Chinese walker

[Download Kenneth Hewitt's full report here]

Glaciers are quite sensitive to climate change and, recently, there have been many reports of major changes in the Himalaya and other parts of High Asia; mostly of glaciers retreating fast. Impacts of a range of glacier hazards, and on the reliability of water resources, are of concern at local, national and transnational scales. However, there is also a growing recognition that glacial conditions in the region are very diverse, and so are their responses to climate change.

There are some very different implications in different societal contexts, not least in relation to rapid socio-economic changes, water resource projects and security crises. The latter are often more urgent or immediate problems that disrupt or undermine peoples%26rsquo; capacities to adapt to environmental change. Such complexities are the focus of this article. The reality of climate change is not questioned, but some recent oversimplifications are, and claims about a narrow range of glacier hazards. In particular, unresolved problems of understanding high altitude glaciers and climate are emphasised, and the inadequacies of available information and monitoring. Recent evidence of glacier advances in the Karakoram Himalaya, and the author%26rsquo;s work there, illustrate many of these complexities.

Ablation zone conditions where annual ice losses are high: dust, dirt and scattered debris areas on Kaberi-Kondus Glacier, late June, at 4,000 metres above sea level. (Photograph/Kenneth Hewitt 1998)

Globally, most glaciers are reported to be diminishing more or less rapidly. Reports of %26ldquo;disappearing glaciers%26rdquo; have come from many parts of High Asia. However, this is not the case in the upper Indus and upper Yarkand River basins. Here, the glaciers have been holding their own for several decades and recently, in the Karakoram Himalaya, many have started thickening and advancing. Not only is this opposite to the broader picture for Eurasian glaciers, but also to what had been happening to Karakoram glaciers. Through most of the twentieth century they too diminished and retreated. There is no question that today%26rsquo;s behaviour is a regionally distinct response to climate change. It may sound like good news, given the dominant lament for the loss of glaciers, but that too would be misleading. Advancing glaciers bring dangers as well.

The surge of the Maedan tributary of Panmah Glacier. Notice severe crevassing of ice. (Photograph/Kenneth Hewitt, June 2005)

Of immediate concern are a number of glaciers on the Indus and Yarkand Rivers, whose past advances gave rise to large ice dams and catastrophic outburst floods. In the longer term, existing and planned water resource uses, dependent on glacier-fed streams or at risk from glacial floods and sedimentation, are of major concern. However, the largest challenges stem from inadequate information and monitoring, and limited scientific understanding of these high elevation glaciers. Misleading or exaggerated reports based on assumption rather than evidence are also a problem. Some high profile reports have suggested that the Indus basin is in imminent danger of losing its glaciers. Glacier hazards, notably %26ldquo;dangerous lakes%26rdquo; associated with retreating ice in other regions, have been assumed to be equally present in the Karakoram. The reports are simply wrong in this case.

Meanwhile, if the main trend in most of High Asia does seem to be glacier retreat, various lines of evidence show that it is occurring at very different rates in different mountain ranges, even within the same mountains. A 2006 survey of 5,020 glaciers in the mountains of western China and the Tibetan Plateau found widely differing rates of reduction. It also found 894 glaciers, about 18%, have advanced in recent decades. The jury is still out on a 2009 report from India [pdf], which questions the scale and reality of the extreme rates of retreat formerly reported for the Himalayas, and projections based on them.

None of this is to suggest that climate change is not a serious issue in the Karakoram. In every valley of the region farmers tell me the winters have grown shorter in the past couple of decades, there is less snow and more rain. They report an increase in windstorms and rain during summer. Formerly, clear, sunny weather in autumn was reliable and perfect for drying grain, fruit and winter fodder, and for post-harvest chores around the villages. Not any more. They report increasing problems with damp and mildew from insufficient drying days. Rain and wind threaten the harvest and damage buildings. These are, in fact, more immediate hazards for the mountain communities than anything that may be happening to the glaciers. This refers to the inhabited areas at lower elevations, where more, and more severe, rainstorms have been reported in recent years, notably a disastrous storm on September 9, 1992. It triggered rockfalls and debris flows that damaged many villages, closed most roads and stranded tourists. Again, advancing glaciers are also a response to climate change %26ndash; and are not necessarily good news.

Although there have been reports and discussions of Karakoram glaciers since the mid-nineteenth century, they have been patchy in space and time and of varying quality. The glaciers are not, and have never been, consistently monitored. Few glaciers anywhere in the inner Asian mountains meet the criteria of the World Glacier Monitoring Service, and hence have not been tracked by it. The cries of concern for these glaciers should at least highlight the need for more reliable data and a better grasp of climate-glacier interactions in the world%26rsquo;s highest mountains.

Panmah Glacier accumulation zone, showing surrounding rock walls up to 2,500 metres high around the Latok Peaks, June 2005. (Photograph/Kenneth Hewitt, 2005)

The glacier cover of High Asia exceeds 110,000 square kilometres, the number of identifiable glaciers more than 50,000. There are major concentrations in about a dozen mountain ranges, forming watersheds of all the major rivers of the central, south and south-east Asian mainland. The Upper Indus and Yarkand basins have around 21,000 square kilometres of glaciers, the larger fraction in the Greater Karakoram, or about 16,500 square kilometres. Most of the biggest valley glaciers outside polar regions are found here. While there are more than 5,000 individual glaciers, just 12 make up almost half the ice cover. Melt waters from glacier basins comprise more than 40% of the average annual flows of the Indus and the Yarkand, with a potential to affect the lives of some millions of people downstream. While there was a roughly 10% reduction of the Karakoram ice cover in the first 60 years of the twentieth century, no significant reduction has occurred in recent decades and, as noted, many glaciers are undergoing advances.

One must qualify the notion that threats only arise from %26ldquo;disappearing%26rdquo; glaciers or in proportion to the rate of reduction. This is certainly a cause for concern, in itself or in what it implies about humanly induced atmospheric changes. But growing glaciers are not necessarily benign. In most glacierised mountains, certainly the Karakoram Himalaya, the worst consequences experienced in recent history came with the enlarged ice cover of the Little Ice Age: a period of several centuries, ending just over 100 years ago, when glaciers grew throughout the northern hemisphere. From those events come most of the stories and fears about glaciers recalled in Himalayan towns and villages. The considerable reduction of the glaciers observed between about 1910 and the 1960s was, in effect, removing ice stored in the Little Ice Age, a process that is not yet complete. Today%26rsquo;s glaciers are larger than a few centuries ago. Meanwhile, the evidence of advances in the Karakoram not only indicates a different response here to changing climate. It raises the prospect of a return to the hazards of advancing ice not seen since the Little Ice Age.

NEXT: Factors underlying regional variance

Kenneth Hewitt is professor emeritus in geography and environmental studies and research associate at the Cold Regions Research Centre at Wilfrid Laurier University in Ontario, Canada.

Homepage image by Kenneth Hewitt shows the upper Chiring-Panmah Glacier in 2005 and illustrates the prevalence of steep rock walls in the upper parts of these glacier basins.

[Download Kenneth Hewitt's full report here]

The most valuable lesson to be learned from the climate change conference in Copenhagen is this: the aims of global governance are unlikely to be met while the diplomatic strategies of China and emerging economies remain unsettled.

Unlike World Trade Organisation talks, the aim of climate negotiations is not only bilateral or multilateral deals between individual governments, but also direct participation in global action. The outcome of the meeting is a marker of the United Nations’ ability to handle global climate governance. But the Copenhagen talks failed to reach consensus, even on matters of principle. Some of the nations involved in the process have decisive influence, but are not yet clear on what their own targets and role in international affairs actually are.

After Copenhagen, opinion in the European Union and United States quickly turned against China. A report by British journalist Mark Lynas in the Guardian newspaper claiming China had wrecked the conference and a similar article by UK climate change secretary Ed Miliband caused an outcry in China. In response to these international misgivings, the country%26rsquo;s official news agency Xinhua published the inside story of premier Wen Jiabao%26rsquo;s experiences during his 60 hours at the conference.

To understand the fierce response from China, we need to look back at the diplomatic programme the country engaged in with both the United States and European Union in the year-long run-up to Copenhagen. A strong basis of trust appeared to have been built up with both America and Europe through diplomatic activity under the auspices of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Chinese People%26rsquo;s Institute of Foreign Affairs (CPIFA) and the National People%26rsquo;s Congress. This makes the problems at Copenhagen all the more surprising.

At the start of 2009, during the early days of president Barack Obama%26rsquo;s administration, US think-tanks the Brookings Institution and the Asia Society proposed a %26ldquo;Group of Two%26rdquo; (G2) relationship between China and the United States. The G2 framework would operate outside of the United Nations; the two countries would establish standards, which would subsequently be widened to the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), then the European Union and, finally, other developing nations.

Hillary Clinton visited China to lobby for closer cooperation between the two countries, and the State Council became the channel for establishing a new relationship between the White House and China. The G2 idea was not embraced but China and the United States did engage in cooperative discussion on energy and the environment. Some academics privately say they believe China hopes to use such partnerships with the United States to win support for adjustments to China%26rsquo;s economic and energy structure.

US climate change envoy Todd Stern paid a number of visits to China in 2009. In May, speaker of the US House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi also paid a rare visit to China, and several months later Wu Bangguo, head of the Standing Committee of the National People%26rsquo;s Congress, visited the United States and met with representatives of the Senate energy panel.

While China was talking to the United States, it was also engaging in brisk diplomacy with the United Kingdom and European Union. Former British prime minister Tony Blair paid a number of visits to China at the invitation of the CPIFA, witnessing the efforts being made to reduce emissions in undeveloped regions such as Guizhou in the south-west and Ningxia in the north. Blair%26rsquo;s comments on his return, combined with Ed Miliband%26rsquo;s optimistic predictions on China%26rsquo;s stance in the run-up to Copenhagen, give us reason to believe that the European Union was, at least prior to the release of emissions targets, supportive of China%26rsquo;s efforts.

China%26rsquo;s diplomacy with the other countries in the %26ldquo;BASIC%26rdquo; group %26ndash; Brazil, South Africa, India and China %26ndash; is also worthy of note. Over the space of more than a year, these four nations have met after every set of climate change negotiations in a bid to maintain a consensus.

So what happened at Copenhagen? A Xinhua article published on December 25th asserts that Wen was excluded from various %26ldquo;clandestine negotiations%26rdquo;, including a meeting of several countries%26rsquo; leaders held by the United States after dinner on the 17th, which %26ldquo;triggered strong discontent%26rdquo;.

Wen did not attend the meetings of national leaders on the morning or afternoon of December 18. In the morning, vice minister of foreign affairs, He Yafei, attended in his place. And, after a meeting with US president Obama at noon, Yu Qingtai %26ndash; deputy head of the delegation and a lower level official %26ndash; took part in the discussions. This provoked speculation and debate and the content of the Xinhua article explains why China was unhappy with closed-door meetings. But, if the article is accurate, it may be worth asking why trust between China and the United States and European Union was so weak that they were unable to work together after a full year of discussion.

During the first week of the conference, the Group of 77 (G77), a loose coalition of 130 developing countries, including China, reached a consensus over three evenings of talks %26ndash; something rarely seen in recent years. The value of maintaining that consensus lay in upholding the principle of a two-track negotiation system, stressing the classification of nations as developing or developed and finding a new agreement based on %26ldquo;common but differentiated responsibilities%26rdquo;. If lines had instead been drawn between major economic groups and poor nations, the game would have become one played between the Group of 20 (G20) major economies and certain developing nations %26ndash; and the logical result of that would have been, at the very least, some changes to the two-track system.

But, at the end of the conference, a split appeared between the least developed nations and the major developing economies of the G77 %26ndash; to an extent this was inevitable given the shifting global order. This change in alignments most affects the BASIC nations, because they are both members of the G20 and developing nations. If the principle is accepted that major economies should take on bigger duties in regard to cutting carbon emissions, there will then be no difference between the BASIC group and developed countries.

I returned from Copenhagen on the same flight as the Chinese delegation. Having spoken to its members, I believe the next UN climate change meeting in Mexico may help to strengthen relations between the BASIC nations, the G77 and China. But the crucial factor in this is whether or not the promised EU and US aid appears.

Zhang Haibin, a specialist in environmental diplomacy at Peking University, believes China faces a number of difficult issues in the wake of Copenhagen. First, he says, the international pressure on China is continuing to grow, and its status as a developing nation becoming less clear. China believes its emissions targets are very ambitious, but the international response to these has not been what it hoped for. China is a major emitter and an economic power; the world%26rsquo;s expectations are increasing, as are China%26rsquo;s responsibilities.

Second, developed nations are becoming more closely aligned, while developing nations are diverging. Maintaining unity within the developing world is an increasingly difficult task. Third, China finds itself at the centre stage of the international community and at the heart of the conflict. Its room for manoeuvre is shrinking and its diplomatic policies and strategies facing ever greater challenges.

Fourth, doubts have been raised over the United Nations%26rsquo; role in nuclear non-proliferation, global finance and climate change %26ndash; a major challenge to China%26rsquo;s multilateral diplomacy.

Solving these issues will mean changes to China%26rsquo;s diplomatic strategy. These changes will be determined by two factors. At the international level, China needs to adjust its stance in step with other interest groups %26ndash; and Copenhagen may promote this. Domestically, China%26rsquo;s leaders need to analyse and coordinate different interests in order to further stabilise domestic policy.

Ultimately, I believe that China should form a twenty-first-century diplomatic strategy to deal with climate change. At the core of this strategy will be this question: what costs is China willing to bear to meet regional and global diplomatic responsibilities?

Until those strategic changes have been made, it is hard to imagine there will be any progress in climate-change negotiations.

Qin Xuan is a reporter at Southern Metropolis Daily.

Homepage image from the White House

In the wake of the recent controversy over the retreat of Himalayan glaciers, in which the United Nations’ climate-science body admitted that it was an error to assert that they would disappear by 2035, water availability has emerged as a key issue with even more uncertainty. Receding Himalayan glaciers grabbed headlines because they feed major rivers in south Asia and some parts of south-east Asia, which is home to a sizeable proportion of the planet’s population. If the glaciers significantly retreated or even disappeared, it would be an issue of life and death for many millions of people who depend on these rivers.

But now that the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has said that it was a mistake to say the glaciers will be gone in a matter of decades, does that mean water is not a worrying issue any more? Many scientists believe it is even more worrying given the uncertainty surrounding the future impacts of climate change in a region not only of high population, but also of high population growth.

The broad consensus is that glaciers themselves are indeed retreating, although the rate of the recession may be debatable. However, there are other climate-influenced factors that affect river flows, such as changes in precipitation, snowfall and regional temperature. %26ldquo;There has been too much focus on glaciers whereas there are other factors like precipitation and snowfall that affect the levels of waters in rivers downstream the eastern Himalayas,%26rdquo; says Mats Eriksson, a senior hydrologist with the Nepal-based International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD), which has carried out several studies on the glaciers in the Hindu Kush Himalayas.

Below the eastern part of the Himalayas are major rivers like the Ganges and the Brahmaputra, as well as their tributaries. These are vital lifelines for millions of people in India, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan and Tibet. A recent study for the World Bank has shown that the volume of water resulting from glacial melt in Nepal makes up less than 5% of the flow of rivers leaving the country and contributing to the Ganges downstream. %26ldquo;That is, about 95% or more of the river flow is the result of rain and melting seasonal snow,%26rdquo; says the report%26rsquo;s co-author, Richard Armstrong, a glaciologist from the University of Colorado at Boulder in the United States.

If that is true, rivers downstream of the eastern Himalayas will hardly be affected, even if the glaciers recede or disappear. However, would the other contributing factors to the rivers%26rsquo; flow, such as precipitation and snowfall, remain the same in the changing climate? No, say scientists, but whether that will lead to rise or fall of river levels %26ndash; and by how much and when %26ndash; are the questions still waiting to be answered.

%26ldquo;We are seeing some changes in the monsoon,%26rdquo; Eriksson says of the seasonal precipitation system that shapes the climate in this part of the region. %26ldquo;Last year, for example, the monsoon arrived one month late in Nepal and then some places saw 80 millimetres of water in a day during the delayed rainy season. But there has been no consistent measurement of precipitation and temperature and there is a lack of proper studies.%26rdquo;

Some scientists believe absorption of solar radiation by aerosols (dust particles and carbon soots) can heat the atmosphere and accelerate regional impacts of global warming, which in turn affect water resources. William Lau, who heads the atmospheric sciences branch at US space agency NASA%26rsquo;s Goddard Space Flight Center, carried out a study in India last year and found that, as a result of aerosols, regional temperature was rising much faster than expected. And that, he said, could influence the monsoon systems, resulting in less water availability in the region.

But Armstrong says a warming climate could also mean a stronger monsoon bringing more precipitation that could increase stream flows. %26ldquo;Having said that, it should be noted that future precipitation patterns predicted by climate models are highly variable and there is a very little regional agreement among the models,%26rdquo; he says.

High variability is also an issue with the flow of rivers in the western Himalayas that do not fall within the monsoon regime. %26ldquo;There is no clear-cut signal as there is a large variation between average annual flows,%26rdquo; says Arshad Muhammad Khan, a physicist who heads the Global Change Impact Studies Centre in Pakistan. %26ldquo;For example, in the Indus River, the maximum flow is twice that of the minimum.%26rdquo; Unlike the Ganges, rivers like the Indus in the western part of the Himalayas are heavily dependent on glaciers, as this region does not get monsoon rains. But even here, glacial status is not reported to be uniform.

Some scientists say increasing temperature has meant that glaciers don’t get enough snowfall during winter and therefore river flow during summer is dwindling. %26ldquo;We have seen the decline in the flow of the Indus, Chenab and Jhelum rivers,%26rdquo; says professor Mohammad Sultan Bhat of Kashmir University, who has conducted field studies with India’s flood and irrigation department. %26ldquo;We have recorded a decrease of 40% in the flow of Jhelum’s tributary river %26hellip; that is fed by the receding Kolahi glacier.%26rdquo; But Kenneth Hewitt, a glaciologist from Canada who has been doing field studies in Pakistan’s Karakoram mountains, told BBC News last October that he had seen at least half a dozen glaciers there advancing since he saw them five years ago.

With glaciers offering such complex pictures, combined with increasingly complicated precipitation and temperature patterns, the region’s river systems that depend on all these factors cannot be simpler. Politics and geography, experts say, have made understanding the situation even more difficult. %26ldquo;Some countries in the region are not willing to share water-related data because they regard it as confidential,%26rdquo; says Eriksson of ICIMOD. %26ldquo;Since it is difficult to access them, proper studies on water availability remain a major challenge.%26rdquo;

Navin Singh Khadka is a journalist with the BBC Nepali service. He has a sustained interest in environment, with a focus on climate change vis-a-vis Himalayan ecology.

An earlier version of this report appeared on the BBC on January 27, 2010.

Homepage image by James C Farmer

The quantity and quality of available water play a crucial role in the politics of central-south Asia. Access to clean drinking water is a major, though largely unmet, objective and poor management lies at the heart of many problems.

Many areas are already experiencing physical water shortages %26ndash; recent studies estimate per capita water availability in the densely-populated Indus basin at around 1,000 cubic metres per year %26ndash; and climate change will only exacerbate this.

The region%26rsquo;s water challenges do not inevitably lead to armed conflict. Unalleviated, however, they threaten to undermine human security and bring different communities into dispute. Cooperative approaches have been sparse and institutional structures remain fragmented. Yet cooperation will be critical for the region to meet its water challenges in the years and decades ahead.

In Afghanistan, the livelihoods of at least 80% of the population are based on agriculture and related occupations. The fertile plains of the Amu Darya basin, account for about 40% of Afghanistan%26rsquo;s irrigated lands. But poorly constructed canals translate into water losses as high as 70%. And droughts and dry years since 1999 have substantially reduced cultivated areas in the south and east.

Moreover, three decades of armed conflict have displaced a large portion of the population, impeded access to farmland, and destroyed irrigation systems. Buffeted by recurring drought and floods, and the population%26rsquo;s desperate coping strategies, the net result has been a severe degradation of Afghanistan%26rsquo;s natural environment and its water and farming infrastructure. According to Oxfam UK, overall agricultural produce has fallen by half in recent years and the loss of rural livelihoods has triggered migration to cities.

Millions of Afghans are either seasonally or chronically food insecure. As well as hunger, these desperate conditions have triggered local conflicts. Water contamination has become a severe public health threat, owing to poor waste management practices and a lack of modern sanitation; a 2003 United Nations assessment concluded no more than 12 to 23% of Afghanistan%26rsquo;s urban population has access to safe water.

In the wider region, the nations sharing the Amu Darya are locked into seemingly irreconcilable sets of interests. Tajikistan and Afghanistan look to the Amu Darya for hydropower as well as irrigation while Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan depend heavily on the river to irrigate their cotton, rice, and wheat fields.

Downstream, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan have similar economic interests, yet their relationship is nonetheless conflictive. Tensions over shared irrigation systems near Tuyamuyun Reservoir could be further inflamed by Turkmenistan’s plans to build an artificial lake in the Karakum desert by 2010.

Upstream, Tajikistan releases reservoir water in the winter months to generate hydropower for heating, frequently causing downstream flooding and damage to infrastructure. In the summer months, it builds up its reservoirs %26mdash; at precisely the time when the irrigation needs of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are most acute.

All these countries plan to increase water extraction, which may exacerbate tensions. Tajikistani plans to complete unfinished Soviet-era hydropower projects on the Vakhsh River, for example, are worrying Uzbekistan, not only because of the potential impact on summer irrigation water flows, but also because it stands to lose income (and leverage) from selling natural gas to its neighbour.

In Pakistan and India, extensive irrigation is also placing Indus basin water resources under heavy stress, with about 90% of the available flow utilised. Overpumping and inefficient irrigation techniques have led to sharply declining groundwater levels, loss of wetlands and salinisation of agricultural lands. Future sea-level rise will place coastal areas at increasing risk of inundation and water availability will decline dramatically as a result of climate change and population growth; Pakistan%26rsquo;s per capita water availability is forecast to fall to a critically low level of just 800 cubic metres annually by 2020.

Already, an estimated 40 million to 55 million Pakistanis do not have access to safe drinking water, yet the government spends 47 times as much on the military budget as on water and sanitation. According to a Unesco report, only 2% of Pakistan%26rsquo;s cities have wastewater treatment facilities and less than 30% of wastewater receives treatment in these cities. Water pollution is the leading cause of death in Pakistan.

Rising water demand in the region is causing trans-border issues as well as internal conflicts. Pakistan has an important agreement with India, the 1960 Indus Water Treaty, which divides the waters of the Indus and its eastern tributaries. However, a number of contentious projects undertaken by India in Kashmir %26mdash; including the Baglihar Hydroelecric Dam, the Kishanganga Hydroelectric project and the Tulbul Navigation project %26mdash; have served as reminders that water disputes between the two neighbours are never far from the surface. It is increasingly important for India and Pakistan to improve their water management and ensure diplomacy, rather than threat of force, governs water relations.

Climate change will dramatically raise the challenges in central and south Asia. By the middle of the century, increasing temperatures and growing water stress may lead to a 30% reduction in crop yields. In central Asia, reduced rainfall and runoff will cause increased heat stress, drought and desertification and lead to increasing migration. Yet no mitigation and adaptation strategies are in place.

The melting of the Hindu Kush-Karakorum-Himalaya glaciers will also have serious consequences for hundreds of millions of people. The warming trend in these mountain ranges has been much greater than the global average and two thirds of the Himalayan glaciers are reported to be shrinking. Over time, this will reduce downstream runoff and compromise hydropower generation, decreasing production of foodstuffs and commodities like cotton. In turn, this may increase poverty and social disparities.

Significant changes to monsoon patterns are also expected. Much of south, east, and south-east Asia may see increased intensity of these storms by the century%26rsquo;s end, while most parts of Pakistan and south-eastern Afghanistan are expected to see a 20% reduction in rainfall. Destructive storm surges and greater salt-water intrusion in low-lying coastal areas could drive migration from urban centres such as Karachi and flooding is expected to increase across the Himalayas, as well as northern Pakistan and India.

International donor support is needed to fund infrastructure maintenance, improvements in water efficiency, and diversification toward more drought-resistant crops, in part by reprioritising existing funds. In Afghanistan, for instance, Oxfam observes that donors have spent less than US$300 million to $400 million directly on agricultural projects over the last six years %26ndash; a fraction of overall assistance to the country.

The governance system for central Asia%26rsquo;s water that emerged in the post-Soviet era remains largely dysfunctional, limited by conflicting interests, mutual suspicions and a reluctance to cooperate. However, the UN Economic Commission for Europe has intensified its engagement in central Asia over the past few years, with a programme to strengthen cooperation among members. Its Water Convention also provides a legal framework for trans-boundary water cooperation, though Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are so far the only regional signatories. Other organisations, including the Environment and Security Initiative and the East-West Institute are also running programmes to boost regional collaboration.

As great as the challenges are, there are multiple avenues for addressing them. One of the most pressing needs is greater efficiency in water use. By 2015, Afghanistan%26rsquo;s Ministry of Energy and Water hopes to boost efficiency by 45%, while improvements in yields for rain-fed cereal crops in Pakistan could help relieve overall water pressures. Their neighbours can and must similarly boost water productivity. Better watershed management, rainwater harvesting, urban water conservation, investments in sanitation, and more integrated planning are vitally important.

The countries of the region have little influence over global greenhouse emissions trajectories, and hence will need to focus principally on adaptation measures. It is essential to build environmental, social, economic, and political resilience, as well as improve institutional capacities to cope with growing water scarcity and climate impacts. Water cooperation across national boundaries offers important benefits but may not be realised without disinterested, innovative third-party facilitation.

Michael Renner is a senior researcher at the Worldwatch Institute in Washington, DC and senior advisor to the Institute for Environmental Security in Brussels.

A full version of this report was first published by the Norwegian Peacebuilding Centre.

Homepage image from IRIN

The north China winter drought of 2008 and 2009, which China%26rsquo;s National Me%26shy;teorological Centre classified as an %26ldquo;extreme weather event%26rdquo; attributable to climate change, illustrates the challenges to China%26rsquo;s food security posed by worsening water shortage.

This drought was the worst in 30 years and affected China%26rsquo;s principal wheat-growing areas, damaging several hundred square kilometres of farmland. Reports indicated that about 40% of China%26rsquo;s winter wheat crop would be affected and that the drought was expected to de%26shy;crease the wheat harvest by 5% nationally and by 20% in areas such as Henan province, east-central China.

The scale of such effects has led many commentators to warn that climate-related drought in north China could threaten the country%26rsquo;s food security. Political factors dictate that food security is an especially sensitive issue in China as the government is anxious to insulate the large population of rural poor from food price shocks.

While it is unclear whether or not climate change will actually threaten China%26rsquo;s total domestic food supply, the government cannot afford to ignore extreme weather events, which increase pressure on the country%26rsquo;s military and paramilitary insti%26shy;tutions to develop disaster management and assistance capabilities.

The drought provides an illustration of the increased need for such operations. The paramilitary People%26rsquo;s Armed Police (PAP) mobilised some 2,400 troops over eight provinces. Ad%26shy;ditionally, assets from the People%26rsquo;s Liberation Army and Air Force were called into service. With the predicted increase in extreme weather events, China%26rsquo;s military will be compelled to incorporate these domestic disaster response and assistance capabilities more closely into its operational planning strategies.

Interestingly, this does not seem to have happened yet; China%26rsquo;s recent law governing the PAP makes only brief mention of disaster-relief activities, focusing instead on the force%26rsquo;s inter%26shy;nal security role. In addition to posing challenges to the country%26rsquo;s military, adaptation to water-related climate impacts will impose serious economic costs upon China. North-west China%26rsquo;s Xinjiang province, for example, is building 59 reservoirs to collect meltwater from the Hi%26shy;malayan shrinking glaciers in an attempt to address concerns about long-term water availability. The 10-year project is expected to cost 200 million yuan (US$29.3m) annually for at least the next three years, a considerable sum for one of China%26rsquo;s poorest areas.

Water-storage costs also vary widely between regions. The cost of capturing 120 billion cubic metres of water is 30.7 billion yuan (US$4.5 billion) in the southern Xi River area, for example, and less than 14 billion (US$2 billion) in the cen%26shy;tral Yangtze River. Most noticeably, it will become increasingly difficult and expensive to enhance water storage capacity through measures such as reservoirs and catchments in water-stressed areas like north China, simply because water shortages will be so severe.

As one commentator has noted, climate change is an %26ldquo;engine of destabilisation%26rdquo;. This characterisation seems particularly appropriate with respect to China. Water-related climate impacts will be severe in several areas within the country, with the result that China%26rsquo;s military, governmental insti%26shy;tutions and national resources will be increasingly burdened by climate change and water issues. As a result, the government has been compelled to devote more atten%26shy;tion to these issues, a trend which is only likely to accelerate.

Concern for resource security issues does appear to drive Chinese policymaking to at least some extent. In mid-2008, state media reported that %26ldquo;With food and wa%26shy;ter security becoming great concerns around the world, China will take measures to ensure agricultural water use and promote its plan to increase food production,%26rdquo; including raising the price of water.

China further appears to take the issue of water availability in the Himalayas seriously, flying several cloud-seeding sorties a month to increase rainfall and water availability on the Qinghai-Tibetan Plateau. Perhaps the clearest statement of the government%26rsquo;s linkage of water and security issues, how%26shy;ever, is the National Framework for Medium to Long-Term Food Security, released in 2008, which emphasises water-saving agriculture.

Water-related climate change impacts will strain the capacity of Chinese institutions and policy frameworks. This is partic%26shy;ularly evident with respect to the military%26rsquo;s natural disaster response capabilities and transboundary water-management policy, as well as with domestic agricultur%26shy;al, emergency-management and water-management policies.

The Chinese govern%26shy;ment, perhaps with the increased aid of international and civil society actors, will be pressed to improve its conceptual, planning and implementation capacities in each of these policy areas. China will be forced to devote large economic resources to ad%26shy;aptation, including the construction of flood defences, reservoirs and water-distri%26shy;bution systems, if it is to escape the worst water-related climate-change impacts. At a time when China%26rsquo;s development priorities demand investment in so many areas, this increasing burden is almost certain to increase political tensions between provinces and governmental institutions.

Nonetheless, these issues in fact point a way forward for improving international cooperation on climate change. First, water-related security issues present a particu%26shy;larly good opportunity to broaden and deepen bilateral and regional cooperation on climate change. Acute institutional vulnerabilities, such as increased strain on emer%26shy;gency management and disaster-response capabilities in China, present opportuni%26shy;ties for international technical assistance and cooperation.

Moreover, adaptation assistance under the new climate regime can be focused to address strategic concerns such as food security. The US Agency for International Development (USAID) has launched a programme in cooperation with the Bill %26amp; Melinda Gates Foun%26shy;dation to develop new rice varieties capable of surviving various climate change-related stresses. The US$35 million (239 million yuan) project will focus on enabling farmers in south Asia to obtain higher rice yields even in the face of climate change, with fewer inputs of fertiliser and irrigated water. Similar models could be explored, possibly with a greater degree of co-financing, in China.

Finally, climate change cooperation should be seen not only as an ecological im%26shy;perative, but also a strategic one. As the Council on Foreign Relations has noted, international climate negotiations have a clear national-security dimension, in as%26shy; much as the international community has an interest in integrating nations like Chi%26shy;na and India into a %26ldquo;rules-based global order%26rdquo; through participation in climate ne%26shy;gotiations.

This interest is heightened when the security ramifications of climate change are considered. Particularly when applied to the regions likely to become flashpoints in a changing climate, the strategic approach can help to guide policymakers towards adopting long-term, systemic approaches to addressing climate change.

Given the severity of climate change for both China and the world at large, it is welcome news that Beijing increasingly sees reducing its own emissions as a matter of national interest. But getting a better idea of what is at stake can provide valuable insights to guide the progress of global climate cooperation.

Framing climate change as a strategic security issue helps to parse its manifold repercussions, which stretch from instability in China%26rsquo;s borderlands to pressures on local government coffers. It also provides added perspective on how large climate change will loom in the future of both China and the world, unless aggressive steps are taken to prevent it.

Scott Moore is a graduate student at the University of Oxford%26rsquo;s Environmental Change Institute and previously held a Fulbright Fellowship at the College of Environmental Science and Engineering, Peking University.

An earlier version of this article was published in China Security in 2009 as %26ldquo;Climate Change, Water, and China%26rsquo;s National Interest%26rdquo;, Vol.5, No.3. It is used here with permission.

Homepage image from the Wuyang government shows soldiers helping to irrigate fields in Henan province.

The quantity and quality of available water play a crucial role in the politics of central-south Asia. Access to clean drinking water is a major, though largely unmet, objective and poor management lies at the heart of many problems.

Many areas are already experiencing physical water shortages %26ndash; recent studies estimate per capita water availability in the densely-populated Indus basin at around 1,000 cubic metres per year %26ndash; and climate change will only exacerbate this.

The region%26rsquo;s water challenges do not inevitably lead to armed conflict. Unalleviated, however, they threaten to undermine human security and bring different communities into dispute. Cooperative approaches have been sparse and institutional structures remain fragmented. Yet cooperation will be critical for the region to meet its water challenges in the years and decades ahead.

In Afghanistan, the livelihoods of at least 80% of the population are based on agriculture and related occupations. The fertile plains of the Amu Darya basin, account for about 40% of Afghanistan%26rsquo;s irrigated lands. But poorly constructed canals translate into water losses as high as 70%. And droughts and dry years since 1999 have substantially reduced cultivated areas in the south and east.

Moreover, three decades of armed conflict have displaced a large portion of the population, impeded access to farmland, and destroyed irrigation systems. Buffeted by recurring drought and floods, and the population%26rsquo;s desperate coping strategies, the net result has been a severe degradation of Afghanistan%26rsquo;s natural environment and its water and farming infrastructure. According to Oxfam UK, overall agricultural produce has fallen by half in recent years and the loss of rural livelihoods has triggered migration to cities.

Millions of Afghans are either seasonally or chronically food insecure. As well as hunger, these desperate conditions have triggered local conflicts. Water contamination has become a severe public health threat, owing to poor waste management practices and a lack of modern sanitation; a 2003 United Nations assessment concluded no more than 12 to 23% of Afghanistan%26rsquo;s urban population has access to safe water.

In the wider region, the nations sharing the Amu Darya are locked into seemingly irreconcilable sets of interests. Tajikistan and Afghanistan look to the Amu Darya for hydropower as well as irrigation while Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan depend heavily on the river to irrigate their cotton, rice, and wheat fields.

Downstream, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan have similar economic interests, yet their relationship is nonetheless conflictive. Tensions over shared irrigation systems near Tuyamuyun Reservoir could be further inflamed by Turkmenistan’s plans to build an artificial lake in the Karakum desert by 2010.

Upstream, Tajikistan releases reservoir water in the winter months to generate hydropower for heating, frequently causing downstream flooding and damage to infrastructure. In the summer months, it builds up its reservoirs %26mdash; at precisely the time when the irrigation needs of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are most acute.

All these countries plan to increase water extraction, which may exacerbate tensions. Tajikistani plans to complete unfinished Soviet-era hydropower projects on the Vakhsh River, for example, are worrying Uzbekistan, not only because of the potential impact on summer irrigation water flows, but also because it stands to lose income (and leverage) from selling natural gas to its neighbour.

In Pakistan and India, extensive irrigation is also placing Indus basin water resources under heavy stress, with about 90% of the available flow utilised. Overpumping and inefficient irrigation techniques have led to sharply declining groundwater levels, loss of wetlands and salinisation of agricultural lands. Future sea-level rise will place coastal areas at increasing risk of inundation and water availability will decline dramatically as a result of climate change and population growth; Pakistan%26rsquo;s per capita water availability is forecast to fall to a critically low level of just 800 cubic metres annually by 2020.

Already, an estimated 40 million to 55 million Pakistanis do not have access to safe drinking water, yet the government spends 47 times as much on the military budget as on water and sanitation. According to a Unesco report, only 2% of Pakistan%26rsquo;s cities have wastewater treatment facilities and less than 30% of wastewater receives treatment in these cities. Water pollution is the leading cause of death in Pakistan.

Rising water demand in the region is causing trans-border issues as well as internal conflicts. Pakistan has an important agreement with India, the 1960 Indus Water Treaty, which divides the waters of the Indus and its eastern tributaries. However, a number of contentious projects undertaken by India in Kashmir %26mdash; including the Baglihar Hydroelecric Dam, the Kishanganga Hydroelectric project and the Tulbul Navigation project %26mdash; have served as reminders that water disputes between the two neighbours are never far from the surface. It is increasingly important for India and Pakistan to improve their water management and ensure diplomacy, rather than threat of force, governs water relations.

Climate change will dramatically raise the challenges in central and south Asia. By the middle of the century, increasing temperatures and growing water stress may lead to a 30% reduction in crop yields. In central Asia, reduced rainfall and runoff will cause increased heat stress, drought and desertification and lead to increasing migration. Yet no mitigation and adaptation strategies are in place.

The melting of the Hindu Kush-Karakorum-Himalaya glaciers will also have serious consequences for hundreds of millions of people. The warming trend in these mountain ranges has been much greater than the global average and two thirds of the Himalayan glaciers are reported to be shrinking. Over time, this will reduce downstream runoff and compromise hydropower generation, decreasing production of foodstuffs and commodities like cotton. In turn, this may increase poverty and social disparities.

Significant changes to monsoon patterns are also expected. Much of south, east, and south-east Asia may see increased intensity of these storms by the century%26rsquo;s end, while most parts of Pakistan and south-eastern Afghanistan are expected to see a 20% reduction in rainfall. Destructive storm surges and greater salt-water intrusion in low-lying coastal areas could drive migration from urban centres such as Karachi and flooding is expected to increase across the Himalayas, as well as northern Pakistan and India.

International donor support is needed to fund infrastructure maintenance, improvements in water efficiency, and diversification toward more drought-resistant crops, in part by reprioritising existing funds. In Afghanistan, for instance, Oxfam observes that donors have spent less than US$300 million to $400 million directly on agricultural projects over the last six years %26ndash; a fraction of overall assistance to the country.

The governance system for central Asia%26rsquo;s water that emerged in the post-Soviet era remains largely dysfunctional, limited by conflicting interests, mutual suspicions and a reluctance to cooperate. However, the UN Economic Commission for Europe has intensified its engagement in central Asia over the past few years, with a programme to strengthen cooperation among members. Its Water Convention also provides a legal framework for trans-boundary water cooperation, though Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are so far the only regional signatories. Other organisations, including the Environment and Security Initiative and the East-West Institute are also running programmes to boost regional collaboration.

As great as the challenges are, there are multiple avenues for addressing them. One of the most pressing needs is greater efficiency in water use. By 2015, Afghanistan%26rsquo;s Ministry of Energy and Water hopes to boost efficiency by 45%, while improvements in yields for rain-fed cereal crops in Pakistan could help relieve overall water pressures. Their neighbours can and must similarly boost water productivity. Better watershed management, rainwater harvesting, urban water conservation, investments in sanitation, and more integrated planning are vitally important.

The countries of the region have little influence over global greenhouse emissions trajectories, and hence will need to focus principally on adaptation measures. It is essential to build environmental, social, economic, and political resilience, as well as improve institutional capacities to cope with growing water scarcity and climate impacts. Water cooperation across national boundaries offers important benefits but may not be realised without disinterested, innovative third-party facilitation.

Michael Renner is a senior researcher at the Worldwatch Institute in Washington, DC and senior advisor to the Institute for Environmental Security in Brussels.

A full version of this report was first published by the Norwegian Peacebuilding Centre.

Homepage image from IRIN

It is clear that water-related climate impacts spill over China%26rsquo;s borders, increasing the importance of water issues in China%26rsquo;s foreign and regional security poli%26shy;cies.

This concern is reflected in the attitudes of China%26rsquo;s neighbours. In Pakistan, for instance, officials have suggested that changes in Himalayan meltwater could devas%26shy;tate agriculture in this already fragile country. A 2008 study from the Earth Policy Institute makes clear the heavy dependence of vast numbers of people on agriculture fed by glacial meltwater and an Asia Society report has similarly concluded that hydro-politics will be an increasingly potent force in Asian security.

The Mekong River system presents particular challenges for China%26rsquo;s security. Relations between China and its downstream neighbours in the Mekong basin have long been fragile. This situation is likely to be exacerbated by the construction of several dams in Chinese territory, which restrict flow to downstream nations. If, as climate models suggest, water flow to the Mekong becomes more vari%26shy;able under climate change, China%26rsquo;s %26ldquo;asymmetric%26rdquo; control of the river%26rsquo;s headwaters will become an issue of even greater concern to south-east Asian nations.

This power asymmetry is of special significance since research on water and con%26shy;flict suggests a high density of dams is associated with conflictive behaviour unless freshwater treaties are involved. China has steadfastly refused to join such %26ldquo;hard law%26rdquo; regimes in the Mekong region. Thus it seems reasonable to assert that China will have to improve its cooperative frameworks and increase diplomacy if it is to avoid significant tension with Mekong nations as the flow of the river changes along with the climate.

There are some signs that China%26rsquo;s strategic studies community is beginning to come to grips with these realities. China%26rsquo;s %26ldquo;New Security Concept%26rdquo;, promulgated since the late 1990s, addresses environmental and social issues, and emphasises cooperation and dialogue as a means of conducting foreign relations.

As a subset of this trend, China%26rsquo;s strategic studies and interna%26shy;tional relations community has devoted increasing attention to the potentially destabilising impacts of climate change. For example, citing the broadening defini%26shy;tion of security in the west, one prominent Chinese article advocates creating a special policy research group that focusses on the political and security dimensions of environmen%26shy;tal change.

Moreover, a series of western studies, including a widely-read 2004 study from the US Department of Defense, have prompted commentary within China on the possibility that climate-related resource shortages could lead to conflict or even war. Some non-official commentators have, more specifically, identified water-related conflict as a growing threat to relations between China and neighbouring countries.

Water issues have, in parallel with this commentary, become more prominent in China%26rsquo;s relations with some neighbours. China has in recent years con%26shy;cluded a number of agreements with countries including Russia and Kazakhstan regarding the demarcation and protection of transboundary rivers. Furthermore, the Shang%26shy;hai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), initially promoted largely as a body for expand%26shy;ing security cooperation, has begun working on water issues. The SCO%26rsquo;s 2004 meet%26shy;ing was devoted to water and, in 2005, the organisation signed a compact with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to broaden cooperation on water resources.

In contrast, however, the Chinese government has appeared hesitant to link cli%26shy;mate change and security at a general level. Beijing has strongly opposed United Nations efforts to connect the two by debat%26shy;ing climate change issues in the Security Council. China Daily, the country%26rsquo;s offi%26shy;cial English-language newspaper, editorialised that %26ldquo;The call for the international community to address climate change is sensible, but sensationalising it as an issue of security is conspiratorial.%26rdquo;

One could read this hesitancy in several ways. China%26rsquo;s long-standing support for the principle of non-interference in domestic affairs probably leads to suspicion of non-traditional security paradigms. In addition, it is important to view the government%26rsquo;s reluctance to link climate change and security in general in the context of Beijing%26rsquo;s determination to avoid binding greenhouse-gas emissions reductions. Nonetheless, there is substantial evidence to suggest a shift of think%26shy;ing is taking place at the domestic level, prompted in large part by the social challenges posed by a changing climate.

If at the international level Chinese officials take a dim view of linking cli%26shy;mate change and security, domestically they appear to take very seriously the conse%26shy;quences of water-related climate-change impacts. Premier Wen Jiabao, for instance, was quoted in 1998 as saying, %26ldquo;The survival of the Chinese nation is threatened by the country%26rsquo;s shortage of water.%26rdquo; Lin Erda, a prominent member of the Chinese Academy of Agricul%26shy;tural Sciences, has similarly called attention to the threat posed by retreat%26shy;ing glaciers, saying that these and other effects of climate change %26ldquo;directly threaten China%26rsquo;s food security%26rdquo;.

The winter drought of 2008 to 2009 also indicated the government%26rsquo;s concern for water issues, with state media reporting in its wake that %26ldquo;Agriculture is a top government priority.%26rdquo;

Several of China%26rsquo;s most strategically important regions are predicted to suffer sig%26shy;nificant water resource shortages as a result of climate change. Some 23% of China%26rsquo;s population lives in western regions, where glacial meltwater provides the principal dry season water source, and as glaciers melt, water will become increas%26shy;ingly scarce.

One study blames climate change for causing a decrease in stream flow during the summer months. This induces de%26shy;sertification, which, exacerbated by population growth, has imposed serious socio%26shy;economic costs on an already poor area. Such impacts are particularly significant since these western regions are not only impoverished but also the most restive in China, being home to ethnic minorities who have long mounted challenges to Bei%26shy;jing%26rsquo;s rule.

Changes in water availability in China%26rsquo;s north-west can pose security challenges in two primary ways. First, competition over scarce resources can exacerbate existing tensions between China%26rsquo;s majority Han ethnic group and minority groups such as Tibetans and Uyghurs. As a 2009 Asia Society report concluded, %26ldquo;One could certainly foresee the potential for conflict as urbanisation and industry begin to deplete al%26shy;ready scarce water supplies, particularly if certain Han-run businesses are perceived to be receiving favourable treatment in water resource allotment.%26rdquo;

Second, water scarcity could increase the number of %26ldquo;environmental refugees%26rdquo; %26ndash; a well established concept in Chinese discourse that describes the internal migration of people to regions where resources seem more plentiful %26ndash; from the north-west, potentially inflaming ethnic tensions as they seek opportunity elsewhere in China.

Sociological studies have found that an increasing number of farmers in Gansu province are abandoning their lands as a result of declining water resources. Similar phenomena have been described in Tibet, where a variety of challenges are inducing higher rates of out-migration of ethnic Tibetans.

The danger posed by such %26ldquo;environmental refugees%26rdquo; is that they may be deprived of the means to sustain livelihoods in their new homes. Research has indicated that gradual environmental deterioration affects the very poor disproportionately; al%26shy;ready bereft of resources, they have little capacity to re-establish themselves elsewhere. Arable land is scarce in China, and environmental refugees, pulled away from their livelihoods and kinship networks, often face great diffi%26shy;culty setting up new livelihoods when forced to resettle. This prospect is particularly notable because, while the concept of %26ldquo;environmental refugees%26rdquo; is well established in Chinese academia, relatively little attention is devoted to potential domestic impacts.

Scott Moore is a graduate student at the University of Oxford%26rsquo;s Environmental Change Institute and previously held a Fulbright Fellowship at the College of Environmental Science and Engineering, Peking University.

An earlier version of this article was published in China Security in 2009 as %26ldquo;Climate Change, Water, and China%26rsquo;s National Interest%26rdquo;, Vol.5, No.3. It is used here with permission.

NEXT: A threat to food security?

Homepage image from Greenpeace

Outside analysts have long stressed that climate change threatens China%26rsquo;s basic national interests. The Chinese government has come to embrace a similar rationale, as a result moving towards aggres%26shy;sive efforts to limit the country%26rsquo;s greenhouse-gas emissions.

In August 2009, China%26rsquo;s cabinet, the Standing Committee of the State Council, announced that China would seek to control its greenhouse-gas emissions even as it continues its economic de%26shy;velopment. Climate change, the council affirmed, threatens the country%26rsquo;s development by increasing extreme-weather events and exacerbating water shortages. As a result, China will set itself on a path towards low-carbon economic growth, stabilising emis%26shy;sions within the next few decades.

This announcement, perhaps more clearly than any previous statement, illus%26shy;trates the growing trend in China towards viewing climate change as a direct threat to the country%26rsquo;s development objectives. It is clear that a number of factors, includ%26shy;ing economic interests and international political pressure, frame the Chinese gov%26shy;ernment%26rsquo;s position on climate change. Nonetheless, given Beijing%26rsquo;s attention at the highest levels to the strategic implications of climate change, it is vital to understand how it may affect the country%26rsquo;s fundamental interests.

At the heart of these challenges to China%26rsquo;s future are changes in the quantity and distribution of water resources throughout the country and its neighbours. Droughts and flooding are expected to become more severe in many areas and the melting of Himalayan glaciers to lead to steep, long-term declines in water avail%26shy;ability in several areas of China and south Asia. Moreover, because of these changes, most major river systems are likely to experience increased variability in water flow, making it harder for farmers and other users to predict water supply. Other interlinked processes, such as desertification in northern China and saltwater in%26shy;trusion in low-lying coastal areas, pose further challenges to food production and ecosystems.

These changes in water availability have important implications for the Chinese government%26rsquo;s objectives both at home and abroad. China already has contentious relations with its neighbours over many transboundary water resources, especially the Mekong River. As these resources shift and, in many cases, dwindle under climate change, China will have to become increasingly adept at dealing with transboundary water issues. Moreover, melting glaciers and shrinking snow packs portend severe water shortages in fragile border regions like northern Pakistan. Such spectres are of great concern to Beijing as it pursues its policy of %26ldquo;peaceful rise%26rdquo;.

Domestically too, water-resource changes threaten China%26rsquo;s vision of stable and orderly economic development. Its restive western areas, including Xinjiang and Ti%26shy;bet, are expected to suffer most from declining water resources. Already poor and underdeveloped, these regions could experience rising inter-ethnic tension over the distribution of water or become a source of growing environmental out-migration as water-stressed inhabitants seek better opportunities elsewhere. Such migration has been documented in several parts of western China and identified by environmental security scholars as a key risk factor for environmental conflict.

These implications indicate that climate change will increasingly bear on China%26rsquo;s strategic ambitions and priorities, forcing the revision of some. Three themes are particularly relevant for policymaking. First, climate-change impacts are defined primarily by the uncertainty that they introduce; it is difficult to plan large-scale development objectives, for example, without being able to count on stable water resources. Second, it is clear that regional climate change impacts will be more acute in some places, like north-western China, than in others. Third and finally, there will be a growing opportunity cost, in terms of financial, administrative and other resources, to adapting to climate change. For a developing country like China, this opportunity cost is of no small concern.

The eastern portion of the Asian landmass faces particularly acute changes in wa%26shy;ter availability and distribution as a result of climate change. Many Asian nations are already under water stress, and the Asian continent has the lowest per-capita water allocation of any continent save Antarctica.

In northern China, the water use-to-availability ratio was three to four times the level in the south as of the year 2000. In China and its immediate neighbourhood, climate change threatens to exacerbate this already tenuous water situation in several ways.

China%26rsquo;s National Climate Change Program asserts that %26ldquo;Climate change has already caused changes [in] water resources distribution over China,%26rdquo; focussing on an increase in %26ldquo;hydrological extreme events%26rdquo;, such as drought in the north and flooding in the south. This assessment draws largely from Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) data indicating an observed increase in precipitation in north and north-eastern China and a marked increase in the Yangtze River delta region and the south-east.

Researchers stress that, as a result of climate change, precipi%26shy;tation is decreasing in eastern China%26rsquo;s agricultural areas, with drought-related agri%26shy;cultural losses increasing steadily since the mid-twentieth century. Soil degradation as a result of climate change is further expected to increase the possibility of %26ldquo;disastrous drought and floods%26rdquo; in central, south-western and north-eastern China.

A tendency towards more extreme climate events is also predicted for other regions surrounding China. A major study of the Indian Himalayas found that climate change will increase the variation of seasonal flows significantly. In the Mekong basin, south-east Asia%26rsquo;s most important river system, maximum monthly water flows are expected by the IPCC to increase by 35% to 41% by mid-to-late century over twentieth century levels, while the minimum monthly water flows are expected to decline by 17% to 24%. Such increased variation threatens to disrupt normal economic and agricultural activity in vulnerable regions. In the case of the Mekong, this vari%26shy;ability is enhanced by additional risks from sea-level rise and resulting saltwater in%26shy;trusion, which pose a profound threat to agricultural production in the river%26rsquo;s delta region.

Potentially even more serious, however, is a predicted long-term decline in water availability as Himalayan glaciers melt and snow packs are reduced in size. The IPCC estimates that a decrease in Himalayan glacier mass of about 25% is possible by 2050 as global temperatures rise. This is significant as glacial meltwater ac%26shy;counts for some 70% of summer flow in the Ganges River system and 50% to 60% of the flow in other major Asian river systems. One major study pre%26shy;dicted that the flow of Himalayan-melt fed water systems will peak by 2050 to 2070, with mean annual flow declining thereafter by between one-fifth and one-third. The consensus of modelling studies is that a significant portion of north-west China and northern India will be subject to declining water availability by the end of the century as seasonal water shortages arrive abruptly, %26ldquo;going from plenty to want in perhaps a few decades%26rdquo;.

Nonetheless, there is likely to be substantial regional variability in these effects. Some river basins are likely to be particularly affected; the Tarim River for instance, Xinjiang%26rsquo;s most important river system, depends on glacial meltwater for 40% of its mean annual flow. Other areas of north-western China are likely to be severely impacted by changes in water availability. As the IPCC has reported, %26ldquo;The duration of seasonal snow cover in [Chinese] alpine areas %26ndash; namely the Tibet Plateau, Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia %26ndash; is expected to shorten, leading to a decline in volume and resulting in severe spring droughts.%26rdquo; Changes of similar magnitude are predicted for major river systems elsewhere in China and Asia.

Water distribution patterns will become much more variable. Many areas of China are likely to have too much water when they don%26rsquo;t need it %26ndash; namely, flood%26shy;ing during the rainy season %26ndash; and too little when they do, during the dry summer months. Certain areas, such as north and north-western China and the Mekong River system, will be impacted more, and by a greater combination of factors, than others. This con%26shy;clusion has important implications for both China%26rsquo;s national and regional security.

Scott Moore is a graduate student at the University of Oxford%26rsquo;s Environmental Change Institute and previously held a Fulbright Fellowship at the College of Environmental Science and Engineering, Peking University.

An earlier version of this article was published in China Security in 2009 as %26ldquo;Climate Change, Water, and China%26rsquo;s National Interest%26rdquo;, Vol.5, No.3. It is used here with permission.

NEXT: The need for diplomacy

Homepage image from Greenpeace

Old truck tyres never die, they just turn into sandals. For decades, that has been the tradition in Ethiopia, where everyone from farmers to guerrilla fighters has fashioned worn-out road rubber into cheap, long-lasting footwear.

But now, thanks to a young woman entrepreneur who has combined the internet%26rsquo;s selling power with nimble business practices more often associated with Asian countries, the idea has been turned into an unlikely international hit. By adding funky cotton and leather uppers to recycled tyre soles, Bethlehem Tilahun Alemu has sold many thousands of pairs of handmade flip-flops, boat shoes, loafers and Converse-style trainers to foreign customers.

In the run-up to Christmas, workers at the soleRebels %26ldquo;factory%26rdquo; %26ndash; a small house on the outskirts of the Ethiopian capital %26ndash; were frantically cutting, sewing and gluing to fulfil internet purchases from customers as far away as Canada and Australia. Alemu%26rsquo;s brother packed pairs of cotton and suede trainers into a box about to be couriered to Amazon.com, the company%26rsquo;s main customer, which receives the shoes in the United States three to five days after placing its bulk order. %26ldquo;We are sitting in Addis Ababa but acting like an American company,%26rdquo; said Alemu, an excitable 30-year-old former accountant who is fond of reeling off the numbers that illustrate her firm%26rsquo;s rapid growth.

Just five years after start-up, soleRebels employs 45 full-time staff who can produce up to 500 pairs of shoes a day. More will be hired after February once the footwear range, priced between US$35 and US$65, goes on sale online in the United Kingdom and Japan on Amazon%26rsquo;s new footwear website javari.co.uk. The company%26rsquo;s sales target for 2010 is an impressive US$475,000 but Alemu%26rsquo;s ultimate goal %26ndash; one she seems deadly serious about %26ndash; is far loftier: to become %26ldquo;the Timberland or Skechers of Africa%26rdquo;.

The success of soleRebels, which has thrived in the global market with no outside support other than a government line of credit to help meet large orders, is challenging preconceptions both about Ethiopia and the best way to lift its people out of poverty.

Abroad, the landlocked east African country still suffers from an image of a hungry and often helpless nation, with six million people requiring food relief and billions of US dollars of aid each year. But where some might see despair Alemu saw inspiration. While brainstorming for an Ethiopian-flavoured product that could be produced in a sustainable manner, she remembered the truck-tyre sandals, which were used by local fighters who repelled Italian soldiers many decades ago, as well as the rebels who marched into Addis Ababa in 1991 and today run the government. %26ldquo;Recycling is a way of life here %26ndash; you don%26rsquo;t throw things away that you can use again and again,%26rdquo; she said. %26ldquo;I wanted to build on that idea.%26rdquo;

At the time, other Ethiopian shoe companies were struggling to compete with cheap imports from China. SoleRebels decided to concentrate instead on the export market, where Alemu reasoned that customers would pay good money for uniquely designed products. She found a supplier who could deliver old truck tyres and tubes, and hired women to spin, weave and dye pieces of locally grown cotton, jute and hemp, using skills passed down through generations.

Tracking international shoe fashion trends on the web, Alemu designed a range of footwear. Some are simple cotton-covered or leather covered flip-flops and sandals with names like Class Act and Gruuv Thong. The bestselling Urban Runner takes inspiration from the classic Converse All Star %26ldquo;lo-top%26rdquo; trainer, with a piece of inner tubing for the toecap and organic cotton-covered footbeds. Virtually all the materials are locally sourced, including the camouflage material used on some shoes, which is cut from old army uniforms.

After receiving international fair-trade certification, Alemu began bombarding US stores and websites with emails and samples. Shops such as Whole Foods and Urban Outfitters agreed to stock the shoes, which were imported duty-free into the United States under the African Growth and Opportunity Act, helping prices stay competitive. As word spread, individual customers began buying directly from the soleRebels website — a Christmas order from Canada included a scanned trace of the customer%26rsquo;s foot — with the shoes usually arriving by courier from Ethiopia within a week. But business really took off when Amazon signed up as a customer.

Alemu is an evangelist for the online business model, saying it allows the company %26ldquo;to understand the market needs and demands in real time%26rdquo;. SoleRebels negotiates directly with retailers, doing everything from ordering processing to credit collection itself, and ensures most of the final sales price remains in Ethiopia. As a result, Alemu said, she can pay her staff between US$1.90 a day for trainees and US$11 a day for experienced artisans %26ndash; good wages by local standards. In turn, the government earns more taxes, spurring more development.

%26ldquo;In Ethiopia we have become used to taking money from the west, to always getting help,%26rdquo; said Alemu. %26ldquo;That does not make for a sustainable economy. We need to solve our own problems.%26rdquo;

The success has enabled soleRebels to begin construction of a solar-powered factory near the current workshop, to allow for expanded production. While it will better showcase the company%26rsquo;s eco-friendly methods, that%26rsquo;s not the main reason customers like the shoes, Alemu said. %26ldquo;People buy soleRebels because they are good, not just because they are %26lsquo;green%26rsquo; or from Ethiopia. Our product speaks for itself.%26rdquo;

www.guardian.co.uk/

Copyright Guardian News and Media Limited 2010

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A key deadline for countries to submit emission-reduction goals to the United Nations as part of the recently negotiated Copenhagen Accord passed on Sunday, January 31. The United Nations received commitments from 55 nations, but 139 countries remain unsupportive of the political statement, leading the international body to push back the commitment deadline indefinitely.

Since the high level climate-change summit in Copenhagen concluded in December, global climate talks have been in a state of confusion. Two parallel tracks are already under way %26ndash; one that includes the United States and one that omits this significant world emitter. The Copenhagen Accord, some say, threatens to introduce a third procedural track, complicating the already tense deliberations.

The accord, a non-binding political statement introduced in the 11th hour of the Copenhagen summit, has been praised by some for garnering stronger commitments from major developing nations, which could in turn deliver a binding global climate treaty. Yet its formulation has also threatened to destabilise the nearly 20-year-old process developed under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the leading international body for climate-change negotiations.

The United States, Brazil, South Africa, India and China formulated the accord with the understanding that the text would later be adopted by all 194 nations. But many participants considered this outcome to be undemocratic and a departure from a UN process meant to offer equal voice to every nation. Many had hoped that the Copenhagen conference would deliver a legally binding international treaty on climate change or at least provide direction on many of the core components under negotiation. But the accord itself contains little such detail and provides instead for countries to set their own emission-reduction targets unilaterally.

Among other elements, it states that two degrees Celsius is the target above which global temperatures must not rise; it proposes the mobilisation of US$30 billion (205 billion yuan) by 2012 and US$100 billion (683 billion yuan) by 2020 for developing countries to address climate change; and it calls on developed and developing countries to submit their national actions on climate change to the United Nations by January 31, a deadline that has now been postponed %26ldquo;indefinitely%26rdquo;.

According to Sanjay Vashist, director of Climate Action Network South Asia, without larger consensus the accord reflects %26ldquo;an outcome of a flawed negotiating process…negotiated by a small group of countries%26rdquo; rather than the 194-nation body. There are further reservations about the accord%26rsquo;s content itself. While the text addresses several key negotiation issues, many crucial details remain undetermined. %26ldquo;It is far from clear where the funding [for climate change mitigation and adaptation] will come from, if it is genuinely new and additional and how it will be allocated and channelled,%26rdquo; says Saleemul Huq, a senior fellow with the International Institute for Environment and Development%26rsquo;s climate-change group, who co-authored a recent report on climate finance.

Some observers say the accord does not contain the level of ambition with respect to temperature rise that is needed to protect the rights to survival or livelihood of many nations and people. According to recent analysis from sustainable energy consultant Ecofys, the emission-reduction targets agreed so far will commit the world to a 3.5-degree Celsius rise in global temperature, not the agreed two degrees.

Other advocacy groups have taken a different perspective, highlighting the accord’s value in establishing an important basis for a shift in US domestic politics. Firmer commitments from large emerging economies such as China and India may facilitate domestic climate-change legislation in the US Senate %26ndash; an action seen as crucial to obtaining strong commitments from Australia, Canada, and Japan, they say.

%26ldquo;It%26rsquo;s a powerful signal to see president Obama, premier Wen, prime minister Singh, and president Zuma agree on a meeting of the minds,%26rdquo; said senator John Kerry, chair of the US Senate%26rsquo;s foreign relations committee, in a prepared statement. %26ldquo;These are the four horsemen of a climate-change solution. With this in hand, we can work to pass domestic legislation early next year to bring us across the finish line.%26rdquo;

The United States has submitted a pledge to reduce national emissions by 17% below 2005 levels by 2020, and 54 other nations, including Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, India and South Africa, have also provided commitments to the United Nations.

What next? In the wake of contention over the accord, major developing countries have restated their commitment to concluding a successful global treaty at meetings to be held in Mexico in December 2010. In a joint statement in Delhi, India, in late January, environment ministers from the so-called BASIC countries %26ndash; Brazil, South Africa, India, and China %26ndash; reiterated their support for the Copenhagen Accord and their %26ldquo;commitment to working together with all other countries to ensure an agreed outcome…later this year%26rdquo;. The ministers called on Danish prime minister Lars L%26oslash;kke Rasmussen, who hosted the Copenhagen summit, to convene meetings of the two negotiating groups by March 2010 and ensure that they meet %26ldquo;at least five times%26rdquo; prior to the Mexico gathering, the 16th Conference of the Parties (COP-16) under the UNFCCC.

Rajendra Pachauri, chair of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, remains optimistic that nations will announce deeper commitments in the months ahead. %26ldquo;I think [the accord%26rsquo;s] adequacy…will depend greatly on what actions the world is willing to take now, and I hope they will take urgent and adequate action in the future,%26rdquo; he said last month in an interview with Science magazine.

The four BASIC countries coordinated their positions closely in Copenhagen, exerting pressure on industrialised nations to commit to ambitious goals for emission reductions as well as to provide technical and financial support to developing nations. But some observers argue that these large developing countries betrayed the interests of their smaller allies in the Group of 77 (G77), a broader grouping of developing nations. There was concern that, by breaking off into a separate bloc, the BASIC nations put at risk many of the fundamental negotiating tenets that the G77 had embraced.

Jairam Ramesh, India%26rsquo;s minister for environment and forests, sought to address this concern at a press conference following a meeting of BASIC leaders on January 24 in New Delhi. %26ldquo;BASIC is embedded in the G77, so there is no fissure,%26rdquo; he said. %26ldquo;Since these four are the big countries, they need to have some coordinated actions towards helping the poor and vulnerable countries within the G77, as well as taking [their] own actions.%26rdquo; Ramesh further emphasised that after each BASIC meeting %26ndash; gatherings that are now scheduled to take place quarterly %26ndash; the group%26rsquo;s decisions will be communicated to the G77 for consideration prior to any wider UN meetings.

Some critics have raised questions about the ability of the United Nations to manage the global negotiations fairly and effectively. %26ldquo;This is a declaration that small and poor countries don%26rsquo;t matter, that international civil society doesn%26rsquo;t matter and that serious limits on carbon don%26rsquo;t matter,%26rdquo; Bill McKibben, a US environmentalist and founder of the climate action group 350.org, said in December. %26ldquo;The president has wrecked the United Nations and he%26rsquo;s wrecked the possibility of a tough plan to control global warming.%26rdquo;

Others suggest that the UN-sponsored climate talks have become unwieldy and should be addressed within a smaller forum of the major emitters, such as the G8+5 %26ndash; a group including the G8 nations plus the BASIC countries and Mexico %26ndash; or the G20. Notably, the 55 nations that are reported to have submitted targets or actions under the accord to date represent 78% of global greenhouse-gas emissions. %26ldquo;We…need to have major reform of the UN body overseeing the negotiations and of the way the negotiations are conducted,%26rdquo; wrote UK climate secretary Ed Miliband in a late-December commentary in UK newspaper, the Guardian. In a more recent interview in the same publication, US climate negotiator Jonathan Pershing observed, %26ldquo;It is…impossible to imagine a negotiation of enormous complexity where you have a table of 192 countries involved in all the detail.%26rdquo;

In their joint declaration, the BASIC environment ministers were quick to stress their wish for the accord%26rsquo;s content to feed into the current framework of climate negotiations and not to adopt a new framework based on the agreement. India%26rsquo;s Ramesh said: %26ldquo;All of us are unanimously of the view that the value of the accord lies not as a stand-alone document but as part of the two-track negotiating process.%26rdquo;

Anna da Costa is a Worldwatch Institute fellow based in New Delhi.

An earlier version of this article was published by the Worldwatch Institute as %26ldquo;As Climate Talks Stumble, UN Process in Question%26rdquo;.

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