctic waters, lacks both the technology and the capital needed to extract them – opening the way for tri-lateral joint ventures in Russian waters using Chinese capital and western or Brazilian technology. For example, when in late 2009 Russia`s state-owned oil company Rosneft announced plans to apply for the operating licences to develop 30 offshore sites on Russia`s Arctic continental shelf, industry experts predicted that it would not be able to develop these deposits on its own.

Another potential multilateral joint venture in which China`s capital could be used in exchange for the opportunity to gain the experience it seeks in deep-water drilling is the ongoing cooperation between Statoil, Total and Gazprom to develop the first phase of the Shtokman gas fields in the Barents Sea, a section of the Arctic Ocean north of Norway and Russia. This is regarded not only as a huge commercial opportunity but also a formidable technological challenge.

Linda Jakobson is the director of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) China and Global Security Programme.

An earlier version of this article was published as “China prepares for an ice-free Arctic”, SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security, No. 2010/2, March 2010. It is used here with permission.

NEXT: Charting political waters

Part one: China’s growing interest in the thawing north

Homepage image from Combat Camera shows a Canadian military training exercise in Resolute Bay.

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Preparing for an ice-free Arctic (1)

April 27th, 2010

China is paying increasing attention to the melting of the ice in the Arctic Ocean as a result of climate change. The prospect of the Arctic being navigable during summer months, leading to both shorter shipping routes and access to untapped energy resources, has impelled the government to allocate more resources to Arctic research. Chinese officials have also started to think about what kind of policies would help the country to benefit from an ice-free Arctic environment.

China is at a disadvantage because it is neither an Arctic littoral state – it has no Arctic coast and so no sovereign rights to underwater continental shelves – nor an Arctic Council member state with the right to participate in the discussion of regional policies. Despite its seemingly weak position, China can be expected to seek a role in determining the political framework and legal foundation for future Arctic activities.

The formerly ice-covered Arctic is undergoing an extraordinary transformation as a result of the unprecedented rate at which the ice is diminishing. According to one report, the annual average extent of Arctic Ocean ice has shrunk by 2.7% per decade, with a decrease of 7.4% per decade during the summer months since 1979. Estimates about when the Arctic Ocean could be consistently ice-free during the summer season vary greatly, ranging from 2013 to 2060.

The melting of the Arctic ice poses economic, military and environmental challenges to the governance of the region. In 2008 the five littoral states, Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia and the United States, committed themselves to the existing legal framework of the Arctic and the “orderly settlement of possible overlapping claims”. Despite these assurances, the evolving situation in the Arctic could potentially lead to new geopolitical disputes, also involving non-littoral states, especially regarding issues related to free passage and resource-extraction rights. Consequently, policymakers – not only in China but across Asia, Europe and North America – are turning their attention to the region in order to assess this transformation and its economic, territorial and geopolitical implications.

To date, China has adopted a wait-and-see approach to Arctic developments, wary that active overtures would cause alarm in other countries due to its size and status as a rising global power. Chinese officials and researchers have told me privately that they are very cautious when formulating their views on the country`s interests in the Arctic. They stress that China`s Arctic research activities remain primarily focused on the climatic and environmental consequences of the ice melting. However, in recent years, the academic and policymaking communities have also started to assess the commercial, political and security implications of a seasonally ice-free Arctic region.

China has one of the world`s strongest polar research capabilities. Since 1984, the country has organised 26 expeditions and established three research stations in the Antarctic. The Arctic became a focus from 1995, when a group of Chinese scientists and journalists travelled to the North Pole on foot and conducted research on the Arctic Ocean`s ice cover, climate and environment. China`s first Arctic research expedition by sea took place in 1999 and, since then, it has carried out two more expeditions, in 2003 and 2008, with a fourth planned for the summer of 2010.

China`s first Arctic research station, Huanghe (Yellow River), was founded at Ny-%26Aring;lesund in Norway`s Svalbard archipelago in July, 2004. Since 1994, China has conducted polar exploration onboard the research vessel Xue Long (Snow Dragon), which was purchased from Ukraine in 1993.

The 163-metre-long vessel, with a displacement of 21,000 tonnes, is the world`s largest, non-nuclear icebreaker. However, in October 2009, the State Council (the Chinese cabinet) decided that Xue Long alone no longer met the demand of the country`s expanding polar research activities and needed “brothers and sisters”. After months of deliberating between purchasing a second-hand foreign vessel and building a Chinese one, the government approved the building of a new high-tech ice-breaker. Preliminary plans to order a Chinese-built ice-breaker at a cost of 2 billion yuan (US$300 million) had been under way within the Chinese Arctic and Antarctic Administration (CAA) since at least early 2009. The new vessel, expected to become operational in 2013, will be co-designed by Chinese and foreign partners and built in China. It will be smaller than Xue Long, with a displacement of only 8000 tonnes.

Besides its own scientific expeditions, China has collaborated with international partners to monitor the Arctic`s environmental changes. In 1997, China joined the International Arctic Science Committee (IASC), a nongovernmental organisation that aims to facilitate multidisciplinary research on the Arctic region and its role in the earth system. At the 2005 Arctic Science Summit Week, held at Kunming, in China`s south-western Yunnan Province, China was also invited to join the Ny-%26Aring;lesund Science Managers Committee, which was established in 1994 to enhance cooperation among the research centres at Ny-%26Aring;lesund.

China has several Arctic-focused research institutions of its own. The primary ones are: the Shanghai-based Polar Research Institute of China (PRIC), which is in charge of polar expeditions on Xue Long and conducts comprehensive studies of the polar regions; the China Institute for Marine Affairs, the research department within the State Oceanic Administration (SOA) in Beijing, which concentrates on international maritime law and China`s ocean-development strategy; and the Institute of Oceanology, a multidisciplinary marine science research and development institute within the Chinese Academy of Sciences. Other organisations conducting Arctic-related research include: the Ocean University of China, Dalian Maritime University, Xiamen University, Tongji University, the Chinese Antarctic Centre of Surveying and Mapping and the Research Centre for Marine Developments of China.

Although there is no Chinese institution devoted specifically to research on Arctic politics, there are a handful of individuals who have published articles and book chapters that focus on Arctic strategies and geopolitics. Since the mid-2000s, Chinese researchers and officials have expanded their participation in international seminars focusing on commercial, legal and geopolitical Arctic issues.

In a major step to enhance China`s understanding of the political, legal and military dimensions of the Arctic, in September 2007 the Chinese government launched a project entitled Arctic Issues Research, which involved scholars and officials from around China and included such research topics as “Arctic resources and their exploitation”, “Arctic scientific research”, “Arctic transportation”, “Arctic law” and “military factors in the Arctic”. The research project, organised by the CAA, was completed by 2009, but the reports were not made public.

Linda Jakobson is the director of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) China and Global Security Programme.

An earlier version of this article was published as “China prepares for an ice-free Arctic”, SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security, No. 2010/2, March 2010. It is used here with permission.

NEXT: The commercial lure of melting ice

Part 3: Charting political waters

Homepage image from Xilin Gol Meteorological Bureau

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Can you imagine? A warming world needs art

April 17th, 2010

Here`s the paradox: if the scientists are right, we`re living through the biggest thing that`s happened since human civilisation emerged. One species, ours, has by itself in the course of a couple of generations managed to powerfully raise the temperature of an entire planet, to knock its most basic systems out of kilter.

But oddly, though we know about it, we don`t know about it. It hasn`t registered in our gut; it isn`t part of our culture. Where are the books? The poems? The plays? The goddamn operas? Compare it to, say, the horror of HIV/Aids in the last two decades, which has produced a staggering outpouring of art that, in turn, has had real political effect. I mean, when people someday look back on our moment, the single most significant item will doubtless be the sudden spiking temperature. But they`ll have a hell of a time figuring out what it meant to us.

Why is that? Well, some of the reasons are obvious. It`s way too big, for one. When something is happening everywhere all at once, it threatens constantly to become backdrop, context, instead of event. And in this case, since the context is the natural world that more and more of us have forgotten how to read, the changes seem small.

At my latitude, spring comes a week earlier than it did in 1970. The ice on the lake melts, and the snow in the fields; and the fields commence to drying out, which has real implications later in the season. That`s an almost inconceivably huge change in a basic physical system over a short stretch of time – but not quite big enough to be noticeable, unless you`re paying attention with, say, the vigilance of a farmer. In a society that has more prison inmates than farmers, that`s unlikely.

Conversely, when global warming does attempt to show its teeth, the immediate event is usually overdramatic, so vast that the event itself grabs all the attention, leaving none behind for the motive cause. Four hurricanes sweep across Florida in a summer, which is just the kind of result computer modelling says is becoming more likely. But who has time for computer modelling and carbon when there is Storm Surge and Blown-Over Mobile Home and Waiting in Line for Ice, all of which are a lot easier to take pictures of.

And the dramatis personae are deficient as well, being us. Too many villains can mar a plot as easily as too few, and “starring everyone with a car” is a large cast indeed. We don`t much want to be told that we`re the problem, primarily because it implies we would have to change some of our ways. In a consumer society, those habits constitute a large part of our identity, not to mention our net worth; once you`ve got your plasma screen installed in the recreation room of the 3,500-square-foot house, this is an epic you can do without.

Especially since there`s no real chance of a happy ending. We can do better, or we can certainly do much worse – but we`ve already pushed the carbon concentration past the point where the atmosphere can easily heal itself. So far we`ve increased the world`s temperature by about one degree Fahrenheit; the best guess is we`ve stoked the fires enough that another two degrees are essentially inevitable. Past that, what we do now matters deeply. But the difference between miserable and catastrophic is not a compelling dramatic device.

The two large-scale attempts to achieve mythic status for climate change thus far – the movie The Day After Tomorrow and Michael Crichton`s State of Fear – prove most of these rules. To dramatise the first story, the producers postulated a series of physically bizarre and silly events: global warming somehow leads to a kind of flash-freezing, with supercyclonic storms ripping chilled air from the stratosphere and forcing it down on midtown Manhattan. Oh, and watch out for the wolf escaped from the zoo. Crichton, meanwhile, postulates environmental-spawned tsunamis and cannibal kings in order to prove the whole thing a fable.

In the face of all this, how to proceed? If we can`t turn to creative artists, then to documentarians. Their impulse is to gather more evidence so that people will listen and do something; hence the photographers descending on Tuvalu to watch for rising waves and the writers heading north to interview the Inuit. It`s all remarkable stuff – the news that communities in the far north were hearing thunder for the first time in their histories shook me. But it`s also news about people who, almost by definition, are marginal to those of us in the developed world. The question is how to unsettle the audience.

The possibility exists, I think – in part because events get steadily more obvious. The western European heatwave that killed tens of thousands in August 2003 is a good example. Its toll was horrifying precisely because they were not Ghanaians or Bengalis, people who we have become used to blithely and guiltily reading about dying by the thousand. These were people who could easily have been us, with magazine subscriptions and cable TV and the expectation that nature was not going to do them in – that they`d progressed to a point where they were beyond nature`s real reach.

Not only that, but the deaths illustrated another crucial point. The breakdown in human community, the rise of a kind of hyper-individualism perfectly symbolised by the automobile, was both the motive and immediate cause of many of the fatalities. Old people baked to death in their apartments because the temperature got higher than it had ever gotten before (and barely cooled at night); and they baked to death in their apartments because the social structure that always protected each of us from such events had broken down. I mean, nobody was checking up on them. It`s hard to imagine more symbolic casualties, and easy to imagine the play, the novel, that should keep that fortnight near the front of our minds.

But what emotions should the playwright play with? Fear? Guilt? Sure, but not only those. For me, a kind of wistfulness has always been at the core of my reaction to global warming, a sense that as a species we`re finally and irrevocably managing to crowd out everything else, smudge our fingerprints on every frame of the book of life. There seems to me no more telling turn in our civilisation, at least since the apple in Eden (a crisis that gave rise to more great art than anything in the western tradition).

But there also needs to be hope as well – visions of what it might feel like to live on a planet where somehow we use this moment as an opportunity to confront our consumer society, use it to begin the process of rebuilding community. They don`t have to be romantic visions, though a little romance wouldn`t hurt.

We are all actors in this drama, more of us at every moment. The great subplot of these few years involves the introduction of Indians and Chinese as principal players, a fascinating confrontation between old privilege and new assertion. It may well be that because no one stands outside the scene, no one has the distance to make art from it. But we`ve got to try. Art, like religion, is one of the ways we digest what is happening to us, make the sense out of it that proceeds to action.

Otherwise, the only role left to us – noble, but also enraging in its impotence – is simply to pay witness. The world is never going to be, in human time, more intact than it is at this moment. Therefore it falls to those of us alive now to watch and record its flora, its fauna, its rains, its snow, its ice, its peoples. To document the buzzing, glorious, cruel, mysterious planet we were born on to, before in our carelessness we leave it far less sweet.

Time rushes on, in ways that humans have never before contemplated. That famous picture of the earth from outer space that Apollo beamed back in the late 1960s – already that`s not the world we inhabit; its poles are melting, its oceans rising. We can register what is happening with satellites and scientific instruments, but can we register it in our imaginations, the most sensitive of all our devices?

The author: Bill McKibben is a writer and journalist. His books include The End of Nature (1989), Enough: Staying Human in an Engineered Age (2004) and Wandering Home (2005).

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Climate Change: the real threat to security

April 17th, 2010

- The effects of climate change are likely to lead to the displacement of peoples from coastline and river delta areas, severe natural disasters and increasing food shortages. This would lead to increased human suffering, greater social unrest, revised patterns of living and the pressure of greatly increased levels of migration across the world.

- This has long-term security implications for all countries which are far more serious, lasting and destructive than those of international terrorism.

- However, the response to climate change should not be the increased use of nuclear power, which would only encourage the spread across an unstable world of technology and materials that can also be used in the development of nuclear weapons and their use by %26lsquo;rogue states` or terrorist networks.

- Instead, a more secure and reliable response is the development of local renewable energy sources and radical energy conservation practices.

The Pentagon`s Office of Net Assessment (ONA) identifies climate change as a threat which vastly eclipses that of terrorism. A report commissioned by the head of the ONA, Pentagon insider Andrew Marshall, and published in late 2003, concluded that climate change over the next 20 years could result in a global catastrophe costing millions of lives in wars and natural disasters. The authors argue that the risk of abrupt climate change should be “elevated beyond a scientific debate to a US national security concern”.

Anyone doubting the serious security implications of environmental disasters, even for rich and powerful countries such as the United States, should simply look at the large-scale loss of life and social breakdown in New Orleans and other Gulf Coast cities (as well as rising petrol prices across the world) following Hurricane Katrina in August and September 2005. This is especially worrying because there has been a near doubling in the number of category 4 and 5 storms such as Katrina in the last 35 years, most likely as a result of rises in the temperature of the surface levels of the sea.

The Social Impacts of Climate Change

In January 2004, the UK Government`s Chief Scientific Adviser, Sir David King, wrote a guest editorial for the journal Science, warning that “climate change is the most severe problem that we are facing today, more serious even than the threat of terrorism”. He argues that as a result of global warming “millions more people around the world may in future be exposed to the risk of hunger, drought, flooding, and debilitating diseases such as malaria”.

Most scientists now believe there has been a considerable increase in atmospheric carbon dioxide levels, mainly as a result of human activity such as burning fossil fuels and the cutting down of the world`s forests, which has led to a large-scale loss of biodiversity and a global average temperature increase. Studies differ, but models are predicting a future temperature rise of 1.5 to 5 degrees Centigrade by the year 2100. This could cause thermal expansion of the sea and global ice melting, resulting in an alarming rise in sea levels and a significant redrawing of the world map.

Among the many consequences are the effects on metropolitan areas. As most of the world`s large cities are positioned on coasts it could mean many of them would be lost to the sea. The gradual displacement of peoples from coastline and river delta areas could number in the hundreds of millions with disastrous economic and social consequences.

Furthermore, climate change is likely to involve elements of %26lsquo;positive feedback` in that it will encourage further environmental changes that will lead to an acceleration of carbon emissions. The melting of Arctic sea ice may result in more open water during Arctic summers which will absorb more solar radiation, speeding up the process of ice melting. A second possibility is that the progressive melting of Arctic and near-Arctic permafrost will release large volumes of methane from rotting vegetation which is, itself, an even more potent cause of climate change than carbon dioxide. Losing the sea ice of the Arctic is likely to cause dramatic changes in the climate of the northern region and will have a very big impact on other climate parameters.

There are also indications that over the next fifty years there will be considerable shifts in the distribution of rainfall, with more rain tending to fall on the oceans and polar regions and progressively less falling on the tropical land masses. The tropics support a substantial part of the human population, much of it surviving by subsistence agriculture. A shift in rainfall distribution is likely to cause a partial drying-out of some of the most fertile regions of the tropics, resulting in a significant reduction in the ecological carrying-capacity of the land and decreases in food production. China and India, in particular, could be hugely affected, with profound national and regional implications. Many of the countries in this region would have very little capacity to respond to such changes, and the resulting persistent food shortages and even famines would lead to increased suffering, greater social unrest and greatly increased migration.

While Africa will be most affected by drought and desertification, researchers are also reporting a general drying out of the land and spread of desertification in the Mediterranean region. One of the worst droughts on record hit Spain and Portugal in 2005 and halved some crop yields, causing both countries to apply to the European Union for food assistance. Droughts have also badly affected crops in Australia, and one in six countries in the world face food shortages because of severe droughts that could become semi-permanent. In fact, new climate prediction research by the UK Meteorological Office indicates that expected shifts in rain patterns and temperatures over the next 50 years threaten to put far more people at risk of hunger than previously thought.

That is, unless carbon dioxide levels can be stabilised and the threat of global warming and climate change taken seriously. Time is of the essence. The average temperature of the earth`s surface has risen by 0.6 degrees Centigrade since reliable records began in the late 1800s. The European Union believes that the eventual rise in the global average temperature must be kept to within two degrees Centigrade of pre-industrial levels to ensure the continued safety of the world`s human population. However, some leading climate scientists suggest that if the concentration of carbon dioxide (CO2) in the atmosphere exceeds 400 parts per million (ppm), then there will be little hope of achieving this goal. The concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere is currently 378 ppm, and is increasing by about 1.5 ppm per year. If the scientists are correct, that leaves just 14 years before the 400 ppm point is reached and, in fact, some of the early effects of global warming are already apparent. In 2004, for example, the World Health Organisation estimated that current mortality attributable to man-made climate change was at least 150,000 people per year – with the highest proportion of these deaths occurring in Southern Africa (see map).

While some governments are taking this threat reasonably seriously, the reaction from the USA has been unhelpful; withdrawing from the Kyoto Protocol was their best known response to what some in the Bush administration still consider the %26lsquo;myth` of climate change. Even though it accounts for only 4% of the world`s population, America is the world`s greatest polluter – producing 20% of the global emissions of greenhouse gases. As the world`s only superpower, the United States must face up to its responsibility to take the threat of climate change seriously. It is also important that China and India, as two of the largest developing countries who have not signed up to the Kyoto Protocol, be brought into greater dialogue on the issue. China has the second highest carbon dioxide emissions behind the USA, with a rapidly developing economy and increasingly high levels of energy use, especially from coal-fired power stations. In the next 20 years China looks set to overtake the USA as the world`s biggest producer of greenhouse gases.

Nuclear is not the Answer

However, the response to global warming should not, as some suggest, be the increased use of nuclear power. Some environmentalists are now promoting nuclear energy as the environmentally sound solution rising levels of atmospheric carbon dioxide.

Aside from the obvious environmental, economic and safety issues associated with radioactive waste, there is a very serious global security issue.

This %26lsquo;nuclear renaissance` will involve the development of facilities – reactors, waste tanks and reprocessing plants – that are potential terrorist targets, as well as encouraging the spread of technology and materials that can be used in the development of nuclear weapons by %26lsquo;rogue states` or terrorist networks. The peaceful atom and the military atom are what the Swedish physicist Hannes Alven, a Nobel Prize laureate, called “Siamese twins”. Civil nuclear activity and nuclear weapons proliferation are intimately linked: one of the %26lsquo;twins` cannot be promoted without the other spreading out of control. This is where much of the current concern over Iran`s nuclear programme comes from, but it is important to note that the development of nuclear power in other countries – for example, China, the USA or Japan – is just as worrying in terms of global security.

There are serious dangers associated with producing plutonium in large quantities for civil use in conditions of increasing world unrest. In particular, the potential use of plutonium in a terrorist weapon – a radiological dispersal device (so-called %26lsquo;dirty bomb`) or a crude nuclear weapon – would have a devastating impact if detonated, for example, in a capital city, but also if the threat of detonation were used to blackmail a government. The problem of safeguarding society against these hazards would become formidable in a %26lsquo;plutonium economy` (that is, an economy significantly dependent on nuclear reactors using mixed oxide fuel and/or plutonium to meet its energy demands). The security measures that might become necessary could seriously affect personal freedoms and have genuine consequences for civil rights.

Nuclear energy is not a carbon free technology. Electricity is used in many stages of the nuclear cycle – from building reactors to waste disposal and decommissioning – and this electricity will mainly have been produced from fossil fuels. Even under the most favourable conditions, the nuclear cycle will produce approximately one-third as much CO2 emission as gas-fired electricity production. Furthermore, nuclear power could only supply the entire world electricity demand for three years before sources with low uranium content would have to be mined. Given that one of the main factors is the amount of carbon dioxide produced by the mining and milling or uranium ore, the use of the poorer ores in nuclear reactors would produce more CO2 emission than burning fossil fuels directly, and may actually consume more electricity than it produces. Furthermore, the problems of the depletion of uranium mineable at economic prices would become as serious as the depletion of oil and gas if a significant nuclear renaissance were to occur.

Therefore, while some may argue that nuclear energy could provide a %26lsquo;solution` to climate change, the implications of such developments would be disastrous. In fact, the UK Government`s own advisory body, the Sustainable Development Commission, concluded in March 2006 that nuclear power was dangerous, expensive and unnecessary. The House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee reached similar conclusions the following month, raising serious concerns relating to safety, the threat of terrorism, and the proliferation of nuclear power across the world. So, rather than constructing new nuclear reactors, attention should be focused on the protection and security of existing facilities and options for phasing out their use altogether. This, combined with an accelerated implementation by the nuclear weapon states of their “unequivocal commitment” to nuclear disarmament under Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the negotiation of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) to ban the further production of fissile materials for use in nuclear weapons, and the development of policies designed to increase confidence in the nuclear non-proliferation regime, would go a long way to making the world a safer place.

Renewable Energy

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Briefing: climate change

April 17th, 2010

Thoughts on global warming

April 17th, 2010

Let me start with a few statements to indicate where I am coming from.

First, the theory and evidence that I have seen all seems to strongly suggest that human-related emissions of carbon into the atmosphere is causing, and will in the future cause, significant global warming.

Second, this global warming is on such a scale that it will wreak havoc on both poor and rich countries. It could even make large sections of the earth uninhabitable.

Third, the costs of abatement are large.

Therefore the decision to curtail emissions is a very serious one and it is clear that these decisions will also cause hardship in poor and in rich countries.

Fourth, despite these high costs, the time has passed that policy makers should still be acting on the null hypothesis that global warming will not occur.

Choice of null

Here I come to the first use of economics. It turns out that this point is central to current US policy. As I see it, current US policy is that the Federal Government should do continued research to ascertain the extent of global warming and its future path and the policy tree is to take future action only if the findings of this research are sufficiently conclusive.

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Selling climate change

April 17th, 2010

In terms of fundraising, the main Western environmental groups have kept pace with increasingly sophisticated marketing techniques. In terms of campaigning, however, we are stuck in a 1970s world of slogans, stunts, posters, placards and banners. There is little understanding of the audience`s frame of mind, and no really tangible communications objectives. The green movement in Europe has become effective only at talking to itself.

This may sound a little harsh. After all, there has been a steadily growing media interest in climate change. That`s true, but too easy a measure. Awareness of climate change isn`t the objective: people may know and still do nothing. So what should we do differently? I have three suggestions.

1. Don`t debate the science

Everybody knows that greens love getting into a good debate. It`s not surprising – there`s a powerful scientific, moral and commonsense case to be made for taking action. Unfortunately, those with a vested interest in doing nothing are too shrewd. In the United States especially, they have successfully entangled environmental change campaigners in detailed debates about the validity of the science.

It`s a simple strategy: the likes of Exxon throw money at some financially compliant scientists, who produce a report with the appearance of credibility and objectivity. The greens, of course, leap to an enthusiastic defense of their case – and the trap is sprung: the public tunes out (too boring), the media downgrade the story (too complex) and the politicians have the greatest excuse for doing nothing (let`s wait until the science is clear).

It`s entirely right to set out the case, of course – but the time has come to have confidence in the scientific consensus around climate change, and to stop debating the science. We urgently need to move the conversation from “is it really happening?” to “what do we do about it?”

2. Stop talking about the environment

Buried around page seven of your newspaper, you might find the occasional story about climate change, along the lines of “Global warming: bad news for polar bears”. Personally, I find this little short of infuriating: it`s counter-productive, yet this kind of story forms the bulk of green communications on climate change.

So what`s the problem? After all, people do care about the environment, don`t they? Indeed, there are plenty of surveys which report that as many as 92% of people care about the environment. Unfortunately, this means very little: ask anyone if they care about the environment, and they`re unlikely to say no. Environmentalists find it difficult to accept that most people simply don`t care about the environment as much as they do.

The problem is this: the steady stream of stories about polar bears and the like has a negative effect: it causes people to think of climate change as a purely environmental issue. Of course, it isn`t: climate change presents serious economic, political and health risks.

Communications around climate change should focus on non-environmental impacts. Let`s face it, there are plenty to choose from: widespread crop failures, outbreaks of disease, the threat of conflict over water, and the increased likelihood of tsunami-like disasters in places like Bangladesh, to name a few.

But here again we need to be careful. If the scale of the impacts we describe is too overwhelming, people will disengage: it seems too big, too uncontrollable, like the threat of sudden annihilation by a giant rogue asteroid. Also, if the impacts are too remote – distant famines, for example – people file it mentally under good causes.

Climate change is more than a “good cause”. If we want people to respond emotionally, practically and urgently to climate change, then we need to present impacts that are both tangible and relevant to their lives. In the UK, we might think of this as “the Daily Mail strategy”: link every story to readers` material wellbeing. So, we move from “climate change is bad news for polar bears” to “climate change may affect your house prices”.

Some may describe this as cynical. In advertising, we think of it as understanding your target audience. Of course, we would all like to believe in the better nature of our own species – but can we afford to rely on an appeal to people`s altruism? After all, we all know where charity begins.

The same logic applies to both consumers at large and the business community. We must move climate change out of the Corporate Social Responsibility box and into the CEO`s in-tray. We need to present this as a serious risk to business as usual: smart, responsible business leaders are taking climate change seriously, because they see it as a strategic issue, not a PR issue.

3. Set clear objectives

It`s sometimes quite tricky to work out exactly what the environmental movement wants to be done about climate change. For those interested to listen, there is a cacophony of messages about what should be done: families should downsize their cars; industry should become “carbon neutral”; kettles should be quarter-filled; investors should back sustainable energy; governments should sign Kyoto; everyone should buy halogen light-bulbs; businessmen should fly a little less – and when they fly, they should plant trees in penance.

It’s understandable, of course. The environmental movement consists of many different constituencies, each working hard to address their own particular areas of concern. Even within a single organisation, different campaign groups may communicate with the public on different issues at the same time.

Even if we are successful in presenting climate change as a real and urgent problem, we are failing to present clear solutions. Climate change campaigners are, of course, painfully aware that there are no easy answers. There’s no quick fix to climate change. However, if progress is to be made, we must be more strategic in the way we communicate solutions.

At the most straightforward level, this means we should always ask two simple questions each time we communicate with the public: who exactly are we communicating with, and what exactly do we want them to do? This may sound blindingly obvious – but there’s little evidence that these questions are being routinely asked.

Ultimately, however, something a little more radical is needed. The scale of climate change as a problem, and the complexity of its solutions, demands that the environmental movement speaks with one voice on this issue. At the very least, the high-profile campaign groups need a coordinated approach. We need to pick our battles with more care, uniting behind a coherent campaign strategy – with carefully chosen targets and clear communications objectives.

The management gurus will tell you that strategy is about deciding what not to do. Communications strategy is no different: for us, it may mean deciding not to talk to a mass audience about polar bears (or halogen bulbs, or half-filling the kettle) but to communicate instead on the solutions that will have highest impact – such as building pressure on the United States to get behind Kyoto.

If the environmental movement were able to speak with one clear, consistent voice, and to present clear, feasible solutions, then we may have a better chance of making some real progress. If our communications remain fragmented and with no clear strategic direction, then I fear we are fighting a losing battle.

Jon Miller is a planner at Ogilvy %26amp; Mather, currently working on Coca Cola in China.

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