Chinese walker

China%26rsquo;s National Audit Office (NAO) recently published a report on the last seven years of efforts to deal with pollution in the Liao, Hai and Huai rivers and the Tai, Chao and Dianchi lakes, known collectively as the %26ldquo;three rivers and three lakes%26rdquo;. According to the report, 91 billion yuan (US$13.3 billion) in government investment and bank loans was spent between 2001 and 2007 on 8,201 separate water-pollution projects, including environmental infrastructure in urban areas in the river and lake basins, ecological construction and general improvements. Yet the water quality remains very poor.

Almost 100 billion yuan were spent and 515 million yuan (US$75 million) were wasted on false reports and embezzlement. The ecological crisis, the public suffering and the constantly changing plans for megacities along these rivers and lakes all make one fear for the future of China%26rsquo;s environment and its cities.

I started researching the pollution of Dianchi Lake, in Yunnan province, as an investigative journalist and later completed a doctoral thesis on the matter, looking at the lake from an ecological and anthropological perspective. I focus on the paradoxes and conceptual risks at the heart of how China handles the ecological crisis %26ndash; in particular, the costs of foresight. The German sociologist Ulrich Beck was the first to propose the concept of the risk society, where decisions increasingly produce unforeseen future hazards. These hazards proliferate and can eventually overwhelm safety systems. A nation may fall into crisis due to a loss of foresight.

The NAO said that management of the rivers and lakes had failed because of inadequacies in these areas: environmental examination and approval; environmental compensation; water pollution statistics; assessment indices; implementation of pollution control plans; enforcement of environmental law; and treatment of urban waste-water. It also pointed to a lack of environmental concern in economic development zones.

But none of these are the crux of the issue. Faced with an unprecedented environmental crisis, the real danger arises from a contradiction between awareness and systems. The systems that exist for managing and investing in the environment perpetuate the pollution.

For instance, the authorities in charge of Dianchi Lake decided to bring water in from the Jinsha River to help control pollution in the lake and water shortages in the city of Kunming. By 2010, Kunming%26rsquo;s population will reach nearly 3.5 million, by 2020 almost five million; the urban area will expand from 201.5 to 470 square kilometres. Meanwhile, Yunnan%26rsquo;s government is working on creating a megacity, one part of which is the idea of a third land bridge between Asia and Europe. This %26ldquo;bridge%26rdquo; would run from China%26rsquo;s eastern port city of Shenzhen, through Kunming to Burma, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Iran and Turkey. It would end up in Rotterdam, in the Netherlands, after passing through 21 different cities %26ndash; a distance of around 15,000 kilometres (3,000 kilometres shorter than the sea route).

Yunnan %26ndash; a water-poor, inland province, with a rich yet fragile ecology %26ndash; has not yet developed an effective or intelligent environmental management system. Nor have policy-makers thought about how to create sustainable cities for the province, preferring to simply propose expansion. Hence long-term plans about land bridges and megacities are unpersuasive.

In dealing with pollution, solving social issues created by urbanisation and searching for sustainable modes of development, there is still a tendency to focus on technological fixes. But these do not clarify our plans for the future of cities or necessarily make them more scientific or advanced %26ndash; in fact, they often continue to create problems.

This lack of foresight means that many areas in need of assistance have become host to manoeuvring by various power groups. There is a tendency to ignore future dangers and confuse their relationships to current pollution problems. In many cases of dealing with pollution, the influence of power is becoming more complex, and the allocation of resources and interests is changing.

A large-scale plan to build a city and scenic area surrounding Dianchi Lake is already underway. Historic villages and semi-urban areas are being flattened. Under that kind of %26ldquo;long-term%26rdquo; guidance, both natural and social sciences need to provide research and analysis. The combination of technology and power in urbanisation will no doubt lead to controversial projects, such as waste incineration, the transportation of water and the construction of clusters of cities.

Dianchi Lake has been given many names through history, from the %26ldquo;Pearl of the Plateau%26rdquo;, to the %26ldquo;Sick Lake%26rdquo; and the %26ldquo;Geneva of the East%26rdquo;. The question is: which one will prove true in the future?

Zhou Lei is a postgraduate anthropology student at Yunnan University and Chevening Scholar at the London School of Economics.

Homepage image from Wikipedia

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Dialogue bank, china, Investment, SAFE

In the attractive Atlantic coast city of Savannah, where the river of the same name meets the ocean, we visited the US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), famous worldwide for its work on dams and levees. USACE is the main builder of dams in the United States.

One hundred years ago, the United States was already building more %26ndash; and bigger %26ndash; dams than any other nation. The country manipulated its rivers to maximise human gains but, in the process, ignored other life forms such as fish, aquatic plants and microorganisms, not to mention the forests, wetlands, lakes, grasslands and animals that depend on the rivers. As Philip Fradkin writes of the Colorado River in A River No More: the Colorado River and the West, %26ldquo;A great river passing through arid lands has been wrung dry by man.%26rdquo;

Yet today, the US government, USACE, energy companies, conservation groups and the public all agree about the need to protect the rivers and each is doing its bit to help rescue river ecosystems. Few people in the United States now deny the true value of the rivers; it is recognised that only free-flowing rivers can ensure biodiverse, natural ecosystems, of which humanity is a part.

The International Commission of Large Dams defines any dam higher than 15 metres as %26ldquo;large%26rdquo;. In China, there are 22,000 such dams %26ndash; 46% of the global total and more than any other country. The United States has 6,575. Major dam-building projects, which can easily cost tens of billions of yuan, have played a significant role in China%26rsquo;s GDP growth.

There is a clear difference between Chinese and US attitudes towards rivers. In the United States, canoeing, fishing and hunting are popular outdoor sports; in China they are either a way to earn a living or hobbies for the rich.

Outdoor sports associations have played a crucial role in the recovery of US rivers. Fans of these pastimes will not stand by and watch the rivers being tamed, or the forests falling silent. Nature lovers are loyal partners of The Nature Conservancy (TNC) and have a lasting enthusiasm for the cause %26ndash; along with plenty of good ideas. For the majority of US citizens today, the ecological value of rivers is much higher than their use for energy generation. Perhaps it is this that has ultimately allowed the rivers to be saved.

We drove upriver to see a dam near Augusta, also on the Savannah River.

The Savannah marks the border between the American states of South Carolina and Georgia. In a river basin stretching over 17,000 square kilometres, there is a wide range of ecosystems, supporting almost 100 rare animal and plant species and providing habitats for more than 100 species of fish; indeed, this stretch of water is home to more fish varieties than any other in the south-eastern United States.

Suddenly Megan, our TNC guide, stops the car %26ndash; she has seen several people pointing cameras at a pool in the river. An alligator is casually observing the people on the bank. It suddenly leaps out of the water, revealing its full length, and then falls back down, leaving only the top of its head exposed.

This is my closest encounter with a wild alligator but afterwards, as we follow the river upstream, we frequently come across them in the marshes and pools. Amazingly, birds and ducks float only two or three metres away from them, seemingly oblivious to the danger.

The Savannah River%26rsquo;s ecosystem was also once in danger.

USACE experts tell us that, sixty years ago, they built three dams on the Savannah. The Hartwell, Richard B Russell and J Strom Thurmond were constructed upstream of Augusta, in order to generate electricity, prevent floods, provide reservoirs for recreation and tourism and supply water. But the dams dealt a grave blow to the integrity of the ecosystem, altering seasonal fluctuations in the river%26rsquo;s flow and threatening the continued existence of crabs, oysters, shrimp and unique fish species. The dams also limited the growth of broadleaf trees on the floodplains, which further affected water quality and reduced survival rates among the fish, mammals and birds reliant on the river water and floodplain forests. Moreover, the dams prevented fish from returning to breeding grounds, forcing them to spawn elsewhere and causing populations to shrink.

In a bid to improve management of the Savannah River, in March 2004 USACE adopted a TNC strategy for operating the dams. The plan restored and increased the number of spawning grounds for fish, while periods of low flow improved growth of broadleaf trees and increased fish reproduction and survival rates. As more water was released, seeds of broadleaf trees and other plants were disseminated and nutrient levels in riverside soil recovered, providing habitats for birds and giving highly endangered animals and plants, such as alligators and floodplain vegetation, another chance at survival.

USACE was applauded for its actions. A good environmental image is crucial for any US firm or organisation and, with public encouragement, USACE is increasing its efforts to restore river ecosystems.

According to USACE hydrologist Stan Simpson, the organisation carefully plans the river%26rsquo;s flow in order to meet the changing needs of the fish; software provided by TNC calculates how much water to release according to the time of year and weather. In the process, USACE has discovered that it used to release the water too quickly for fish to pass through the dam. The team implanted tracking chips into a number of fish and found none were making it back to the river mouth. Where had they gone? Had they turned back? And would they use the shallows in front of dams as new spawning grounds?

%26ldquo;We analysed the relationship between water temperature and flow rates,%26rdquo; says Simpson. %26ldquo;Water from the base of the reservoir, tens of metres deep, can be too cold, and the fish don%26rsquo;t like it. Similarly, they don%26rsquo;t like it if you release the water at the wrong time. Some fish swim near the surface of the water, but trout swim near the bottom; you can%26rsquo;t just release water because you need to give the trout a channel they can use. They are very sensitive to the environment.%26rdquo;

He tells us that the previous winter USACE implanted tracking chips, costing US$250 (1,707 yuan) a piece, into 30 fish to observe how dry years affect their mating patterns. This was done in winter because the chips have he least impact on the fish at that time.

Simpson adds that the role of dams in human life cannot be ignored when planning the river%26rsquo;s flow. %26ldquo;We also need to take into account the dams need for water for electricity generation,%26rdquo; he says. %26ldquo;We need to find a balance between forestry, agriculture, fish, electricity generation, and urban water supply.%26rdquo;

Simulating the natural water flow needed by the fish is no easy task. Hundreds of scientists took two years to produce a plan for dams to release water in waves over different seasons %26ndash; a plan that is adjusted annually according to the weather, air temperature and changes in water quantity.

According to a TNC freshwater and river conservation expert, the acceptance of these conservation ideas and river restoration methods has prompted USACE into becoming more active in developing response plans. It has launched research programmes on a range of energy sources, including coal, nuclear and wind, to help it make better decisions about the most appropriate type of power to use and reduce the impact of hydropower on the rivers.

The Savannah%26rsquo;s future now looks brighter. But what about the prospects of saving China%26rsquo;s rivers? TNC%26rsquo;s expert argues that the Yangtze River%26rsquo;s situation is more complex than that of the Savannah and achieving the same aims will be more difficult. But, if all parties work together to improve dam management, she says there is still hope that bit by bit, stretch by stretch, China%26rsquo;s rivers can be revived.

Zhang Kejia is a reporter for China Youth Daily

Homepage image by brothergrimm

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Dialogue bank, china

Until the 1980s the Mekong River flowed freely for 4,900 kilometres from its 5,100-metre-high source in Tibet to the coast of Vietnam, where it finally poured into the South China Sea. The Mekong is the world%26rsquo;s twelfth longest river, and the eighth or tenth largest, in terms of the 475 billion cubic metres of water it discharges annually. Then and now it passes through or by China, Burma (Myanmar), Laos, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam. It is south-east Asia%26rsquo;s longest river, but 44% of its course is in China, a fact of capital importance for its ecology and the problems associated with its governance.

In 1980 not only were there no dams on its course, but much of the river could not be used for sizeable, long-distance navigation because of the great barrier of the Khone Falls, located just above the border between Cambodia and Laos, and the repeated rapids and obstacles that marked its course in Laos and China. Indeed, no exaggeration is involved in noting that the Mekong%26rsquo;s overall physical configuration in 1980 was remarkably little changed from that existing when it was explored by the French Mekong Expedition that travelled painfully up the river from Vietnam%26rsquo;s Mekong Delta to Jinghong in southern Yunnan in 1866 and 1867. This was the first European expedition to explore the Mekong from southern Vietnam into China and to produce an accurate map of its course to that point.

Since 2003, the most substantial changes to the Mekong%26rsquo;s character below China have related to navigation. Following a major program to clear obstacles from the Mekong begun early in the present decade, a regular navigation service now exists between southern Yunnan and the northern Thai river port of Chiang Saen. It is not clear whether the Chinese, who promoted the concept of these clearances and carried out the work involved, still wish to develop navigation further down the river, as was previously their plan. To date, the environmental effects of the navigation clearances have been of a limited character.

The Mekong plays a vital role in the countries of the Lower Mekong Basin (LMB): Laos, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam. (Burma is not within the basin). In all four LMB countries the Mekong is a source of irrigation. In Vietnam%26rsquo;s Mekong Delta the annual pattern of flood and retreat insure that this region contributes over 50% of agriculture%26rsquo;s contribution to the country%26rsquo;s GDP. For all four LMB countries the Mekong and its associated systems, particularly Cambodia%26rsquo;s Great Lake (Tonle Sap), are a bountiful source of fish, with the annual value of the catch conservatively valued at US$2 billion. More than 70% of the Cambodian population%26rsquo;s annual animal protein consumption comes from the river%26rsquo;s fish. Eighty per cent of the Mekong%26rsquo;s fish species are migratory, some travelling many hundreds of kilometres between spawning and reaching adulthood. Overall, eight out of 10 persons living in the LMB depend on the river for sustenance, either in terms of wild fish captured in the river or through both large and small-scale agriculture and horticulture.

Since the 1980s, the character of the river has been steadily transformed by China%26rsquo;s dam-building program in Yunnan province. The important changes that had taken place on the course of the river since 1980 and up to 2004 were outlined in the Lowy Institute Paper, River at Risk: The Mekong and the Water Politics of Southeast Asia. In 2010 three hydroelectric dams are already in operation and two more very large dams are under construction and due for completion in 2012 and 2017. Plans exist for at least two further dams, and by 2030 there could be a %26ldquo;cascade%26rdquo; of seven dams in Yunnan. Even before that date and with five dams commissioned, China will be able to regulate the flow of the river, reducing the floods of the wet season and raising the level of the river during the dry. In building its dams, China has acted without consulting its downstream neighbours. Although until now the effects of the dams so far built have been limited, this is set to change within a decade, as discussed below.

For despite the limited environmental costs of the dams China has so far completed, and of the river clearances to aid navigation, this state of affairs will change once China has five dams in operation. And the costs exacted by the Chinese dams will be magnified if the proposed mainstream dams below China are built.

Even if no dams are built on the mainstream below China, the cascade to which it is committed will ultimately have serious effects on the functioning of the Mekong once the dams are used to control the river%26rsquo;s flow. This will be the case because the cascade will:

* Alter the hydrology of the river and so the current %26ldquo;flood pulse%26rdquo;, the regular rise and fall of the river on an annual basis which plays an essential part in the timing of spawning and the migration pattern. This will be particularly important in relation to the Tonle Sap in Cambodia, but will have an effect throughout the river%26rsquo;s course;

* Block the flow of sediment down the river which plays a vital part both in depositing nutrients on the agricultural regions flooded by the river and also as a trigger for fish migration %26mdash; at present well over 50% of the river%26rsquo;s sediment comes from China;

* At least initially cause problems by restricting the amount of flooding that takes place most importantly in Cambodia and Vietnam; and

* Lead to the erosion of river banks.

Proposed dams below China

So China%26rsquo;s dam-building plans are worrying enough, but the proposed new mainstream dams would pose even more serious concerns. In contrast to what has occurred in China, and until very recently, there have been no firm plans for the construction of dams on the mainstream of the Mekong below China. This situation has changed over the past three years. Memoranda of Understanding have been signed for 11 proposed dams: seven in Laos; two between Laos and Thailand; and two in Cambodia. The proposed dams are being backed by foreign private capital or Chinese state-backed firms. Government secrecy in both Cambodia and Laos means that it is difficult to judge which, if any, of these proposed dams will actually come into being. Attention and concern have focused on two sites: Don Sahong at the Khone Falls in southern Laos and Sambor in north-eastern Cambodia. The reason for this attention is that if built these dams would block the fish migrations that are essential to insure the food supplies of Laos and Cambodia.

Those built at sites higher upstream would cause the least damage to fish stocks, but if, as currently seems possible, the most likely dams to be built would be at Don Sahong and Sambor, the costs to fish stocks could be very serious. This is because unanimous expert opinion judges that there are no ways to mitigate the blocking of fish migration that would occur if these dams are constructed. None of the suggested possible forms of mitigation %26mdash; fish ladders, fish lifts, and alternative fish-passages %26mdash; are feasible for the species of fish in the Mekong and the very large biomass that is involved in their migratory pattern. Fish ladders were tried and failed at the Pak Mun dam on one of the Mekong%26rsquo;s tributaries in Thailand in the 1990s.

Why are the governments of Laos and Cambodia contemplating the construction of dams that seem certain to have a devastating effect on their populations%26rsquo; food security? The answers are complex and include some of the following:

* A lack of knowledge at some levels of government;

* A readiness to disregard available information on the basis that it may be inaccurate; and

* A belief or conviction that fishing is %26ldquo;old-fashioned%26rdquo;, whereas the production of hydroelectricity is %26ldquo;modern%26rdquo;.

In Cambodia%26rsquo;s case, and in particular in relation to the proposed dam at Sambor, the fact that a Chinese firm is seeking to construct the dam raises the possibility that prime minister Hun Sen is unready to offend the country that has become Cambodia%26rsquo;s largest aid donor and Cambodia%26rsquo;s %26ldquo;most trusted friend%26rdquo;. In Laos, the proposal for a dam at Don Sahong is very much linked to the interests of the Siphandone family for whom southern Laos is a virtual fief. Of all the proposed dam sites, Don Sahong is the most studied in terms of knowledge of fisheries so that it can be safely said that the planned dam would wreak havoc on a migratory system that involves fish moving through the Hou Sahong channel throughout the year, movement that takes place in both directions, upstream and downstream.

In the face of the threats posed by both the Chinese dams and those proposed for the downstream stretches of the river, there is no existing body able to mandate or control what individual countries choose to do on their sections of the Mekong. The agreement establishing the Mekong River Commission (MRC) in 1995 does not include China or Burma, and though the latter%26rsquo;s absence is not important, the fact that China is not an MRC member underlines the body%26rsquo;s weakness. In any event, the MRC members%26rsquo; commitment to maintaining the Mekong%26rsquo;s sustainability has not overcome their basic commitment to national self-interest. A prime example of this is the manner in which the Lao government has proceeded in relation to the proposed Don Sahong dam. For at least two years while the dam was under consideration there was no consultation with Cambodia. Similarly, so far as can be judged, Cambodia%26rsquo;s consideration of a possible dam at Sambor has taken place without consultation with the governments of either Laos or Vietnam.

At the moment the best hope is that both the Cambodian and Lao governments will abandon their plans for Sambor and Don Sahong. If they do not, the future of the Mekong as a great source of food, both through fish and agriculture, is in serious jeopardy. At the time of writing the intentions of the Lao and Cambodian governments remain uncertain.

Concern about dams in China and the LMB is given added importance in the light of worries associated with the likely effects of climate change in the region through which the river flows. Research suggests there will be a series of challenges to the Mekong%26rsquo;s future ecological health. Until recently concerns about the likely impact of climate change tended to focus on the ongoing reduction in the size of the glaciers from which its springs in the Himalayas and which feed it as the result of snow melt. But while there is no doubt that a diminishment in size of the glaciers feeding the Mekong is taking place, recent research has suggested that a more immediate serious threat to the river%26rsquo;s health will come from sea-level changes, particularly as rising levels could begin to inundate large sections of Vietnam%26rsquo;s Mekong Delta. To what extent the threat posed by rising sea levels will be affected by another predicted development linked to climate change %26mdash; greatly increased precipitation leading to more flooding during the wet season %26mdash; is not yet clearly established. But research is pointing to a greatly increased precipitation that is likely to cause major increases in flooding in the future, possibly as early as 2030.

Against the pessimistic views outlined in this article perhaps the best that can be hoped for is that once serious consequences begin to become apparent advice can be offered to mitigate the worst effects of the developments taking place. Where once it was appropriate to write of risks, when assessing the Mekong%26rsquo;s future it is now time to write of fundamental threats to the river%26rsquo;s current and vital role in all of the countries of the Lower Mekong Basin.

Milton Osborne is visiting fellow at the Lowy Institute. He has been associated with the south-east Asian region since being posted to the Australian embassy in Phnom Penh in 1959. Osborne is the author of 10 books on the history and politics of south-east Asia, including The Mekong: turbulent past, uncertain future (2006) and Southeast Asia: an introductory history.

An earlier version of this article was published as %26quot;The Mekong River Under Threat,%26quot; The Asia-Pacific Journal, 2-2-10, January 11, 2010. It is used here with permission.

This article draws on the author%26rsquo;s Lowy Institute Paper 27, 2009. See the complete paper here. To read the complete paper, it is necessary to type in the current year after entering the site.

Homepage image shows the proposed location of the Sambor Dam, Kratie province, Cambodia. Photograph by Carl Middleton, International Rivers.

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Dialogue bank, Banks, china, SAFE, Stock

In Japan, the government has only recently reached the point where it is finally willing to recognise the causal relationship between reservoirs and landslides.

The Ōtaki Dam in southern Honshu was completed in 1977 after more than two decades of construction, the expenditure of 23 billion yen (US$251million), and the relocation of 475 homes. After years of delay, workers began to fill the reservoir up with water in March 2003.

The following month, a slope to the right of the dam in an area known as Shiroya began to creep downward. %26ldquo;In the middle of the village, a crack appeared in the ground, and it was clear that it was very deep,%26rdquo; says president of the neighbourhood community association, 75-year old Isaka Kanshiro.

Isaka recalls that, before the dam was constructed, the government determined that the area was in danger of landslides and researchers recommended that all the households in the village be moved to a safe location.

But this did not happen. %26ldquo;Government officials decided that the village did not need to be moved if certain measures were taken to prevent the land from sliding,%26rdquo; says Isaka. %26ldquo;But once they began to design the dam, they decided that it would be okay and simply drove some piles into the ground at a depth of 20 metres. This was like beating the air. When they started filling up the reservoir and the water level rose, of course the land slid.%26rdquo;

Soon afterwards, the construction ministry, now part of the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, recognised that the dammed water was the cause of the landslide. In May 2003, it created a committee to investigate the fissure in the Shiroya area, which cited other examples of reservoirs triggering landslides such as Ōdo Dam, on the southern Japanese island of Shikoku in 1982 and Vajont Dam in Italy in 1963. The Construction Ministry was clearly aware of dam-caused landslides.

There is evidence in parliamentary records that the government knew about the danger of landslides at Ōtaki Dam. During a session of the Lower House Budget Committee in March 1990, questions were raised about sections of a local soil survey report that indicated there was a possibility of landslides.

Even though Italian engineers were aware there was a danger of a mountain collapsing into a newly-created reservoir behind the Vajont Dam, once the dam was completed and the reservoir filled, a massive landslide occurred, creating a tsunami that swept downstream and took the lives of 2,000 people. Likewise, the damage at Shiroya happened because the government ignored survey results and the concerns of residents and concentrated on cutting costs while continuing to push forward the project.

MLIT has now emptied the reservoir and is carrying out projects to prevent further landslides. Truly, the criticism that public works projects are %26ldquo;born small but grow huge%26rdquo; aptly fits landslide prevention measures. In August 2008, the government amended its dam legislation, extending construction projects to 2012, and allocating funds of 364 billion yen (US$4 billion). Projects that were supposed to take 15 years will now take half a century and cost 16 times more than originally expected.

Landslide prevention measures at JWA%26rsquo;s Takizawa Dam in central Honshu have continued for three years. The first landslide occurred on November 2, 2005. The previous month, while the reservoir was being filled, a slope 1.5 kilometres above the dam shifted one centimetre and fissures appeared in four separate spots. Landslide prevention procedures were conducted for nine months at a cost of 3 billion yen (US$32.8 million).

In August 2006, soon after those measures completed, workers began to fill the reservoir again. In May 2007, the slope right next to the one that had been strengthened collapsed. Half a month later, the slope %26mdash; now 90 metres wide, 27 metres deep, and 15 metres long %26mdash; slid further. JWA had taken preventative measures in no less than 40 different places. Yet this was insufficient.

Prevention measures continued and, in August 2007, another attempt was made to fill the reservoir. This time, workers were able to fill it to capacity but, as they began to lower the water in April 2008, a crack was discovered in a city road near the reservoir bank. As the water level continued to decline, other fissures appeared. Even when the water level was maintained, the land continued to slump. It was an obvious disaster.

Could this all have been avoided? A JWA official reported: %26ldquo;In November 2003, a public works committee at the Kanto Region Development Bureau evaluated the cost-benefit of the landslide prevention measures and recommended that we %26lsquo;continue%26rsquo;. We did not arrive at this decision internally.%26rdquo; But an investigation of the committee%26rsquo;s minutes reveals that there was not a single geologist among its 12 members. No one takes responsibility, no one makes rational decisions and tax monies continue to be wasted.

There may be nothing as perverse as building a dam in an area that you know is susceptible to landslides. Japan%26rsquo;s Landslide Prevention Law places limits on %26ldquo;increasing, attracting, or retaining ground water%26rdquo; above areas deemed vulnerable to landslides. Dams constructed in such areas present a stark violation of this law. One example of this is the JWA%26rsquo;s Shimokubo Dam on the Kanna River, the westernmost branch of the Tone River.

Just below the dam is an area that was designated a protected zone in 1962 because landslides had occurred there in 1910, 1938, and 1947. Despite this, the Shimokubo Dam was constructed there in 1968.

About two years after the dam was completed in 1991, a concentrated downpour triggered a huge landslide, which destroyed 40 homes. Cracks and bumps appeared in other houses and roads. A motorway was completely closed for six days, and one lane was closed for a further 565 days. The following year, heavy rains intensified the landslide problems and, in 1995, the area was declared one of 12 %26ldquo;landslide zones under direct control of the central government%26rdquo;.

These problems have transformed the area into one of the country%26rsquo;s largest public works projects, currently expected to complete in 2025 and to cost 38 billion yen (US$415 million). Though the project is under central government control, the prefecture is expected to bear one-third of the cost.

What is the relationship between the dam and the landslides? The hypothesis that the reservoir, which seeps into the groundwater causing its level to rise, is a contributing factor seems reasonable. However, officials are unwilling even to investigate this relationship. Planning officials at the Kanto Region Development Bureau appear to have been unaware that a landslide zone under the direct control of the central government lay just below the Shimokubo Dam. Perhaps they would like to deny any relationship between the dam and landslides, but they should at least investigate the possibility and the risks involved.

Even as questions about the possibility of landslides go unanswered, the Asakawa Dam in central Honshu %26ndash; a venture that was once cancelled %26ndash; is moving ahead. The site of the project is on the south-west side of the one-time volcano Mount Iizuna, located between the epicentre of the 7.4 magnitude Zenkoji Earthquake, which rocked the area in 1847, and the Mount Chizuki Landslide, that occurred in July 1985. All three locations lie on the western edge of the Nagano Basin, where volcanic tuff is widely distributed.

One of the first people to realise the danger of the Asakawa Dam was Uchiyama Takurō, who was forced to relocate his house by the Chizuki Landslide from a hill on the right side of the Asakawa River to one on the left side. He decided to build a pond on his new property, but was told that he could not because the area was susceptible to landslides. Why then, he wondered, is a dam being planned in this area? After investigating, Uchiyama discovered workers had been drilling bore samples for twenty years and had failed to find a site that was appropriate for a dam.

Suddenly, however, the project began to accelerate. In preparation for the 1998 Nagano Winter Olympics, the prefecture decided it needed a road to replace a toll road that had been devastated by the Chizuki Landslide. The prefecture, which was short of money, combined the road with the Asakawa dam project as a last ditch measure to obtain additional funding. In this way, the dam project was restarted.

In 2000, Uchiyama led newly-elected prefectural governor Tanaka Yasuo on a tour of the dam site. He informed him that the current location was the fourth or fifth that had been proposed and that it had initially been abandoned as inadequate. By the end of the day, Tanaka had decided to pull the plug on the project.

But in June 2007, a number of prefectural assembly members suggested that another investigation be conducted into the geology of the proposed site. In response, the director of the construction department declared that %26ldquo;sufficient surveys had been conducted%26rdquo; and that the prefecture would proceed %26ldquo;using the best designs and workmanship%26rdquo;. Such statements have been heard before in the cases of the Ōtaki Dam and the Takizawa Dam.

When dams are constructed in areas with volcanic geology or that have been designated as landslide prevention areas, they often lead to serious human and economic costs. When will the government learn from all these examples that %26ldquo;using the best designs%26rdquo; will not be enough? Just what will it take for officials to cancel dangerous dam projects?

Masano Atsuko is a journalist specialising in environmental issues.

An earlier version of this article appeared in Sekai in December 2008 and was later published as %26ldquo;The Immense Cost of Japanese Dams and Dam-related Landslides and Earthquakes,%26rdquo; The Asia-Pacific Journal, 1-2-10, January 4, 2010, translated from Japanese into English by Aaron Skabelund. It is used here with permission.

Homepage image shows one of the many landslides triggered by the Iwate-Miyagi Nairuku Earthquake, which struck northern Honshu in June 2008.

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Dialogue bank, SAFE, tax

China%26rsquo;s National Audit Office (NAO) recently published a report on the last seven years of efforts to deal with pollution in the Liao, Hai and Huai rivers and the Tai, Chao and Dianchi lakes, known collectively as the %26ldquo;three rivers and three lakes%26rdquo;. According to the report, 91 billion yuan (US$13.3 billion) in government investment and bank loans was spent between 2001 and 2007 on 8,201 separate water-pollution projects, including environmental infrastructure in urban areas in the river and lake basins, ecological construction and general improvements. Yet the water quality remains very poor.

Almost 100 billion yuan were spent and 515 million yuan (US$75 million) were wasted on false reports and embezzlement. The ecological crisis, the public suffering and the constantly changing plans for megacities along these rivers and lakes all make one fear for the future of China%26rsquo;s environment and its cities.

I started researching the pollution of Dianchi Lake, in Yunnan province, as an investigative journalist and later completed a doctoral thesis on the matter, looking at the lake from an ecological and anthropological perspective. I focus on the paradoxes and conceptual risks at the heart of how China handles the ecological crisis %26ndash; in particular, the costs of foresight. The German sociologist Ulrich Beck was the first to propose the concept of the risk society, where decisions increasingly produce unforeseen future hazards. These hazards proliferate and can eventually overwhelm safety systems. A nation may fall into crisis due to a loss of foresight.

The NAO said that management of the rivers and lakes had failed because of inadequacies in these areas: environmental examination and approval; environmental compensation; water pollution statistics; assessment indices; implementation of pollution control plans; enforcement of environmental law; and treatment of urban waste-water. It also pointed to a lack of environmental concern in economic development zones.

But none of these are the crux of the issue. Faced with an unprecedented environmental crisis, the real danger arises from a contradiction between awareness and systems. The systems that exist for managing and investing in the environment perpetuate the pollution.

For instance, the authorities in charge of Dianchi Lake decided to bring water in from the Jinsha River to help control pollution in the lake and water shortages in the city of Kunming. By 2010, Kunming%26rsquo;s population will reach nearly 3.5 million, by 2020 almost five million; the urban area will expand from 201.5 to 470 square kilometres. Meanwhile, Yunnan%26rsquo;s government is working on creating a megacity, one part of which is the idea of a third land bridge between Asia and Europe. This %26ldquo;bridge%26rdquo; would run from China%26rsquo;s eastern port city of Shenzhen, through Kunming to Burma, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Iran and Turkey. It would end up in Rotterdam, in the Netherlands, after passing through 21 different cities %26ndash; a distance of around 15,000 kilometres (3,000 kilometres shorter than the sea route).

Yunnan %26ndash; a water-poor, inland province, with a rich yet fragile ecology %26ndash; has not yet developed an effective or intelligent environmental management system. Nor have policy-makers thought about how to create sustainable cities for the province, preferring to simply propose expansion. Hence long-term plans about land bridges and megacities are unpersuasive.

In dealing with pollution, solving social issues created by urbanisation and searching for sustainable modes of development, there is still a tendency to focus on technological fixes. But these do not clarify our plans for the future of cities or necessarily make them more scientific or advanced %26ndash; in fact, they often continue to create problems.

This lack of foresight means that many areas in need of assistance have become host to manoeuvring by various power groups. There is a tendency to ignore future dangers and confuse their relationships to current pollution problems. In many cases of dealing with pollution, the influence of power is becoming more complex, and the allocation of resources and interests is changing.

A large-scale plan to build a city and scenic area surrounding Dianchi Lake is already underway. Historic villages and semi-urban areas are being flattened. Under that kind of %26ldquo;long-term%26rdquo; guidance, both natural and social sciences need to provide research and analysis. The combination of technology and power in urbanisation will no doubt lead to controversial projects, such as waste incineration, the transportation of water and the construction of clusters of cities.

Dianchi Lake has been given many names through history, from the %26ldquo;Pearl of the Plateau%26rdquo;, to the %26ldquo;Sick Lake%26rdquo; and the %26ldquo;Geneva of the East%26rdquo;. The question is: which one will prove true in the future?

Zhou Lei is a postgraduate anthropology student at Yunnan University and Chevening Scholar at the London School of Economics.

Homepage image from Wikipedia

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Dialogue bank, china, Investment, SAFE

In the attractive Atlantic coast city of Savannah, where the river of the same name meets the ocean, we visited the US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), famous worldwide for its work on dams and levees. USACE is the main builder of dams in the United States.

One hundred years ago, the United States was already building more %26ndash; and bigger %26ndash; dams than any other nation. The country manipulated its rivers to maximise human gains but, in the process, ignored other life forms such as fish, aquatic plants and microorganisms, not to mention the forests, wetlands, lakes, grasslands and animals that depend on the rivers. As Philip Fradkin writes of the Colorado River in A River No More: the Colorado River and the West, %26ldquo;A great river passing through arid lands has been wrung dry by man.%26rdquo;

Yet today, the US government, USACE, energy companies, conservation groups and the public all agree about the need to protect the rivers and each is doing its bit to help rescue river ecosystems. Few people in the United States now deny the true value of the rivers; it is recognised that only free-flowing rivers can ensure biodiverse, natural ecosystems, of which humanity is a part.

The International Commission of Large Dams defines any dam higher than 15 metres as %26ldquo;large%26rdquo;. In China, there are 22,000 such dams %26ndash; 46% of the global total and more than any other country. The United States has 6,575. Major dam-building projects, which can easily cost tens of billions of yuan, have played a significant role in China%26rsquo;s GDP growth.

There is a clear difference between Chinese and US attitudes towards rivers. In the United States, canoeing, fishing and hunting are popular outdoor sports; in China they are either a way to earn a living or hobbies for the rich.

Outdoor sports associations have played a crucial role in the recovery of US rivers. Fans of these pastimes will not stand by and watch the rivers being tamed, or the forests falling silent. Nature lovers are loyal partners of The Nature Conservancy (TNC) and have a lasting enthusiasm for the cause %26ndash; along with plenty of good ideas. For the majority of US citizens today, the ecological value of rivers is much higher than their use for energy generation. Perhaps it is this that has ultimately allowed the rivers to be saved.

We drove upriver to see a dam near Augusta, also on the Savannah River.

The Savannah marks the border between the American states of South Carolina and Georgia. In a river basin stretching over 17,000 square kilometres, there is a wide range of ecosystems, supporting almost 100 rare animal and plant species and providing habitats for more than 100 species of fish; indeed, this stretch of water is home to more fish varieties than any other in the south-eastern United States.

Suddenly Megan, our TNC guide, stops the car %26ndash; she has seen several people pointing cameras at a pool in the river. An alligator is casually observing the people on the bank. It suddenly leaps out of the water, revealing its full length, and then falls back down, leaving only the top of its head exposed.

This is my closest encounter with a wild alligator but afterwards, as we follow the river upstream, we frequently come across them in the marshes and pools. Amazingly, birds and ducks float only two or three metres away from them, seemingly oblivious to the danger.

The Savannah River%26rsquo;s ecosystem was also once in danger.

USACE experts tell us that, sixty years ago, they built three dams on the Savannah. The Hartwell, Richard B Russell and J Strom Thurmond were constructed upstream of Augusta, in order to generate electricity, prevent floods, provide reservoirs for recreation and tourism and supply water. But the dams dealt a grave blow to the integrity of the ecosystem, altering seasonal fluctuations in the river%26rsquo;s flow and threatening the continued existence of crabs, oysters, shrimp and unique fish species. The dams also limited the growth of broadleaf trees on the floodplains, which further affected water quality and reduced survival rates among the fish, mammals and birds reliant on the river water and floodplain forests. Moreover, the dams prevented fish from returning to breeding grounds, forcing them to spawn elsewhere and causing populations to shrink.

In a bid to improve management of the Savannah River, in March 2004 USACE adopted a TNC strategy for operating the dams. The plan restored and increased the number of spawning grounds for fish, while periods of low flow improved growth of broadleaf trees and increased fish reproduction and survival rates. As more water was released, seeds of broadleaf trees and other plants were disseminated and nutrient levels in riverside soil recovered, providing habitats for birds and giving highly endangered animals and plants, such as alligators and floodplain vegetation, another chance at survival.

USACE was applauded for its actions. A good environmental image is crucial for any US firm or organisation and, with public encouragement, USACE is increasing its efforts to restore river ecosystems.

According to USACE hydrologist Stan Simpson, the organisation carefully plans the river%26rsquo;s flow in order to meet the changing needs of the fish; software provided by TNC calculates how much water to release according to the time of year and weather. In the process, USACE has discovered that it used to release the water too quickly for fish to pass through the dam. The team implanted tracking chips into a number of fish and found none were making it back to the river mouth. Where had they gone? Had they turned back? And would they use the shallows in front of dams as new spawning grounds?

%26ldquo;We analysed the relationship between water temperature and flow rates,%26rdquo; says Simpson. %26ldquo;Water from the base of the reservoir, tens of metres deep, can be too cold, and the fish don%26rsquo;t like it. Similarly, they don%26rsquo;t like it if you release the water at the wrong time. Some fish swim near the surface of the water, but trout swim near the bottom; you can%26rsquo;t just release water because you need to give the trout a channel they can use. They are very sensitive to the environment.%26rdquo;

He tells us that the previous winter USACE implanted tracking chips, costing US$250 (1,707 yuan) a piece, into 30 fish to observe how dry years affect their mating patterns. This was done in winter because the chips have he least impact on the fish at that time.

Simpson adds that the role of dams in human life cannot be ignored when planning the river%26rsquo;s flow. %26ldquo;We also need to take into account the dams need for water for electricity generation,%26rdquo; he says. %26ldquo;We need to find a balance between forestry, agriculture, fish, electricity generation, and urban water supply.%26rdquo;

Simulating the natural water flow needed by the fish is no easy task. Hundreds of scientists took two years to produce a plan for dams to release water in waves over different seasons %26ndash; a plan that is adjusted annually according to the weather, air temperature and changes in water quantity.

According to a TNC freshwater and river conservation expert, the acceptance of these conservation ideas and river restoration methods has prompted USACE into becoming more active in developing response plans. It has launched research programmes on a range of energy sources, including coal, nuclear and wind, to help it make better decisions about the most appropriate type of power to use and reduce the impact of hydropower on the rivers.

The Savannah%26rsquo;s future now looks brighter. But what about the prospects of saving China%26rsquo;s rivers? TNC%26rsquo;s expert argues that the Yangtze River%26rsquo;s situation is more complex than that of the Savannah and achieving the same aims will be more difficult. But, if all parties work together to improve dam management, she says there is still hope that bit by bit, stretch by stretch, China%26rsquo;s rivers can be revived.

Zhang Kejia is a reporter for China Youth Daily

Homepage image by brothergrimm

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Dialogue bank, china

Until the 1980s the Mekong River flowed freely for 4,900 kilometres from its 5,100-metre-high source in Tibet to the coast of Vietnam, where it finally poured into the South China Sea. The Mekong is the world%26rsquo;s twelfth longest river, and the eighth or tenth largest, in terms of the 475 billion cubic metres of water it discharges annually. Then and now it passes through or by China, Burma (Myanmar), Laos, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam. It is south-east Asia%26rsquo;s longest river, but 44% of its course is in China, a fact of capital importance for its ecology and the problems associated with its governance.

In 1980 not only were there no dams on its course, but much of the river could not be used for sizeable, long-distance navigation because of the great barrier of the Khone Falls, located just above the border between Cambodia and Laos, and the repeated rapids and obstacles that marked its course in Laos and China. Indeed, no exaggeration is involved in noting that the Mekong%26rsquo;s overall physical configuration in 1980 was remarkably little changed from that existing when it was explored by the French Mekong Expedition that travelled painfully up the river from Vietnam%26rsquo;s Mekong Delta to Jinghong in southern Yunnan in 1866 and 1867. This was the first European expedition to explore the Mekong from southern Vietnam into China and to produce an accurate map of its course to that point.

Since 2003, the most substantial changes to the Mekong%26rsquo;s character below China have related to navigation. Following a major program to clear obstacles from the Mekong begun early in the present decade, a regular navigation service now exists between southern Yunnan and the northern Thai river port of Chiang Saen. It is not clear whether the Chinese, who promoted the concept of these clearances and carried out the work involved, still wish to develop navigation further down the river, as was previously their plan. To date, the environmental effects of the navigation clearances have been of a limited character.

The Mekong plays a vital role in the countries of the Lower Mekong Basin (LMB): Laos, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam. (Burma is not within the basin). In all four LMB countries the Mekong is a source of irrigation. In Vietnam%26rsquo;s Mekong Delta the annual pattern of flood and retreat insure that this region contributes over 50% of agriculture%26rsquo;s contribution to the country%26rsquo;s GDP. For all four LMB countries the Mekong and its associated systems, particularly Cambodia%26rsquo;s Great Lake (Tonle Sap), are a bountiful source of fish, with the annual value of the catch conservatively valued at US$2 billion. More than 70% of the Cambodian population%26rsquo;s annual animal protein consumption comes from the river%26rsquo;s fish. Eighty per cent of the Mekong%26rsquo;s fish species are migratory, some travelling many hundreds of kilometres between spawning and reaching adulthood. Overall, eight out of 10 persons living in the LMB depend on the river for sustenance, either in terms of wild fish captured in the river or through both large and small-scale agriculture and horticulture.

Since the 1980s, the character of the river has been steadily transformed by China%26rsquo;s dam-building program in Yunnan province. The important changes that had taken place on the course of the river since 1980 and up to 2004 were outlined in the Lowy Institute Paper, River at Risk: The Mekong and the Water Politics of Southeast Asia. In 2010 three hydroelectric dams are already in operation and two more very large dams are under construction and due for completion in 2012 and 2017. Plans exist for at least two further dams, and by 2030 there could be a %26ldquo;cascade%26rdquo; of seven dams in Yunnan. Even before that date and with five dams commissioned, China will be able to regulate the flow of the river, reducing the floods of the wet season and raising the level of the river during the dry. In building its dams, China has acted without consulting its downstream neighbours. Although until now the effects of the dams so far built have been limited, this is set to change within a decade, as discussed below.

For despite the limited environmental costs of the dams China has so far completed, and of the river clearances to aid navigation, this state of affairs will change once China has five dams in operation. And the costs exacted by the Chinese dams will be magnified if the proposed mainstream dams below China are built.

Even if no dams are built on the mainstream below China, the cascade to which it is committed will ultimately have serious effects on the functioning of the Mekong once the dams are used to control the river%26rsquo;s flow. This will be the case because the cascade will:

* Alter the hydrology of the river and so the current %26ldquo;flood pulse%26rdquo;, the regular rise and fall of the river on an annual basis which plays an essential part in the timing of spawning and the migration pattern. This will be particularly important in relation to the Tonle Sap in Cambodia, but will have an effect throughout the river%26rsquo;s course;

* Block the flow of sediment down the river which plays a vital part both in depositing nutrients on the agricultural regions flooded by the river and also as a trigger for fish migration %26mdash; at present well over 50% of the river%26rsquo;s sediment comes from China;

* At least initially cause problems by restricting the amount of flooding that takes place most importantly in Cambodia and Vietnam; and

* Lead to the erosion of river banks.

Proposed dams below China

So China%26rsquo;s dam-building plans are worrying enough, but the proposed new mainstream dams would pose even more serious concerns. In contrast to what has occurred in China, and until very recently, there have been no firm plans for the construction of dams on the mainstream of the Mekong below China. This situation has changed over the past three years. Memoranda of Understanding have been signed for 11 proposed dams: seven in Laos; two between Laos and Thailand; and two in Cambodia. The proposed dams are being backed by foreign private capital or Chinese state-backed firms. Government secrecy in both Cambodia and Laos means that it is difficult to judge which, if any, of these proposed dams will actually come into being. Attention and concern have focused on two sites: Don Sahong at the Khone Falls in southern Laos and Sambor in north-eastern Cambodia. The reason for this attention is that if built these dams would block the fish migrations that are essential to insure the food supplies of Laos and Cambodia.

Those built at sites higher upstream would cause the least damage to fish stocks, but if, as currently seems possible, the most likely dams to be built would be at Don Sahong and Sambor, the costs to fish stocks could be very serious. This is because unanimous expert opinion judges that there are no ways to mitigate the blocking of fish migration that would occur if these dams are constructed. None of the suggested possible forms of mitigation %26mdash; fish ladders, fish lifts, and alternative fish-passages %26mdash; are feasible for the species of fish in the Mekong and the very large biomass that is involved in their migratory pattern. Fish ladders were tried and failed at the Pak Mun dam on one of the Mekong%26rsquo;s tributaries in Thailand in the 1990s.

Why are the governments of Laos and Cambodia contemplating the construction of dams that seem certain to have a devastating effect on their populations%26rsquo; food security? The answers are complex and include some of the following:

* A lack of knowledge at some levels of government;

* A readiness to disregard available information on the basis that it may be inaccurate; and

* A belief or conviction that fishing is %26ldquo;old-fashioned%26rdquo;, whereas the production of hydroelectricity is %26ldquo;modern%26rdquo;.

In Cambodia%26rsquo;s case, and in particular in relation to the proposed dam at Sambor, the fact that a Chinese firm is seeking to construct the dam raises the possibility that prime minister Hun Sen is unready to offend the country that has become Cambodia%26rsquo;s largest aid donor and Cambodia%26rsquo;s %26ldquo;most trusted friend%26rdquo;. In Laos, the proposal for a dam at Don Sahong is very much linked to the interests of the Siphandone family for whom southern Laos is a virtual fief. Of all the proposed dam sites, Don Sahong is the most studied in terms of knowledge of fisheries so that it can be safely said that the planned dam would wreak havoc on a migratory system that involves fish moving through the Hou Sahong channel throughout the year, movement that takes place in both directions, upstream and downstream.

In the face of the threats posed by both the Chinese dams and those proposed for the downstream stretches of the river, there is no existing body able to mandate or control what individual countries choose to do on their sections of the Mekong. The agreement establishing the Mekong River Commission (MRC) in 1995 does not include China or Burma, and though the latter%26rsquo;s absence is not important, the fact that China is not an MRC member underlines the body%26rsquo;s weakness. In any event, the MRC members%26rsquo; commitment to maintaining the Mekong%26rsquo;s sustainability has not overcome their basic commitment to national self-interest. A prime example of this is the manner in which the Lao government has proceeded in relation to the proposed Don Sahong dam. For at least two years while the dam was under consideration there was no consultation with Cambodia. Similarly, so far as can be judged, Cambodia%26rsquo;s consideration of a possible dam at Sambor has taken place without consultation with the governments of either Laos or Vietnam.

At the moment the best hope is that both the Cambodian and Lao governments will abandon their plans for Sambor and Don Sahong. If they do not, the future of the Mekong as a great source of food, both through fish and agriculture, is in serious jeopardy. At the time of writing the intentions of the Lao and Cambodian governments remain uncertain.

Concern about dams in China and the LMB is given added importance in the light of worries associated with the likely effects of climate change in the region through which the river flows. Research suggests there will be a series of challenges to the Mekong%26rsquo;s future ecological health. Until recently concerns about the likely impact of climate change tended to focus on the ongoing reduction in the size of the glaciers from which its springs in the Himalayas and which feed it as the result of snow melt. But while there is no doubt that a diminishment in size of the glaciers feeding the Mekong is taking place, recent research has suggested that a more immediate serious threat to the river%26rsquo;s health will come from sea-level changes, particularly as rising levels could begin to inundate large sections of Vietnam%26rsquo;s Mekong Delta. To what extent the threat posed by rising sea levels will be affected by another predicted development linked to climate change %26mdash; greatly increased precipitation leading to more flooding during the wet season %26mdash; is not yet clearly established. But research is pointing to a greatly increased precipitation that is likely to cause major increases in flooding in the future, possibly as early as 2030.

Against the pessimistic views outlined in this article perhaps the best that can be hoped for is that once serious consequences begin to become apparent advice can be offered to mitigate the worst effects of the developments taking place. Where once it was appropriate to write of risks, when assessing the Mekong%26rsquo;s future it is now time to write of fundamental threats to the river%26rsquo;s current and vital role in all of the countries of the Lower Mekong Basin.

Milton Osborne is visiting fellow at the Lowy Institute. He has been associated with the south-east Asian region since being posted to the Australian embassy in Phnom Penh in 1959. Osborne is the author of 10 books on the history and politics of south-east Asia, including The Mekong: turbulent past, uncertain future (2006) and Southeast Asia: an introductory history.

An earlier version of this article was published as %26quot;The Mekong River Under Threat,%26quot; The Asia-Pacific Journal, 2-2-10, January 11, 2010. It is used here with permission.

This article draws on the author%26rsquo;s Lowy Institute Paper 27, 2009. See the complete paper here. To read the complete paper, it is necessary to type in the current year after entering the site.

Homepage image shows the proposed location of the Sambor Dam, Kratie province, Cambodia. Photograph by Carl Middleton, International Rivers.

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Dialogue bank, Banks, china, SAFE, Stock

In Japan, the government has only recently reached the point where it is finally willing to recognise the causal relationship between reservoirs and landslides.

The Ōtaki Dam in southern Honshu was completed in 1977 after more than two decades of construction, the expenditure of 23 billion yen (US$251million), and the relocation of 475 homes. After years of delay, workers began to fill the reservoir up with water in March 2003.

The following month, a slope to the right of the dam in an area known as Shiroya began to creep downward. %26ldquo;In the middle of the village, a crack appeared in the ground, and it was clear that it was very deep,%26rdquo; says president of the neighbourhood community association, 75-year old Isaka Kanshiro.

Isaka recalls that, before the dam was constructed, the government determined that the area was in danger of landslides and researchers recommended that all the households in the village be moved to a safe location.

But this did not happen. %26ldquo;Government officials decided that the village did not need to be moved if certain measures were taken to prevent the land from sliding,%26rdquo; says Isaka. %26ldquo;But once they began to design the dam, they decided that it would be okay and simply drove some piles into the ground at a depth of 20 metres. This was like beating the air. When they started filling up the reservoir and the water level rose, of course the land slid.%26rdquo;

Soon afterwards, the construction ministry, now part of the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, recognised that the dammed water was the cause of the landslide. In May 2003, it created a committee to investigate the fissure in the Shiroya area, which cited other examples of reservoirs triggering landslides such as Ōdo Dam, on the southern Japanese island of Shikoku in 1982 and Vajont Dam in Italy in 1963. The Construction Ministry was clearly aware of dam-caused landslides.

There is evidence in parliamentary records that the government knew about the danger of landslides at Ōtaki Dam. During a session of the Lower House Budget Committee in March 1990, questions were raised about sections of a local soil survey report that indicated there was a possibility of landslides.

Even though Italian engineers were aware there was a danger of a mountain collapsing into a newly-created reservoir behind the Vajont Dam, once the dam was completed and the reservoir filled, a massive landslide occurred, creating a tsunami that swept downstream and took the lives of 2,000 people. Likewise, the damage at Shiroya happened because the government ignored survey results and the concerns of residents and concentrated on cutting costs while continuing to push forward the project.

MLIT has now emptied the reservoir and is carrying out projects to prevent further landslides. Truly, the criticism that public works projects are %26ldquo;born small but grow huge%26rdquo; aptly fits landslide prevention measures. In August 2008, the government amended its dam legislation, extending construction projects to 2012, and allocating funds of 364 billion yen (US$4 billion). Projects that were supposed to take 15 years will now take half a century and cost 16 times more than originally expected.

Landslide prevention measures at JWA%26rsquo;s Takizawa Dam in central Honshu have continued for three years. The first landslide occurred on November 2, 2005. The previous month, while the reservoir was being filled, a slope 1.5 kilometres above the dam shifted one centimetre and fissures appeared in four separate spots. Landslide prevention procedures were conducted for nine months at a cost of 3 billion yen (US$32.8 million).

In August 2006, soon after those measures completed, workers began to fill the reservoir again. In May 2007, the slope right next to the one that had been strengthened collapsed. Half a month later, the slope %26mdash; now 90 metres wide, 27 metres deep, and 15 metres long %26mdash; slid further. JWA had taken preventative measures in no less than 40 different places. Yet this was insufficient.

Prevention measures continued and, in August 2007, another attempt was made to fill the reservoir. This time, workers were able to fill it to capacity but, as they began to lower the water in April 2008, a crack was discovered in a city road near the reservoir bank. As the water level continued to decline, other fissures appeared. Even when the water level was maintained, the land continued to slump. It was an obvious disaster.

Could this all have been avoided? A JWA official reported: %26ldquo;In November 2003, a public works committee at the Kanto Region Development Bureau evaluated the cost-benefit of the landslide prevention measures and recommended that we %26lsquo;continue%26rsquo;. We did not arrive at this decision internally.%26rdquo; But an investigation of the committee%26rsquo;s minutes reveals that there was not a single geologist among its 12 members. No one takes responsibility, no one makes rational decisions and tax monies continue to be wasted.

There may be nothing as perverse as building a dam in an area that you know is susceptible to landslides. Japan%26rsquo;s Landslide Prevention Law places limits on %26ldquo;increasing, attracting, or retaining ground water%26rdquo; above areas deemed vulnerable to landslides. Dams constructed in such areas present a stark violation of this law. One example of this is the JWA%26rsquo;s Shimokubo Dam on the Kanna River, the westernmost branch of the Tone River.

Just below the dam is an area that was designated a protected zone in 1962 because landslides had occurred there in 1910, 1938, and 1947. Despite this, the Shimokubo Dam was constructed there in 1968.

About two years after the dam was completed in 1991, a concentrated downpour triggered a huge landslide, which destroyed 40 homes. Cracks and bumps appeared in other houses and roads. A motorway was completely closed for six days, and one lane was closed for a further 565 days. The following year, heavy rains intensified the landslide problems and, in 1995, the area was declared one of 12 %26ldquo;landslide zones under direct control of the central government%26rdquo;.

These problems have transformed the area into one of the country%26rsquo;s largest public works projects, currently expected to complete in 2025 and to cost 38 billion yen (US$415 million). Though the project is under central government control, the prefecture is expected to bear one-third of the cost.

What is the relationship between the dam and the landslides? The hypothesis that the reservoir, which seeps into the groundwater causing its level to rise, is a contributing factor seems reasonable. However, officials are unwilling even to investigate this relationship. Planning officials at the Kanto Region Development Bureau appear to have been unaware that a landslide zone under the direct control of the central government lay just below the Shimokubo Dam. Perhaps they would like to deny any relationship between the dam and landslides, but they should at least investigate the possibility and the risks involved.

Even as questions about the possibility of landslides go unanswered, the Asakawa Dam in central Honshu %26ndash; a venture that was once cancelled %26ndash; is moving ahead. The site of the project is on the south-west side of the one-time volcano Mount Iizuna, located between the epicentre of the 7.4 magnitude Zenkoji Earthquake, which rocked the area in 1847, and the Mount Chizuki Landslide, that occurred in July 1985. All three locations lie on the western edge of the Nagano Basin, where volcanic tuff is widely distributed.

One of the first people to realise the danger of the Asakawa Dam was Uchiyama Takurō, who was forced to relocate his house by the Chizuki Landslide from a hill on the right side of the Asakawa River to one on the left side. He decided to build a pond on his new property, but was told that he could not because the area was susceptible to landslides. Why then, he wondered, is a dam being planned in this area? After investigating, Uchiyama discovered workers had been drilling bore samples for twenty years and had failed to find a site that was appropriate for a dam.

Suddenly, however, the project began to accelerate. In preparation for the 1998 Nagano Winter Olympics, the prefecture decided it needed a road to replace a toll road that had been devastated by the Chizuki Landslide. The prefecture, which was short of money, combined the road with the Asakawa dam project as a last ditch measure to obtain additional funding. In this way, the dam project was restarted.

In 2000, Uchiyama led newly-elected prefectural governor Tanaka Yasuo on a tour of the dam site. He informed him that the current location was the fourth or fifth that had been proposed and that it had initially been abandoned as inadequate. By the end of the day, Tanaka had decided to pull the plug on the project.

But in June 2007, a number of prefectural assembly members suggested that another investigation be conducted into the geology of the proposed site. In response, the director of the construction department declared that %26ldquo;sufficient surveys had been conducted%26rdquo; and that the prefecture would proceed %26ldquo;using the best designs and workmanship%26rdquo;. Such statements have been heard before in the cases of the Ōtaki Dam and the Takizawa Dam.

When dams are constructed in areas with volcanic geology or that have been designated as landslide prevention areas, they often lead to serious human and economic costs. When will the government learn from all these examples that %26ldquo;using the best designs%26rdquo; will not be enough? Just what will it take for officials to cancel dangerous dam projects?

Masano Atsuko is a journalist specialising in environmental issues.

An earlier version of this article appeared in Sekai in December 2008 and was later published as %26ldquo;The Immense Cost of Japanese Dams and Dam-related Landslides and Earthquakes,%26rdquo; The Asia-Pacific Journal, 1-2-10, January 4, 2010, translated from Japanese into English by Aaron Skabelund. It is used here with permission.

Homepage image shows one of the many landslides triggered by the Iwate-Miyagi Nairuku Earthquake, which struck northern Honshu in June 2008.

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In the wake of the recent controversy over the retreat of Himalayan glaciers, in which the United Nations’ climate-science body admitted that it was an error to assert that they would disappear by 2035, water availability has emerged as a key issue with even more uncertainty. Receding Himalayan glaciers grabbed headlines because they feed major rivers in south Asia and some parts of south-east Asia, which is home to a sizeable proportion of the planet’s population. If the glaciers significantly retreated or even disappeared, it would be an issue of life and death for many millions of people who depend on these rivers.

But now that the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has said that it was a mistake to say the glaciers will be gone in a matter of decades, does that mean water is not a worrying issue any more? Many scientists believe it is even more worrying given the uncertainty surrounding the future impacts of climate change in a region not only of high population, but also of high population growth.

The broad consensus is that glaciers themselves are indeed retreating, although the rate of the recession may be debatable. However, there are other climate-influenced factors that affect river flows, such as changes in precipitation, snowfall and regional temperature. %26ldquo;There has been too much focus on glaciers whereas there are other factors like precipitation and snowfall that affect the levels of waters in rivers downstream the eastern Himalayas,%26rdquo; says Mats Eriksson, a senior hydrologist with the Nepal-based International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD), which has carried out several studies on the glaciers in the Hindu Kush Himalayas.

Below the eastern part of the Himalayas are major rivers like the Ganges and the Brahmaputra, as well as their tributaries. These are vital lifelines for millions of people in India, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan and Tibet. A recent study for the World Bank has shown that the volume of water resulting from glacial melt in Nepal makes up less than 5% of the flow of rivers leaving the country and contributing to the Ganges downstream. %26ldquo;That is, about 95% or more of the river flow is the result of rain and melting seasonal snow,%26rdquo; says the report%26rsquo;s co-author, Richard Armstrong, a glaciologist from the University of Colorado at Boulder in the United States.

If that is true, rivers downstream of the eastern Himalayas will hardly be affected, even if the glaciers recede or disappear. However, would the other contributing factors to the rivers%26rsquo; flow, such as precipitation and snowfall, remain the same in the changing climate? No, say scientists, but whether that will lead to rise or fall of river levels %26ndash; and by how much and when %26ndash; are the questions still waiting to be answered.

%26ldquo;We are seeing some changes in the monsoon,%26rdquo; Eriksson says of the seasonal precipitation system that shapes the climate in this part of the region. %26ldquo;Last year, for example, the monsoon arrived one month late in Nepal and then some places saw 80 millimetres of water in a day during the delayed rainy season. But there has been no consistent measurement of precipitation and temperature and there is a lack of proper studies.%26rdquo;

Some scientists believe absorption of solar radiation by aerosols (dust particles and carbon soots) can heat the atmosphere and accelerate regional impacts of global warming, which in turn affect water resources. William Lau, who heads the atmospheric sciences branch at US space agency NASA%26rsquo;s Goddard Space Flight Center, carried out a study in India last year and found that, as a result of aerosols, regional temperature was rising much faster than expected. And that, he said, could influence the monsoon systems, resulting in less water availability in the region.

But Armstrong says a warming climate could also mean a stronger monsoon bringing more precipitation that could increase stream flows. %26ldquo;Having said that, it should be noted that future precipitation patterns predicted by climate models are highly variable and there is a very little regional agreement among the models,%26rdquo; he says.

High variability is also an issue with the flow of rivers in the western Himalayas that do not fall within the monsoon regime. %26ldquo;There is no clear-cut signal as there is a large variation between average annual flows,%26rdquo; says Arshad Muhammad Khan, a physicist who heads the Global Change Impact Studies Centre in Pakistan. %26ldquo;For example, in the Indus River, the maximum flow is twice that of the minimum.%26rdquo; Unlike the Ganges, rivers like the Indus in the western part of the Himalayas are heavily dependent on glaciers, as this region does not get monsoon rains. But even here, glacial status is not reported to be uniform.

Some scientists say increasing temperature has meant that glaciers don’t get enough snowfall during winter and therefore river flow during summer is dwindling. %26ldquo;We have seen the decline in the flow of the Indus, Chenab and Jhelum rivers,%26rdquo; says professor Mohammad Sultan Bhat of Kashmir University, who has conducted field studies with India’s flood and irrigation department. %26ldquo;We have recorded a decrease of 40% in the flow of Jhelum’s tributary river %26hellip; that is fed by the receding Kolahi glacier.%26rdquo; But Kenneth Hewitt, a glaciologist from Canada who has been doing field studies in Pakistan’s Karakoram mountains, told BBC News last October that he had seen at least half a dozen glaciers there advancing since he saw them five years ago.

With glaciers offering such complex pictures, combined with increasingly complicated precipitation and temperature patterns, the region’s river systems that depend on all these factors cannot be simpler. Politics and geography, experts say, have made understanding the situation even more difficult. %26ldquo;Some countries in the region are not willing to share water-related data because they regard it as confidential,%26rdquo; says Eriksson of ICIMOD. %26ldquo;Since it is difficult to access them, proper studies on water availability remain a major challenge.%26rdquo;

Navin Singh Khadka is a journalist with the BBC Nepali service. He has a sustained interest in environment, with a focus on climate change vis-a-vis Himalayan ecology.

An earlier version of this report appeared on the BBC on January 27, 2010.

Homepage image by James C Farmer

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On returning from the climate conference at Copenhagen, the Vanke Group chairman, Wang Shi, posted a picture of himself pushing an old bike through the streets of the city on his blog. On December 7, the head of the largest property company in China %26ndash; who climbs an 8,000-metre high mountain every year %26ndash; had joined a group of Chinese businessmen on a week-long cycling tour around the city, after which he announced the saving of 115 kilograms of carbon.

The trip was quickly branded a mere stunt. But Wang did not seem to mind, saying that, unlike actors, the businessmen were playing themselves and that he hoped to see more, and better, such events in the future. Afterwards, he and his companions made numerous appearances in the Chinese media, talking about Copenhagen and advocating low-carbon ideas.

On December 5, Wang and Feng Lun, chairman of Beijing Vantone Real Estate, were chosen to board the %26ldquo;Climate Express%26rdquo;, a special train from Brussels to Copenhagen organised by the United Nations Environment Program, the International Union of Railways and the World Wildlife Fund. Another group of %26ldquo;green entrepreneurs%26rdquo;, including Marjorie Yang, chairwoman of textile manufacturer Esquel Group; Zhang Yue, chairman of Broad Air-conditioning; Zhang Zaidong, chairman of Beijing Fengshang Real Estate; Song Jun, president of hotel and travel investment firm Beijing Jiuhan Tiancheng and Huang Ming, chairman of Himin Solar Energy Group travelled north from Germany with Lu Zhi, Peking University professor and head of the Shanshui Conservation Centre. They met with Deutsche Bank%26rsquo;s climate finance team in Frankfurt, visited Europe%26rsquo;s solar-power %26ldquo;capital%26rdquo;, Freiburg, and then joined the property group in Copenhagen.

This was the first time Chinese entrepreneurs had attended a UN climate-change conference as observers and a rare high-profile appearance at an international climate-change event. Hopes were high for these enlightened businessmen, both in China and overseas. So what did they actually do?

At a small ceremony to mark the start of the trip held at Beijing%26rsquo;s exclusive Chang%26rsquo;an Club, they said they wanted to put forward the Chinese business world%26rsquo;s stance on climate change, and learn about the business risks and opportunities it will bring. On December 8, they set out this stance at their first appearance in Copenhagen. This took place away from the Bella Center, the main conference facility, at the five-star Radisson hotel, where Chinese premier Wen Jiabao would later stay. Unfortunately very few foreign reporters were present and almost all the attendees were Chinese. So why, those present wondered, couldn%26rsquo;t they just have held the press conference in China?

On December 11, these business leaders were not present at the Business Day event, hosted by the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBSCD) and the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC).

The WBCSD has 200 members, including Shell, Duke Energy, E.ON, BP and Rio Tinto. At Copenhagen the WBCSD advocated a global carbon market and a voluntary industrial code, covering industry, agricultural oil use, nuclear power and carbon capture and storage. The ICC, a similar organisation whose members include several major polluters such as Areva, Exxon Mobil and Vattenfall, continued to tell political leaders that business is part of the solution and that economic growth and free trade should be given priority.

The reason the Chinese group was absent was simpler than many thought. The head of the delegation, Wang Shi, had already left Copenhagen due to a prior engagement and the other members, for the most part having poor English and little experience of international events, were not too keen to attend %26ndash; and so they didn%26rsquo;t.

As head of one of the world%26rsquo;s largest property firms, Wang Shi was undoubtedly the most prominent member of the delegation. In 2007, Vanke started to use reusable steel frames in buildings, rather than the traditional wood. Over the past three years, this method has been applied to 600,000 square metres of building space and, after Copenhagen, Wang set a new target of two million square metres. His ambitions do not stop there, however. Wang wants to lead China%26rsquo;s property sector in making a contribution of more than 10% to China%26rsquo;s 2020 emissions target.

Wang told all of this to the Wall Street Journal and Daily Telegraph newspapers while he was on the Climate Express, to widespread acclaim. And so his early departure, to a certain extent, reduced the voice of Chinese business at Copenhagen. More disappointing was the fact that, although the Business Day was on the agenda provided at the pre-departure press conference and was widely reported in both Chinese and western media, not a single Chinese businessperson was seen at the actual event.

However, the Business Day, which brought together chief executives of giant multinationals, was also lacking attendees from South Africa, Brazil and India. Moreover, those who did attend did not gain much. As Yvo de Boer, executive secretary of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change told them, the negotiations going on at the Bella Center were inter-governmental and the participants temporarily had to put business to one side.

The delegation was more influenced by events not on the agenda; namely, the civil society activities they attended as private individuals, such as marches organised by non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Song Jun of the Jiuhan Tiancheng, commented that the range of protests by NGO members gave him more to think about than the disorganised negotiations and dull reports and made him more determined than ever to keep his business on a green path. This entrepeneur, often criticised for being too idealistic, has always tried to persuade more people to accept traditional Chinese ideas of conservation, calling for a limit on human demands rather than technical solutions to environmental and climate issues.

In 2002, Song started investing in the Moonlight Lake eco-tourism project in the deserts of Inner Mongolia, in northern China. But it is hard to stick to environmental ideals in today%26rsquo;s China and he has suffered a number of financial setbacks, only making a profit after five or six years. Next he plans to implement his new grasslands conservation plan in Xilin Gol, which aims to bring back herders forced to leave by environmental problems. The plan won support from Wang Shi and Zhang Zaidong at Copenhagen %26ndash; perhaps the most concrete result Song got from the summit.

Regardless, many people were left disappointed by the performance of these entrepreneurs at Copenhagen. Like the Chinese government, the Chinese business world has, over the last few years, been striving to improve communications and keep up with the global response to climate change and environmental protection. But getting that message across fully and accurately still needs work.

However, some are doing better than others. The story of how Zhang Yue of Broad Air-conditioning gave up his private jet is well known. And Broad’s non-electric air-conditioners were the focus of the only corporate case study in a report presented to G8 leaders by former UK prime minister Tony Blair in 2008. Zhang came and went at Copenhagen, clutching his own document, Measures to Reduce CO2 Emissions. He believes that there is huge potential for emissions reductions to be made by the Chinese public, though nobody knows how he has worked this out.

Many are also familiar with the story of Huang Ming%26rsquo;s solar empire and he was one of the delegation%26rsquo;s most active speakers. He also organised a football match to urge countries not to pass the buck on climate change and, on returning to China, called for COP18, the UN-sponsored climate summit scheduled for 2012, to be held in China. Shi Zhengrong of solar firm Suntech Power is even better known internationally. In May 2009, he was the only Chinese entrepreneur from the private sector to appear at the World Business Summit on Climate Change in Copenhagen. Unfortunately he was not able to be present at COP15.

But, for these business personalities, whether they come across well or badly is not the important thing. Wang Shi, Zhang Yue and Song Jun are more concerned about the weak message sent out by Copenhagen. Without a clear, strong and long signal, it is hard for businesses to make investment decisions %26ndash; even for these pioneers who have not hestitated in going with the green flow.

Feng Jie is a journalist at Southern Weekend and was formerly a reporter at the China Economic Herald.

Homepage image from hudong.com shows (left to right) Song Jun, Feng Lun, Wang Shi, Zhang Yue and Zhang Zaidong.

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